# Disaster management, risk reduction and non-governmental organizations

A case study of the typhoon Haiyan natural disaster in the Philippines 2013

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Thesis for a Master's degree in Natural Resources Management

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MASTER'S THESIS

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Title: Disaster management, risk reduction and non-governmental organizations - a case study of the typhoon Haiyan natural disaster in the Philippines 2013

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Summary

The thesis consists of a study of natural hazards and disasters as well as disaster management and disaster risk reduction. The thesis focuses on the non-governmental sector and examines disaster management in a case study from a non-governmental organization's perspective.

The number of people affected by natural disasters have risen since 1950 and the disasters are getting more costly for the society. In the same time poor countries are disproportionately affected by natural disasters. The IPCC states there are a likely link between climate change and natural disasters. However, the overall number of deaths in natural disasters is not rising, due to disaster management development during the last decades.

The thesis study was conducted in cooperation within the network of the Finnish NGO Frikyrklig samverkan and Finlands Svenska Pingstmission. The study aims at answering questions such as "how does natural disaster affect societies in general", "what is the possible role of a NGO in international disaster management", "how can an international humanitarian relief operation benefit from NGOs" and "what is important in coordination and cooperation". The methods used in the study was a case study of the typhoon Haiyan disaster management in the Philippines 2013, an interview and personal communication combined with a survey sent to 1502 people working in the Haiyan relief operation. 89 responded to the survey.

The results shows that the immediate consequences on a society can be very dramatic. The role of NGOs is very important in international disaster management, since they are key players in distributing help to people in need. Coordination in the disaster zone was considered necessary, but the results also shows that there were problems and challenges in for example in information sharing. The survey results also shows that NGOs can have experienced people in the field and their local networks can provide valuable information for the international relief operation.

The large majority (over 75 %) of the survey respondents were happy or somewhat happy with the results of their own organizations relief operation, scoring the operation by a grade of 4 or 5 on a scale of 1-5, 5 being the highest score.

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Language: English

Key words: NGO, natural disaster, international disaster management

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EXAMENSARBETE

Författare: Niklas Andersson

Utbildningsprogram och ort: Natural Resource Management, Raseborg

Handledare: Patrik Byholm

Titel: Disaster management, risk reduction and non-governmental organizations - a case study of the typhoon Haiyan natural disaster in the Philippines 2013

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Abstrakt

Mastersexamensarbetet innehåller en studie i naturfenomen och naturkatastrofer följt av katastrofhantering och riskminimering. Examensarbetet fokuserar på tredje sektorn och studerar katastrofhantering i en fallstudie ur perspektivet av en organisation från tredje sektorn.

Antalet människor som påverkas av naturkatastrofer har ökat sedan 1950 och blir alltmer kostsamma för samhällena. Samtidigt är fattiga länderna oproportionerligt stort drabbade av naturkatastroferna. IPCC menar att det finns en länk mellan klimatförändring och naturkatastrofer. Trots ökningen har ändå antalet dödsoffer inte stigit i samma takt, tack vare utvecklingen av internationell katastrofhantering de senaste decennierna.

Studien gjordes i samarbete med nätverken i de Finländska föreningarna Frikyrklig samverkan och Finlands Svenska Pingstmission. Studien strävar till att söka svar på frågor så som "hur påverkas samhällen generellt av naturkatastrofer", "vilken roll kan tredje sektorn ha i internationell katastrofhantering", "hur kan tredje sektorn gynna en internationell humanitär biståndsoperation" och "vad är viktigt med tanke på samarbete och koordinering". Metoderna som användes var dels en fallstudie av katastrofarbetet som gjordes efter tyfonen Haiyan i Filippinerna 2013, dels en intervju och personlig kommunikation samt en enkätundersökning som sändes ut till 1502 respondenter som jobbat i katastrofområdet. 89 svar kom in på enkäten.

Resultaten visar att ett samhälle kan påverkas på ett dramatiskt sätt av en naturkatastrof. Tredje sektorn kan ha en mycket viktig roll i internationell katastrofhantering i och med att sektorn är i nyckelposition för att få ut hjälpen till de behövande. Man ansåg att koordinering i katastrofområdet var viktigt, men resultaten visar också på att det fanns utmaningar och problem i t.ex. att dela information. Enkätresultaten visar också på att tredje sektorn kan ha erfaren personal på fältet och att sektorns lokala nätverk kan förse den internationella operationen med värdefull information.

De flesta av enkätens respondenter (över 75 %) ansåg att resultaten från deras egen organisations katastrofresponsoperation var lyckad, poängsatt 4 eller 5 på en skala på 1-5, där 5 var högsta poäng.

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Språk: Engelska
Nyckelord: medborgarorganisationer, naturkatastrofer, katastrofhantering

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1 Acronyms

ADRC	Asian Disaster Reduction Center
ASEAN	the Association of South East Asian Nations
CRED	Centre for Research on Epidemiology and Disasters
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EM-DAT	Emergency Database, disaster record
FHDFI	Family Help Development Foundation, Inc, Philippine NGO foundation
FHP	Family Help Project, Swedish NGO
FS	Frikyrklig samverkan, NGO
FS Global	The ODA-project organization in FS
FSPM	Finlands Svenska Pingst Mission, NGO
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOV INT	International government, used in the survey presentation
Haiyan	International name of case study typhoon name, named Yolanda in the Philippines
IHP	International Humanitarian Partnership
INGO	International NGO
IPCC	The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JTWC	Joint Typhoon Warning Center
LGU	Local Government Unit
MO	Member Organization (within FS)
MRDP	Multi-Rural Development Project, ODA project
NDRRMC	The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, Philippines
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NGO PH	Philippine NGO, used in the survey result presentation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAGASA DOST	Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Service Administration, Department of Science and Technology
PAR	Philippine Area of Responsibility
PH GOV	Philippine Government, used in the survey presentation

Seconded staff	Working on a salary base
SMHI	Svenska Meteorologiska och Hydrologiska Institutet
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change
UNISDR	The Secretariate of The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
Volunteer	Not working on salary base
Yolanda	Philippine name of case study typhoon, international name Haiyan

2 Preface

People suffer from natural disasters following severe natural hazards every year. Since the 1950's, there has been an increasing number of natural disasters registered, related to weather phenomena. The discussion whether this is mother earth's reaction to climate change goes on. At the same time as the climate change debate goes on in the political sphere, millions of people fall as victims to these disasters every year. The increase is registered over the years in the EM-DAT database (Fig. 4).

Many NGOs are involved in development aid projects in disaster prone areas. The research partner NGO FS has development projects in 15 countries, of which many work in higher risk area (Fig. 5). This makes the question of understanding and planning for disaster management and risk reduction important, even if the NGOs primary activities are not focused on disaster management, but on development projects.

There is a lot of material available on the topic of disaster management and risk reduction, a lot of evaluation reports, news, reviews and training material for NGOs, but not that much actual easy available research on especially NGOs and their activities in disaster management. The idea to this thesis came during the participation of the post-Haiyan disaster NGO crisis management in 2013 that I was a part of in the partner NGO for this research. The partner NGO was taken by surprise by the disaster and had to handle the situation the best it could. During the operation the idea of analysing the events, decisions and process to be able to learn and build back better was the inspiration for this thesis.

The thesis consists of an introduction in disaster management and risk reduction, including some references to previous research of natural hazards and disaster, disaster management, prevention and disaster risk reduction, followed by a case study in what was done during the aftermath of Haiyan and what lessons there was to be learned. The case study was followed by a survey sent to people working within the disaster relief and humanitarian response to the Haiyan typhoon. Last, there is an implementation study on how the lessons learned could be implemented in the partner NGO.

The research was conducted in cooperation with the NGOs Frikyrklig Samverkan (FS) and Finlands Svenska Pingst Mission (FSPM).

3   Introduction

Disaster management is understood as the body of policy and administrative decisions and operational activities that takes place within a response to a disaster (UNDP, 1992). With disaster risk reduction (DRR) one aim to reduce the damage caused by natural hazards like earthquakes, floods, droughts and cyclones, through an ethic of prevention and attentional choices made (UNISDR definition, webpage). This thesis focuses on natural disasters caused by natural hazards. In addition to natural hazards, disasters can also can be caused by human activities such as for example pollution, war or terrorism.

Throughout the human history natural hazards has caused disasters for people and there are also evidence of measures taken to prevent disaster in different ways. One example of a well-known disaster is the Vesuvius volcano eruption in 79 AD and the destruction of the city of Pompeii (UNESCO, 2015). In the case of Vesuvius, there are reasons to believe that most of the people of Pompeii survived due to an organized evacuation (Luongo & others, 2003). The story about Noah and his family in the Bible's book of Genesis tells about not only a natural disaster of forty days of rain that drowned a whole society, but also about disaster preparedness. In the story Noah is prepared for the coming disaster when building the Ark and survives the flood with his family (Genesis 7-8, The Bible, 1996).

In the human history there are examples on how societies tried to prevent severe disasters by for example building shelter for rain and floods. The first known fire department was established in the ancient Rome. However, more efforts on the international disaster response capacity was made as late as in the mid twentieth century when the governments took a new role in disaster response and prevention. In the 1970-1980 the countries build up more national capacity to emergency response and in 1987 the UN declared the 1990s to be the "International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction". The modern concept of international disaster management was built in the nineties. (Coppola, 2015)

Today, disaster management is also a discipline of research and education. There are master programmes in disaster management in universities in for example University of Copenhagen, Charles Darwin University in Australia and many more. There are also research institutions that focuses on disaster management such as the Disaster Research Centre (https://drc.udel.edu/) within the University of Delaware. In the international NGO context there are also a lot of educational material and courses available in the field of disaster management. One examples of this is the Red Cross Online Certificate Course on

Disaster Management. Another example could be found in the training for NGO's that UNDP has developed in India as a concept of training modules in a "training module for non-governmental organizations on Disaster Risk Management" as a part of government and UNDPs Disaster Risk Management Programme 2002-2007. UNDP has built up training programmes in disaster management and resources for training can be found online. One example of a training resource is the UNDP publication "an overview of disaster management" (1992) which presents the same basic phases of a disaster that is also shown in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1 The disaster risk management cycle (UNESCO, 2013)

Disaster management and disaster risk reduction as it is defined today are combined to each other in the disaster risk management cycle in Fig. 1. Disaster management is decision making and policy, administrative decisions and operational activities that takes place both in advance to reduce the impact of an event, during and after the event. The disaster follows by response and recovery. By learning from the experience it is then possible to take action for better prevention and preparation before the next event occurs.

3.1 Natural hazards and disasters

A natural hazard is biological, geological, hydrological, meteorological, or seismic conditions that may cause a disaster (Business dictionary, 2016). If a society is well prepared, a certain hazardous event may not cause a disaster, while the same event occuring in a society with low resilience and preparedness may lead to a disaster causing loss of human lives.

> A disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community's or society's ability to cope using its own resources. Though often caused by nature, disasters can have human origins.
> *International Red Cross*
> https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster/

Natural hazards that may cause disasters can be classified in geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and volcanic activity), hydrological (avalanches and floods), climatological (extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires), meteorological (cyclones and storms/wave surges) or biological (disease epidemics and insect/animal plagues) (International Red Cross, 2015).

Other hazards such as war, terrorism etc. are caused by human activities. This study focuses on natural hazards and will not include disasters caused by human activities.

Over all, there are on average some 300 registered natural disasters every year. Over the years the registered natural disasters have varied, but it is worth to notice, that 1) natural disasters happen frequently every year causing deaths and economic loss and 2) natural disasters can occur all over the globe even though there is variation in risk (Fig. 5)

Victims : Sum of deaths and total affected

Fig. 2 Registered disasters and number of victims 1990-2013 (Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters CRED, 2013).

When looking in to the year of 2013 in the Annual Disaster Statistical Review by CRED (the year that the typhoon Haiyan occurred) there were 330 registered natural disasters in the EM-DAT (Emergency Disaster Database, managed by CRED since 1988). This is a little lower number than the years before, but three times the numbers from the seventies (Fig. 4). These 330 disasters were registered from 108 countries. The number of the EM-DAT registered natural disasters in 2013 were:

- 159 Hydrological disasters (floods and wet mass movements)
- 106 Meteorological disasters (storms)
- 33 Climatological disasters (extreme temperatures, droughts and wildfires)
- 32 Geophysical disasters (earthquakes/tsunamis, volcanoes and dry mass movements)

At a total these natural disasters caused the death to more than 21 610 people and made over 91 million people victims. The economical loss due to natural disasters was estimated to over 118,6 billion USD. As presented in Fig. 3 the disasters followed by a hydrological hazard are the most common, but the economic loss is almost as large in the other groups.

Fig. 3 Natural disaster impacts by disaster sub-group: 2013 versus 2003-2012 annual average. (CRED, 2013).

In the year of 2013, the typhoon Haiyan that this thesis focuses on, was the worst natural disaster in the world by numbers of deaths (Table 1.) and the numbers of victims (Table 2.). Haiyan was the second worst natural disaster in the world in 2013 by economic loss (Table 3.). In Table 1-3 disasters in the Philippines are mentioned six times on the worst ten list of the disasters on the globe 2013. This single country was hit several times by large disasters that year.

Table 1. The 10 worst natural disasters by number of deaths 2013 (CRED, 2013).

Event	Country	No. of deaths
Tropical cyclone (Haiyan), November	Philippines	7354
Flood, June	India	6054
Heat wave, July	United Kingdom	760
Heat wave, April-June	India	557
Earthquake, September	Pakistan	399
Heat wave, May-September	Japan	338
Flood, August	Pakistan	234
Flood, July	China P Rep	233
Earthquake, October	Philippines	230
Flood, September-October	Cambodia	200
	Total	16359

Table 2. The 10 worst natural disasters by number of victims 2013 (CRED, 2013).

Event	Country	Victims (in millions)
Tropical cyclone (Haiyan), November	Philippines	16.1
Tropical cyclone (Phailin), October	India	13.2
Tropical cyclone (Utor/Labuyo), August	China P Rep	8.0
Drought, January-July	China P Rep	5.0
Flood, July	China P Rep	3.5
Flood, September-October	Thailand	3.5
Earthquake	Philippines	3.2
Flood, July	Philippines	3.1
Drought, December	Zimbabwe	2.2
Earthquake, April	China P Rep	2.2
	Total	60.01

Table 3. The 10 worst natural disasters by economic damages 2013 (CRED, 2013).

Event	Country	Damages (in 2013 US$ bn.)
Flood, May-June	Germany	12.9
Tropical cyclone (Haiyan), November	Philippines	10.0
Earthquakes, April	China P Rep	6.8
Tropical cyclone (Fitow), October	China P Rep	6.7
Flood, June	Canada	5.7
Flood, August-September	China P Rep	5.0
Storm, July	Germany	4.8
Flood, July	China P Rep	4.6
Hurricane (Manuel), September	Mexico	4.2
Storm May	United States	3.1
	Total	63.8

3.2   Climate change and trends in natural hazards and disasters

There has been a lot of debate of the climate change over the past twenty years since the first convention on the on climate change, the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change) was signed in 1992. Leading politicians in the world have doubted both climate change and global warming and the link between climate change and human activity. Others have spoken for understanding the role of human activities in climate change. One well-known speaker and politician being a climate change activist is the former US vice president Al Gore.

Prior to this discussion, in 1988, the IPCC (The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) was founded and endorsed by the UN General Assembly to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. (IPCC, 2015) The IPCC does not do its own research, but evaluates other research and provides reports and background material for decision makers based on scientific evidence. IPCC writes Assessments Reports (the Fifth Assessment Report was finalized in November 2014) and also produces Special Reports, Methodology Reports, Technical Papers and Supporting Material.

While studying natural disasters, it is interesting to study the link between climate change and natural hazards leading to natural disasters. Merkouris (2014) discusses climate change and natural disasters from a responsibility and legal perspective. He argues that the link between climate change and natural disasters is not studied enough and that the IPCC reports uses terms such as "likely" or "very likely" when discussing correlation between climate change and natural disasters. The fact that there is not undoubtable evidence of the link, is problematic when discussing international responsibility in terms of international legally binding documents. However, there are many strong arguments that there is a link between climate change and natural disasters, and the IPCC addresses this in its documents.

When looking into the EM-DAT database, where information about emergencies and natural disasters are stored over the years, the following picture is drawn:

Fig. 4 Numbers and Types of Natural Disasters, 1950–2012 (Leaning & Guha-Sapir, 2013).

Fig. 4 shows a clear increase in hydro-meteorological based disasters. One can always discuss the reliability of the registered data and ask the question if the climate-related disasters were properly registered all over the world back in the fifties. However, when looking just at the geophysical-related disasters registered, there is a straight line: they have stayed almost the same since the seventies. This suggests that there in fact is a clear increase of climate-related disasters since at least the late 1970-ies.

The IPCC papers draws a picture of the climate change making a huge impact on the globe's people. The IPCC fifth Assessment Reports summary for policymakers states that changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the globe (IPCC, 2014). The fifth Assessment report acknowledges natural hazards as a likely result of climate change and the impact of climate change on extreme weather. Extreme weather conditions can result in natural hazards leading to natural disasters.

Coppola (2015) identifies five trends in his book "An introduction to international disaster management" when discussing trends in natural disasters. Coppola's five identified trends are: 1) the fact that the number of people affected by disasters is rising 2) disasters are becoming less deadly 3) disasters are becoming more costly 4) poor countries are disproportionately affected by disaster consequences and 5) the number of disasters is increasing each year.

The number of people affected is also acknowledged by the fact that the number of disasters is increasing (Fig. 4). Statistics from the EM-DAT of the numbers of deaths

shows that the numbers of deaths have decreased. One reason to this is considered to be the activities for better preparedness and better post-disaster health care than before (Coppola, 2015). The trend of rising economic loss is also visible in Fig. 4. The trend of poor countries being hit harder also correlates with the risk index map in Fig. 5.

3.3   Participants in international disaster management

Within international disaster management different kind of participants can be found. A specific country's own government organizations form a local framework for disaster management and can consist of for example emergency services, police and military organizations. Multilateral organizations are formed by sovereign states, the largest and most significant multilateral organization is the UN, but there are several others also such as the EU, ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) or NATO. NGO's, the private sector and academia can also be a part of international disaster management. (Coppola, 2015)

The UN is the most important multilateral organization when it comes to international disaster management. This is due to the fact that the organization has built up not only a large base of knowledge, network and funding, but also because of the strong relationship with most countries and especially the developing countries. In the developing countries the assistance in disaster management is most needed. (Coppola, 2015).

The United Nation is present in almost every developing country and this makes the possibility for the UN to act among the first when disaster strikes. The UN has a special organization to lead the efforts in a disaster relief operation, The UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). There are many other UN organizations involved in the disaster management that OCHA coordinates, such as UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP). (Coppola, 2015)

3.4   The NGOs in disaster management

The term NGO (short for Non-Governmental Organization) came in to use after the founding of the United Nations in 1945. There was a need to separate international governmental agencies from private organizations in terms of participation rights (Willets, 2001). Since then the UN has cooperated with NGOs. Today, NGOs play a role in a broad

range of sectors within the UN and there are various ways that NGOs and UN cooperate, disaster management being one field of cooperation (UN, 2009).

NGOs are seen as important players in the international community and are recognized by the UN as such. They contribute valuable information and ideas, advocate effectively for positive change, provide essential operational capacity in emergencies and development efforts, and generally increase the accountability and legitimacy of the global governance process (Global policy forum, 1999).

NGOs are also important to the development aid contribution for governments and intergovernmental organizations. The Official Development Assistance or ODA goals are included in the UN Millenium Declaration (UN, 2000). The goal was to give 0,7 % of the nations GDP to the ODA by 2015. In the year of 2013 only four states had reached the goal: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Luxemburg. Finland was reaching 0,55 % by the year 2013 (UNDP, 2013). Since then the Finnish government has made budget cuts in the development aid funding.

In Finland some 100 million euros was given to development aid through NGOs in 2012 (Finnish Foreign Ministry, 2014). The amount is approximately 10 % of the budget as a whole for developmental aid. The examples studied in this thesis case studies are funded within the Finnish NGO FS (Frikyrklig Samverkan) and the development aid projects are partly funded with government development aid, partly with private funding coming from private donors.

The NGO sector as a whole carry out a complete range of disaster related work (Yoder-Bontrager, 2014). Many NGOs work in developing countries and the NGOs can be already on site when disaster occurs. This makes the NGO sector a valuable player in international disaster management operation. (Coppola, 2015) Overall the NGO contribution to aid in crisis situation all over the world is significant. Some literature suggests that the NGO sector provides more than 90 % of the aid coordinated by the UN (Frandsen, 2002).

There are no organization model for a NGO and their structure varies over the globe. The NGOs can be everything from a local community association to a international network organization. There can also be international umbrella NGOs with branches and local organizations all over the globe. Some NGOs can also be lobbying organizations at for example UN conferences. (Willets, 2001)

In the Nordic countries we often refer to the NGO sector as the "third sector" meaning these associations and organizations being separate from the public and private sector.

Examples of well-known NGOs are the Red Cross, Oxfam and Wikimedia. Even though NGOs are non-governmental by definition, they can still be partly or mostly funded by the public sector. The Red Cross for example, receives large donations from governments for its work in disaster zones.

> "A non-governmental organization (NGO, also often referred to as "civil society organization" or CSO) is a not-for-profit group, principally independent from government, which is organized on a local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public good. Task-oriented and made up of people with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring public concerns to governments, monitor policy and programme implementation, and encourage participation of civil society stakeholders at the community level. Some are organized around specific issues, such as human rights."
>
> *NGO definition on UN homepages,*
> *http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=23*

There are a number of NGOs that are working with questions regarding natural resources management, farming, nature conservation, ecosystem services etc. The research partner NGO that are included in the case study work with natural resources management in several projects. For example, the project in the Philippines "Multi rural development project" is based on a model farm that is producing organic crops and farming products, and is teaching methods of organic farming within seminars witch are arranged in the project (FSPM, 2015).

Internationally NGOs are important for the natural resources management sector. NGOs can play an important role in improving sustainability in natural resource management (Ramanathan, 1992).

The NGOs that are focusing on environment or other natural resource management related projects will be faced with the impacts of climate change. In the thesis case study, that has meant facing natural disasters and the challenges they bring. This in turn has brought up the need to discuss both plan for crisis management and a need to implement a new cross-cutting policy within the organizations projects. Adapting a new policy in the partner NGO means both to consider the climate changes impact on every project plan in the terms of

impact and risk evaluation and on the other hand, the projects possibilities to help climate change mitigation.

Within disaster management the role of NGOs can vary from everything from health education to housing and NGOs are engaged in the whole spectre of disaster management. The NGOs also vary in size, methods and objectives. In disaster management they however share the same interest than the other participants: they want to reduce excess mortality, reduce or minimize excess disease, disability and unstable health conditions generally, provide infrastructure rehabilitation (including health-care facilities, water and sanitation, systems, roads, telecommunication systems, and so on), ensure and protect return passage for displaced populations. Some deliver only short term disaster relief, others are in it on the long term. (Frandsen, 2002)

Three common reasons for NGOs to work in the disaster zone can be found. First, The NGO can have an advantage in responding to a specific emergency, as it has current operations in the area that precede the emergency, it can have specific capacity nearby that could be utilized in the emergency, or it has a specific expertise or strength in the affected region or emergency type. The NGO can have a specific interest in the area, if it was for example formed to serve a specific population or region, and any emergency within that population or region would naturally receive a response from the NGO. The NGO can also be targeting specific type of victim, and responds to an emergency that creates these kind of victims. (Frandsen, 2002)

Even though NGOs are all different, they have certain characteristics in common. Coppola (2015) sums their common characteristics in four points: 1) NGOs value their independence and neutrality 2) a decentralized organizational structure 3) NGOs are highly operational and practice-oriented and 4) NGOs are committed.

3.5   Cooperation and coordination in international disaster management

When a disaster event occurs, the scope of structure that manages resources and stakeholders (government, private sector, non-government) extends beyond what is considered to be normal routines. This leads to a situation where there is a potential of confusion and loss of control. As there are many participants and stakeholders in the response to disaster situation and a large number of agencies can be found working in the affected areas, there is a need for coordination. (Coppola, 2015)

Coppola (2015) divides disaster management in a disaster situation into establishment of command, control and coordination. Command and control systems are important for authorities, as coordination is important for NGOs. As a large number of participants and agencies quickly descends to a disaster area, need for coordination of efforts are both vital and immediate. In a larger disaster it is common that hundreds of NGOs arrive to the disaster zone, all with specific skills, and this is a challenge for a disaster manager. Coppola (2015) compare the situation for a disaster manager to "hearding cats", a term that is also found in other literature in the subject (Yoder-Bontrager, 2014).

Coordination within a country is guided by its legal system. In a large scale disaster coordination can be managed by UN and by the OCHA cluster system. The cluster system was established in 2005 and the idea is to gather every stakeholder working in the disaster zone, including NGOs, by thematic interest, so that coordination of efforts can be done within each cluster. The OCHA system contains of eleven clusters: protection, camp coordination and management, water sanitation and hygiene, health, emergency shelter, nutrition, emergency telecommunications, logistics, early recovery, education, agriculture. Coordination systems generally focuses on consensus-building and problem solving. Coordination also allows for example information collection and situation assessment or prioritizing. (Coppola, 2015)

NGO coordination is a complicated affair, but there are observations that resistance to coordinate have declined in recent years (Yoder-Bontrager, 2014). Coordination between NGOs is challenging for a number of reasons, not only because of the very nature of NGOs as being independent agencies that work both in the whole spectre of disaster management, but due to the fact that NGOs varies in size, resource and networking abilities. Yoder-Bontrager (2014) has gathered seven barriers for NGO cooperation: 1) they are beholden to the wishes of their donors 2) coordination requires resources (that donors often wants to go directly to aiding disaster victims) 3) there is no consensus of who and what should constitute the coordinating body 4) NGOs may come and go quickly in a disaster zone 5) official agencies and NGOs have different vision of what coordination means 6) NGOs may feel that governments and intergovernmental organizations attempts to control them, compromising their neutrality and 7) NGOs also compete with each other for funding and places to work.

Yoder-Bontrager (2014) suggests in the discussion of his research of NGO coordination, that these barriers for coordination exists, but can be overcome and may not be as high as

expected in literature. In his interviews with NGOs working in Honduras, cooperation between the NGOs was unsystematic but existed with information flows among them through multiple communication channels. The study of NGOs working in Honduras found a "small NGO world" where everyone claimed to know everyone else and found examples of the cooperation system building on personal relationships.

Frandsen (2002) writes that NGOs spend a lot of time and efforts on cooperation and coordination. Coppola (2015) notes that a previous trend of NGOs resisting widespread coordination has changed over the last two decades. Today many NGOs are required to participate in coordination by their funding governments or international organizations to increase their capacity (Coppola 2015, Frandsen, 2002). Frandsen (2002) lists six reasons for NGOs to cooperate and coordinate with each other: 1) increase logistical and service capacity 2) share and obtain new information pertinent to a humanitarian operation 3) increase the weight of NGO community suggestions and appeals 4) reduce operational costs 5) increase security and 6) enhance efficiency and transparency.

NGOs coordinate with UN as stated above. Coordination activities include sharing information. Information sharing between NGOs and the national government and the UN agencies is valuable, and every participant depend on information. NGOs have specific on-the-ground data, can detect community instability, health dangers or outbreaks and know the lay of the land while the government and UN agencies have access to more strategic information. If everyone can meet in a coordinating point, all entities will achieve more information than they contributed with. (Frandsen, 2002)

3.6   Recovery

Recovery after a disaster refers to activities when countries, people, families repair and regain what has been lost. Recovery is included as an activity in disaster management and by far the most costly. Ideally, the rebuilding process reverse the impact of the disaster and building back is done better, so that the disaster risk is smaller in the future. Recovery consists of activities such as building homes, infrastructure, strengthening economic drivers like employment and businesses, resumption of social services, health care and rehabilitation of injured. (Coppola, 2015)

In a disaster situation, the society is deeply disrupted due to impacts in the complex social system. Disaster also affects a far broader geographical area than only the direct affected areas for example in business chains and subcontractors to business. Examples of

consequences that lowers quality of life due to a disaster can be reduced ability to move around and travel, interrupted education, loss of cultural heritage, economic losses, communication difficulties, homelessness, hunger and starvation, unemployment, loss of community tax base, damage and pollution to the environment. The primary goal of recovery is to reverse this kind of consequences. (Coppola, 2015)

3.7   Natural disaster risk and risk assessment

The question of where natural disasters is to be expected can be answered in many ways. One way of calculating the risk and illustrate the distribution of risk in the world is like the Maplecroft (2010) company has done, by creating a risk index (Fig. 5). The Maplecroft risk index is counted by measuring the human impact of natural disasters in terms of deaths per year and per million of population, and add the frequency of events over the last 30 years. Maplecroft is a company that works with global risk analytics, research and strategic forecasting. There are many other ways on looking at the global distribution of natural disasters, and when looking at natural hazards it can be noticed that even the Nordic countries have experienced for example strong storms that have had a strong economic impact. One example of a severe storm in the Nordic countries is the storm Gudrun that killed 7 people in southern Sweden in 2005 (Sveriges meteorologiska och hydrologiska institute SMHI, 2011). Still the risk index is low in the Nordic countries compared to the rest of the world.

Fig. 5 Natural disasters risk index calculated by measuring the human impact of natural disasters, in terms of deaths per annum and per million of population, plus the frequency of events over the last 30 years (Maplecroft, 2010).

One other way of looking at natural disasters is also what kind of economic damage is followed by them as presented in Fig. 6. By looking at the different kind of registered events on a global map it is possible to get an overview of what kind of disasters happened and where. There is a broad distribution of natural disasters causing economic loss over the globe.

NatCatSERVICE
Loss events worldwide 2013
Geographical overview

Munich RE

Flash floods
Canada, 8–9 July

Winter Storm Christian (St. Jude)
Europe, 27–30 October

Floods
Europe,
30 May–19 June

Meteorite impact
Russian Federation,
15 February

Floods
Canada, 19–24 June

Earthquake
China, 20 April

Hailstorms
Germany,
27–28 July

Floods
USA, 9–16 September

Severe storms,
tornadoes
USA, 18–22 May

Typhoon Fitow
China, Japan,
5–9 October

Severe storms, tornadoes
USA, 28–31 May

Typhoon Haiyan
Philippines,
8–12 November

Hurricanes Ingrid &
Manuel
Mexico, 12–19 September

Floods
India, 14–30 June

Floods
Australia,
21–31 January

880
Loss events

Earthquake (series)
Pakistan, 24–28 September

Heat wave
India, April–June

Source: Munich Re, NatCatSERVICE, 2014

● Geophysical events
(Earthquake, tsunami,
volcanic eruption)

● Meteorological events
(Tropical storm,
extratropical storm,
convective storm,
local storm)

● Hydrological events
(Flood, mass movement)

● Climatological events
(Extreme temperature,
drought, wildfire)

● Extraterrestrial events
(Meteorite impact)

○ Loss events

○ Selection of
catastrophes

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
Fig. 6 Distribution of different kind of natural disasters over the globe in 2014, events registered followed by economic loss. (UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides, 2013)

I the light of the statistics presented earlier, natural disasters have a huge impact on people's lives in the world. This challenges the world to respond to this problem, and the world's society has done so, not only by responding to the actual crisis, but to plan for resilience and risk reduction as shown in the cycle of disaster risk management in Fig. 1. In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted an International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 2015). At the same time a special UN office was established to work with Disaster Risk Reduction: the UNISDR (short for The secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction). On a global scale, the strategy is to reduce the number of natural hazards turning into disasters.

UNISDR goals:

- Increase public awareness of the risks that natural, technological and environmental hazards pose to modern societies.

- Obtain commitment by public authorities to reduce risks to people, their livelihoods, social and economic infrastructure, and environmental resources.

- Engage public participation at all levels of implementation to create disaster-resistant communities through increased partnership and expanded risk reduction networks at all levels.

- Reduce the economic and social losses of disasters as measured, for example, by Gross Domestic Product

http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/international-strategy-for-disaster-reduction

The UNISDR then works through coordinating, campaigning, advocate and informing towards these goals.

There are several factors that contributes to the risk of a hazard turning into a disaster. Risk can be seen as the product of two components multiplied: Risk = Likelihood x Consequence (Coppola, 2015). Likelihood of an event occurring can be estimated in different ways, as seen in Fig. 7. When assessing possible consequences and how severe they could be, one could at least consider factors such as deaths, injuries, economic loss but also factors like damage to business, loss of farm land, cost of relocating, social disruption or environmental damage (Coppola, 2015).

To assess risk there are various methods that can be used and there are hundreds of different risk models developed. It is also possible to compute the monetary risk due to loss of structures and replacement values when taking the likelihood of a possible hazard into account. When assessing risk of a certain hazard, historical data can be taken into account (quantitative analysis) or modelling could be used. It is still difficult to determinate the likelihood of a hazardous event. For example UN, governments and research facilities maintain data on the likelihood on infrequent events. (Coppola, 2015)

Coppola (2015) states that the depth of risk assessment is dependent on resources and time available and summarizes effective qualitative risk analysis in four steps: 1) calculating the

likelihood of each identified hazard 2) calculating the consequences that are expected for each hazard in terms of human impacts and economic or financial impacts 3) develop a locally tailored system for measuring likelihood and consequences of each hazard 4) translate all quantitative data into qualitative data into measures for each hazard's likelihood and consequence.

The website PreventionWeb (www.preventionweb.net) is one resource when thinking of what hazards could be expected locally in different parts of the world. The PreventionWeb website is managed by UNISDR and contains information on for example disaster risk reduction, hazards and country specific analysis and data. There is a database for a county specific risk profile and information and a GIS-system where you can view layers of for example hazards and risks. The maps are available for free and can be a used as a resource when evaluation local risks.


Fig. 7 GIS-tool on the UNISDR PreventionWeb for creating risk assessment maps displaying the Philippines and the risk for mortality related to Tropical Cyclones (PreventionWeb, website, 2015).

4 Goals with the study

This research will focus on the NGO sector and disaster management within a natural disaster. The research will seek answers to the following questions:

- On a general level, what kind of natural disasters can be expected in different regions of the world, and what are the trends?

- How does natural disaster affect societies in general?

- What is the possible role of a NGO in international disaster management?

- How can an international humanitarian relief operation benefit from NGOs?

- Is there a possibility or method to do easy, local project based risk assessment in a NGO involved in development project in a disaster prone area?

- What is important for a NGO to consider when planning for disaster management and what challenges is to be expected for the NGO in a natural disaster?

- What is important to notice for NGOs regarding coordination and cooperation in disaster management?

5 Methods

The research used both qualitative and quantitative methods. In the case study, the interview, personal communication and examples gives qualitative information. The aim of the survey was to provide quantitative information about the research questions. Open questions that could be answered freely also provided the possibility to evaluate comments in a qualitative way.

The thesis focuses on a case study of the partner organizations projects in the Philippines and the 2013 typhoon Haiyan impact, disaster management, relief operation and efforts related to the typhoon crisis.

The case study

In the research I have used textbooks and guides, studies of other research, assessments and reports from different organizations to understand the backgrounds. To generate new information for this research I used a case-study including a background information study of the typhoon and decisions made, an interview with the research partner NGO staff, personal communication and workshops within the partner NGO, an implementation study and a survey.

There are lots of information and documentation related to the humanitarian response to the Haiyan typhoon available on the internet and a lot of the theoretical background frame in this thesis is based on this existing material. A good textbook resource to understand the framework of international disaster management was Damon Coppolas "Introduction to international disaster management, third edition" from 2015.

In the case study focus was on the events taken place after the typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The case-study both focus on the international dimension as well as what happened both locally in the Philippines and in Finland in the partner NGO.

The interview and personal communication

I interviewed the partner NGO staff (two persons, the project managers at 31.10.2014) that was on site prior, during and post the typhoon disaster while visiting the Philippines a year after the typhoon in 2015. My aim was to achieve a deeper understanding of the events and the relief operation as well as the recovery process. I also tested a list of good practice (Jacobs, 2013) with the staff to see if the suggested ten good advice was considered to work on the field. To discuss and analyse the decisions that was made in the Finnish NGO, personal communication with decision makers (head of homeland office 5.8.2015, Asia committee chair 5.8.2015) as well as meeting minutes from the NGO meetings during the disaster relief operation was used.

The survey

To get a broader view of the international dimension of the disaster management that was done after Haiyan, who were involved in the international, national and local relief operation and if there were experiences to be learned from, I used a survey that I sent out by email to 1502 respondents.

The email addresses were gathered from the internet from people that had been working as a contact person in the Haiyan humanitarian operation. With the survey I tried to get an overview of who was on site working, what those who were there had experienced and if there was something general to be learned for future relief work and operations. There were also a part of the survey considering training aspects, to get a better view over what to focus on in training.

The survey form and questions as it was sent is seen in Appendix 1. The survey was sent out the 2nd of December 2014, one year after the relief operations first weeks. I used googles free electronic forms for the purpose. The survey was first open for 7 days. A reminder was sent out the 9th of December 2014 and the due date was extended to 12th of December 2014. 89 responses came in to the survey that are presented in the results.

Workshops

In the partner NGO there were two workshops arranged in Finland (25.11.2014, 15.9.2015) where crisis management in general and the experiences from the Haiyan case was discussed. The participants in the workshops were FS Global board members and two persons from the staff in Finland. The material from the workshops was then used to form the bases for the crisis management and disaster risk reduction plan for the partner NGO.

6 Partners for the research

This thesis study was conducted in partnership with NGOs within the FS Global network. A partnership agreement with the Finnish Swedish Pentecostal Missionary organization in Finland (FSPM) was signed for this research.

The Finnish Ministry of Interior was also an important contact, especially in the beginning when planning the research. Background discussions with experts, as well as having access to the library of the Ministry of the Interior was very valuable to get started.

6.1 Finnish Free Church Federation and FS Global

The Finnish Free Church Federation (FS, Frikyrklig Samverkan in Swedish), and its organization for ODA-project FS Global, is the main NGO-partner organization for this research. The case-study and interview were conducted within FS Global's projects run by FSPM. FS Global is the organisation for development aid that is financed by the Finnish

free churches (non-lutheran). The organization founded in 1936 and is today representing 5400 members. Since 1995 the organization have an agreement with the Finnish Foreign Ministry in terms of development aid and since 2003 FS Global has been a NGO partner organization with the Finnish Foreign Ministry (FS, 2015).

The organization manages development aid projects that are partly financed by the Finnish states Foreign Ministry (within ODA) and partly by the member churches. FS Global have projects in over 15 different countries in South America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

6.2 FS Global organization and FSPM

The FS Global is an umbrella organization that facilitates the free churches development aid project. Under the FS Global there is the member churches own missionary or development aid organizations. This research case-study include on one of the member church network´s development aid project.


Fig. 8 FS Global organization system and an example of project organizing in one member church network, Finlands Svenska Pingst Mission, FSPM (personal communication, Oskar Sjöberg).

FSPM, short for Finlands Svenska Pingstmission, is a network organization for the Swedish pentecostal churches in Finland. The Swedish Pentecostal churches in Finland do not have a centralized church administration and the church network is based on local churches. The network have a central organization, FSPM, for missionary and development aid projects. The local churches are members in the FSPM and funds the

administration and the FSPM staff. The FSPM administration is rather small, there is $3-4$ persons working part-time within the organization. Some are also working part time for the FS Global organization. FS Global is also very lightly organized, with only a few people working with the administration. The administration organization changes constantly depending on the projects. (Personal communication, Oskar Sjöberg, head of development aid projects, FS, November 2015)

Fig. 8 shows how the development aid projects are organized within the FSPM. The idea is that one of the local churches is acting as a "sending church". This local church is where the ideas for the projects start, where the project ideas are developed and the local church also have a responsibility for the funding. It is common that when one church launches a project, other local churches will join in co-funding the project. Coordination of the funding, planning process and ODA-process is done by FSPM in cooperation with FS Global. The other FS Global member churches are organized in similar ways.

The ODA projects can then be organized to be carried out in different ways depending on the country's rules and regulations. In the Philippines the ODA projects are carried out in cooperation with a local registered non-profit foundation, the Family Help Development Foundation, Inc (FHDFI). The FSPM typhoon relief and recovery operation was coordinated with the local foundation.

7 Case study: the typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, 2013

This case-study is about the natural disaster that followed the natural hazard, the super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The case-study first gives a general overview of the Philippines, how disaster management is organized in the country and is then followed by a study of the events that took place after the natural hazard. This case study looks in to a certain development aid project, what happened and how the disaster was managed within the NGO organization. The case-study includes a survey done one year after the typhoon with the aim to explore if there are something in general to learn for the NGO sector from what happened before and after the typhoon.

7.1 The Philippines

The case study is located in the Philippines. The Philippines is a state of over 7000 islands in the Pacific in Southeast Asia. The surface area within the islands is about the same as in

Finland, some 300 square kilometres, but has a population that is today close to 100 million.

Table 4. Comparison of the country data, the Philippines and Finland (UN Data, 2012).

	The Philippines	Finland
Surface area	300 000 km^2	336 852 km^2
Population in 2012 (estimated)	96,707 million	5,4 million
Population density in 2012	322,4 per km^2	16,1 per km^2

Fig. 9 The islands of the Philippines (Google maps, 2015)

The Philippines was named after a 16th century Spanish king and was a Spanish colony for more than three centuries (BBC, 2015). It was taken over by the US in the early 20th century and became an independent state in 1935. There is still a lot of influence of both

the Spanish time and the US – time. For example, the country is 83 % Catholic, which was introduced in the Philippines by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, and the Catholic Church was established under the Spanish rule (Embassy of Philippines in Belgium, 2015). Spanish names and words in the language can still be seen and heard, and the currency used is Peso. The presence of the United States brought the English language that as for today is the second official language in the Philippines along with national language Filipino (Embassy of Philippines in Belgium, 2015). English is seen both in media, the street and heard spoken within the population.

The Philippines is highly densely populated and is now an economy moving away from traditional agriculture to a more and more industrialised country. Electronics, petrol and other goods are on the rise. A trend in the Philippines is also people working abroad, sending home billions of dollars (BBC, 2015).

The general security situation and general political situation in the Philippines is peaceful. However, the situation varies in different parts of the Philippines. There is a risk of terrorism and there are active communist gerilla group troops and muslim separatist groups. There is a continuous risk of armed conflict between these groups and the military. These groups also are involved in criminal activities such as kidnappings. Traffic and criminality in general as well as natural hazards is to be considered a risk for foreign travellers. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2015).

The Philippines is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world (UN OCHA, 2015). It is located in the "Pacific ring of fire" (Fig. 10) which is a long horseshoe-shaped seismically active belt of earthquake epicentres, volcanoes, and tectonic plate boundaries in the Pacific (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). The "Pacific ring of fire" is presented in Fig. 10. In this area volcano and other seismic activities is a potential risk. There are 47 active volcanos in the Philippines and 30 % of the population, or some 30 million people are living closer than 30 km from an active volcano (Preventionweb, 2015).

Fig. 10 The Pacific Ring of Fire (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014)

Other than seismic hazard risk, the Philippines has a broad range of natural hazards occurring on a yearly basis. These can be floods, landslides, storms and other natural hazards. Fig. 11 shows the different kind of hazards by frequency. The most common hazard are the storms, representing 51,3 % of the hazards. Again, the storms are also the most dangerous hazards in the Philippines, 78,7 % of the deaths in the natural hazards in the Philippines are caused by tropical stoms (Fig. 12). The same goes for economic losses; the storms are responsible for as much as 79 % of the annual economic loss followed by natural hazards (Fig. 13).

Fig. 11 Natural hazards in the Philippines by frequency (Preventionweb, 2015)

Fig. 12 Natural hazards in the Philippines by mortality (Preventionweb, 2015)

Fig. 13 Natural hazards in the Philippines by economic issues (Preventionweb, 2015)

The tropical storms or typhoons are the most common natural hazard in the Philippines, with over 50 % in both frequency, mortality numbers and economic losses (Fig. 11 - 13). There is some 20 typhoons in the Philippines every year of which five is destructive (Asian Disaster Reduction Center ADRC, 2015).

Due to the fact that natural hazards and disasters are quite common in the Philippines, the country and people are prepared for possible impacts. The Philippines have a strong capacity and a well-developed disaster management system (Carden & Clements, 2015).

Alongside the government, a broad range of NGOs are working with disaster relief operations in the country. The international community is represented by the UN that has an ongoing mission in the country. With the motive that the Philippines is one of the world's most disaster prone countries, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of the Humanitarian Affairs established a presence in Manila in 2007. The presence has been upgraded to an office with a mission to work with both emergency response preparedness and response to sudden emergencies as well as the conflict situation in Mindanao (UN OCHA, 2015).

The Philippines has a disaster risk reduction and management organization based on a legal framework (ADRC, 2015). The organization is called The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). The NDRRMC has drawn up both a long term plan for National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management for the years

2011-2028 and a National Disaster Response Plan updated in June 2014. The goals of the the long term plan are presented in Fig. 14. The goal is to make a more resilient and safer community.


Fig. 14 Goals of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management plan 2011 – 2028 (NDRRMC, 2011).

The goals of the plan is then broadened into a plan of what to do in a certain timeframe to create a better disaster preparedness (Fig. 15). Finally, there is a timeframe plan (pre-disaster, during disaster and post-disaster) of what to do when the threat of a disaster is a fact (Fig. 16).

Prevention and Mitigation	Preparedness	Response	Rehabilitation and Recovery	Prevention and Mitigation

DRR and CCA mainstreaming into
national and local plans and programs;
LDRRMO institutionalization
Hazard and risk mapping
Early Warning Systems

Activities related to ensuring that (a)
people are prepared and (b) response
will be carried out efficiently and
effectively

Restoration of life lines and basic
infrastructure
Early recovery
Psychosocial care

Long term recovery and prevention
and mitigation – building back better

Fig. 15 Timeline cycle in the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management plan 2011 – 2028 (NDRRMC, 2011).

Fig. 16 Table from the National Disaster Response Plan covering different activities in a hydro-meteorological natural hazard (NDRRMC, 2014)

The NDRRMC works with a broad range of Philippine government organizations, including the Department of Defense, which has a role to play in disaster response. (NDRRMC, 2015)

With all this governmental and international activities around disaster preparedness, there is a potential to take action when a disaster threats the country of 6000 islands. Over the past 40 years, the Philippines have moved in national policy from disaster response to disaster management to disaster risk management and finally towards disaster risk reduction. Philippine government spending on DRR is close to 800 million USD per year (Peters & Budimir, 2015).

However, the large number of people living in the area makes the task to respond huge if the natural hazard is super large like the typhoon Haiyan described later in this thesis.

7.2 Partner NGO ODA projects in the Philippines

FS Global and FSPM facilitates ODA-financed projects in the Philippines. The project name is Multi-rural development project, MRDP. The base of the project is located in the municipality of Merida on the island of Leyte. FS Global and FSPM works through a local organization, the FHDFI Family Help Development Foundation Inc. The cooperation with FHDFI foundation is coordinated by the FS Global/FSPM staff in the Philippines, Andreas and Laila Pettersson. The Pettersson's started the Family Help Project in Sweden in 2003 and have been working with poverty issues in the Philippines since then (FHP website, 2015).

The MRDP project is divided into several subordinated projects. As the FS Global and FSPM have been working on the Philippines for several decades, there are also some activities that is not connected to ODA-funded projects but is still assisted with church funding. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

Fig. 17 The multi-rural development projects 2014 in the Philippines connected to FS Global and FSPM

The partner NGO (FS and FSPM) projects in the Philippines are built around the FHP Model Farm in Merida municipality on Leyte. The model farm goal is to promote sustainable organic farming for the local people. The methods are both modelling, education and workshops for local people both on the farm and in the villages. The model farm activities are conducted in cooperation with the local University, the State University of Visayas. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

FSPM has previously built a preschool building in the municipality and the learning center project is built around this building. In 2014 there were 65 children in the pre-school. In 2014, there was a building project going on with the ambition to expand the learning center to also provide education for primary school (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014). The building was finished and the primary school opened in 2015 (Personal communication, Andreas Pettersson 24.1.2016). The learning center building is also used for farming education, health education and other MRDP activities. The other MRDP projects, staff development, feeding programme and health project supports the two main activities, the model farm and the learning center. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

There are two other projects that are not a part of the ODA-project anymore. There is the School and Childrens home in Surigao, an orphanage and primary school. In 2009, FSPM

built a primary school in Surigao with ODA-funding. The organization still keeps in touch and helps out on the school and children's home. The second non-ODA project is a vocational training education project, Jire skills training in the southern parts of the Philippines. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

The disaster response and recovery project has been a separately funded project since the typhoon Haiyan. The funding of the project rebuilding, roofing of schools, providing education material and relief goods was collected in Finland mostly from private donations through a public fundraising campaign. The disaster response and recovery was not a part of the MRDP activities prior to the supertyphoon Haiyan, but was activated on the week after the typhoon (FSPM Asia-committee, 2013).

7.3 Supertyphoon Haiyan or Yolanda

Fig. 18 Tropical typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda track KMZ-file on Google Earth (JTWC, 2013).

The typhoon Haiyan, named Yolanda in the Philippines, was formed over the pacific and first issued the 2nd of November by the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, the US Navy and Air Force center based on Hawaii.

The track of the typhoon Haiyan is presented in Fig. 18.

At first, the wind speeds were not strong. As the beginning typhoon moved towards the Philippines, it picked up in speed. By Wednesday, the 6th of November, Haiyan had become classified as a typhoon, which means its winds had exceeded 118 km/h. The typhoon now seemed to enter the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) (the geographical area of the PAR is presented in Fig. 19) and the Philippine government

PAGASA DOST (Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Service Administration, Department of Science and Technology) would closely monitor the typhoon, its predicted track and possible impacts. The public was warned through media and social media such as twitter accounts. Fig. 20 shows an example of warning maps that was sent out on the PAGASA DOST twitter account to warn the people of the typhoon.

Fig. 19 The Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) in monitoring tropical cyclones and the Haiyan typhoon entering the PAR on Wednesday 6th of November. (Philstar, 6.11.2013)


Fig. 20 Predicted track of Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda as communicated 6th of November on PAGASA DOST Twitter account @dost_pagasa

The Haiyan typhoon picked up in speed, and it was predicted that the typhoon would make landfall as a very strong typhoon. The Joint Typhoon Warning Center said Haiyan likely to reach supertyphoon category before making landfall over central Philippines (Philstar, 2013).

The category supertyphoon is used in the northwestern Pacific area to describe typhoons with winds over 240 km/h. The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is used to warn people about storms, and has been an excellent tool for alerting the public about the possible impacts of various intensity hurricanes (The Saffir-Simpson Team, 2012)

Table 5. Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (National Hurricane Center, 2013)

Category	Sustained Winds	Types of Damage Due to Hurricane Winds
1	119-153 km/h	Very dangerous winds will produce some damage: Well-constructed frame homes could have damage to roof, shingles, vinyl siding and gutters. Large branches of trees will snap and shallowly rooted trees may be toppled. Extensive damage to power lines and poles likely will result in power outages that could last a few to several days.
2	154-177 km/h	Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive damage: Well-constructed frame homes could sustain major roof and siding damage. Many shallowly rooted trees will be snapped or uprooted and block numerous roads. Near-total power loss is expected with outages that could last from several days to weeks.
3	178-208 km/h	Devastating damage will occur: Well-built framed homes may incur major damage or removal of roof decking and gable ends. Many trees will be snapped or uprooted, blocking numerous roads. Electricity and water will be unavailable for several days to weeks after the storm passes.
4	209-251 km/h	Catastrophic damage will occur: Well-built framed homes can sustain severe damage with loss of most of the roof structure and/or some exterior walls. Most trees will be snapped or uprooted and power poles downed. Fallen trees and power poles will isolate residential areas. Power outages will last weeks to possibly months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months.
5	252 km/h or higher	Catastrophic damage will occur: A high percentage of framed homes will be destroyed, with total roof failure and wall collapse. Fallen trees and power poles will isolate residential areas. Power outages will last for weeks to possibly months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months.

Eventually, the typhoon reached the category 5 that is the highest category in the used scale. When the typhoon made landfall, the winds were blowing at a speed of 312 km/h, being the strongest typhoon ever made landfall (Mercycorps, 2013). In Fig. 21 the measured wind speed of the typhoon during its cycle is presented.

Fig. 21 The typhoon Hayian windspeeds in knots, 1 kts = 1,852 km/h, reaching a maximum of 314,84 km/h (JTWC, 2013).

The landfall of the typhoon Haiyan caused a severe disaster in a large area of the Philippines. Winds destroyed what came in its way, a rising storm surge flooded both cities and fields. Over 6000 people were killed, four million people displaced over one million homes were damaged or destroyed. Not only left the typhoon people homeless, but it destroyed infrastructure and the livelihood as the society collapsed in the affected area. Some 33 million coconut trees were damaged and around 30 000 fishing boats were damaged or destroyed (Disasters Emergency Committee, 2014).

The day after the typhoon, the disaster was complete. The affected areas were in a chaotic state, with collapsed infrastructure. There were no communications such as radio, tv or mobile phone network (interview with Andreas and Laila Pettersson). There were lack of safe drinking water, no shelter, untreated injuries and illnesses, insufficient food, lack of

sanitation and personal hygiene items, lack of household supplies like fuel (Mercycorps 2013).

Impact of the typhoon Haiyan

- World Health Organization disaster classification: Category 3, the highest — on par with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the Haiti earthquake in 2010
- People affected: More than 16 million
- Death toll: More than 6,000
- People injured: More than 27,000
- People displaced: 4.1 million
- People in need of food: 2.5 million
- Amount of area destroyed in the storm's path: 70 to 80 percent
- Homes damaged or destroyed: 1.2 million — over half of which were completely destroyed
- Amount of homes lost in hardest-hit areas: 90 percent
- Most immediate threats to survivors (in order of urgency): Lack of safe drinking water, no shelter, untreated injuries and illnesses, insufficient food, lack of sanitation and personal hygiene items, lack of household supplies like fuel

(Mercycorps 2013)

Experiencing the typhoon was dramatic in many ways for the local people. The following interviews were made two weeks after the typhoon by the FSPM first team (Andersson & Hellström, November 2013). The quotes are from the Andersson and Hellström documentary movie (2013).

The typhoon started attacking in the morning and early in the morning, maybe six o'clock some men came and told us that we had to evacuate. But we stayed here and tried to relax during the first winds. It's ok, we are taking pictures and the wind is coming in from the sea. Then, the roofs started to fly. In our house, the ceiling started to move and come down, and we tried to hide under the table. But before the ceiling came down, we decided to run to the pre-school building. The coconut trees fell down. Most of the people are afraid, thinking they were dying.

Survivor from Merida

I am from Tacloban, I am one of the survivors. The water was very, very high, it came all over the houses. We managed to climb up on the toilet (building). From the toilet, we climbed up to a tree. I put my baby daughter in a bucket so that the baby would survive.

Survivor from Tacloban

The wind is blowing very strong at 7 o'clock. We had some 20 children in our house, they were first laughing when they saw the trees and roofs flying off the buildings. My son said, do something papa, do something papa! But there was not much we could do. Suddenly, the kitchen door flies open and the winds blows into the house. I tried to pull the kitchen door with all my power to close it, but the wind is so incredibly strong, that I cannot close the door. I could not go outside, because I was afraid that I could be hit by something that was flying around in the storm. We took the children to a bedroom further away from the kitchen. Then we start to hear that the roof starts to move, and blows away from our house. The inner roof, the ceiling starts to move and we understands that we have to get out of here, otherwise the ceiling will fall upon us. We had a ping pong table in the house, and everyone takes cover under the table. We were some 30-50 persons in the house by then. We sat under the ping pong table, the rain made the water rise in the house to some 20 centimeters on the floor. The wind was blowing through the house and we were really cold, sitting in the water, shaking of the cold. We are sitting there for two hours. We are praying and singing worship songs, and manages to keep up the spirit. After the two hours, we are able to go outside.

Andreas Pettersson, FHP Organic Farm

7.4 The disaster response to Haiyan

The world soon became aware of the disaster in the Philippines that followed the typhoon. For example, CNN reported continuously about the typhoon in the news, starting before landfall and continuing over the weeks to come after landfall. Table 6 shows the timeline of the first two weeks. It is based on sources from the Philippine Government websites, UN OCHA situation reports 1-9, Finnish government press releases, interview, meeting minutes, workshop and personal communication with the FS Global and FSPM organization.

Table 6. Timeline and decisions in the relief operation in different organizations.

	UN	Philippine government	Finnish government	FHP foundation	FSPM
Before landfall	On 7 November, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim sent a letter to the Chairman of the NDRRMC reiterating the offer of international assistance to the Government as needed. The NDRRMC Executive Director welcomed the offer of technical assistance in the conduct of a joint rapid needs assessment.	Public information, evacuation, warnings and presidential statement. Discussions with UN.		People taking refuge in the Pettersson home and pre-school building.	
Day 0, Friday 8th of November	On 8 November, the cluster co-leads agreed on the immediate deployment of assessment teams to the worst affected areas.	Yolanda landfall, 44 of 81 provinces are affected	News are read in Finland.	Pettersson house, farm and buildings destroyed. The FHP personnel survives, the pre-school building survives.	News are read in Finland.
Day 1, Saturday 9th of November	Government accepts UN offer of international assistance. The Humanitarian Country Team and the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination team were deployed to Tacloban City , Iloilo City, and Busuanga in Palawan province to support rapid needs assessment, support coordination and re-establish communication networks. On 9 November, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator expressed condolences. The UN is mobilizing international support.	First responders fly from the Air force flies from Cebu to Tacloban. Priority to clear the airports and roads, establish communications. Government accepts UN offer of international assistance.		Sends boys to Merida to see if other team is alive. Tries to get information of whats going on. Roads blocked, clears the road to mainroad. Concerns about volunteers. Leyte rice storage running out.	Organization realizes the area hit by the Typhoon is in the FHP-area. FSPM Asia-committee is scheduled for a meeting on Monday. FSPM organization contacts partner organizations during weekend.
Day 2, Sunday 10th of November	Funding starts pooring in.	The president visits Tacloban. To adress looting and for security, checkpoints are set up. 150 policeman are deployed. More resources are brought in by the Ph Navy.	CMC Finland coordinates Finnish response preparations. (intermin.fi) Finnish foreign ministry is locating finnish citizens in the Philippines. (formin.fi) CMC Finland monitors the situation.	Ferries starts to operate from Cebu to Ormoc. FHP foundation evacuates Pettersson family along with volunteers and some staff to Cebu i order to plan relief operation. Leftover food is distributed.	Prayer in local churches in Sunday meetings.
Day 3, Monday 11th of November	UN Member States continued to announce commitments to support the typhoon affected communities. Incoming international humanitarian workers are encouraged to contact OCHA for the facilitation of visas with the Department of Foreign Affairs. A Reception and Departure Centre (RDC) is active at Tacloban City airport. The RDC will register incoming relief teams, provide information briefing and refer the teams to the operational centres.	State of national calamity is declared. Assistance is asked from other countries. Distribution hubs are formally decided to be set up in Tacloban and Guiuan.	Finland sends three experts to the IHP-team in Denmark where they are to continue to the Philippines. Finnish goverment urges citizens to donate for the Philippines.	Reports to Scandinavia and request help. Sets up administration in Cebu for relief operation. Buys supplies. Media contacts to Scandinavia.	Organization gets in contact with Pettersson family. The FSPM Asia-committee meets partly over internet, discussion the situation. Decisions to accept funds from partner organization, donating extra funding to the project in the Philippines. Decision on needs assessment on the Philippines, long-term planning, contacting media, fundraising.
Day 4, Tuesday 12th of November		Start of repacking 45000 sacks of rice donated by the UN WFP in Tacloban. The packs are distributed within November. Roads are starting to be cleared up.		Shipping starts to Leyte, organized relief actions starts.	
Day 5, Wednesday 13th of November	Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Humanitarian Coordinator for the Philippines visited Tacloban City to take stock of the humanitarian situation. Vodafone Instant Network has deployed two teams to restore mobile access. First Response Radio is planning to deploy an emergency radio station together with Far East Broadcasting Co.	A distribution hub opens in Ormoc.	Finnish foreign ministry has located all Finnish citizens in the Philippines. (formin)		Meetings with local media for consultations about the campaign for fundraising. Consultations within organization about sending a team to the Philippines. Decision within staff to prepare for sending a team.
Day 6, Thursday 14th of November		Relief is executed for forty towns on Leyte. Delivery of goods by trucks starts to the hubs. Goods are unloaded and entrusted to mayors. Mayors distributes goods to Barangay captains. 1000 policemen arrives to support ground personnel.			Advertisements about the fundraising in local media. Decision on first two team members.
Day 7, Friday November		Power restoration begins. Relief efforts continue.			
Days 8-11		More than 100 stores re-opens in the affected areas. Banking services starts in Tacloban. The president visits the affected areas.		FHP buys truck to assist in relief goods transport.	Local churches starts raising money for disaster relief operation. Media exposure helps in the campaign. FSPM board meeting 18th of November takes formal decision to send a team to the Philippines.
Within 14 Days	International relief workers continue to arrive, establish missions and work in the affected areas.	Tacloban port fully operational. 1,15 million foodpacks have been delivered. More security personnel is deployed. The government estimates that over 2800 doctors, nurses and personnel (including foreign) has arrived to Tacloban.		Team from Finland arrives 21th of November, doing assessments and reporting, connecting to the UN OCHA network.	Team departures 20th of November from Finland to the Philippines. A new advertisement set in the local media and newspapers about the fundraising.
Later			28.11 Finland gives 2,7 million euros to the humanitarian response.	Relief and rebuilding operation continues. Medical doctor team arrives and works with LGU doctor.	Fundraising is continuing for several months, funding the relief and rebuilding operation. Reporting in media, social media and documentary movie. Second team with medical expertize is sent out.

National and international response to the disaster

The Haiyan typhoon left behind a disaster of a magnitude that could have overwhelmed the capacity of any country (Carden & Clemets 2015).

As seen in Table 6, there were consultations between the UN and the Philippine government already before the typhoon made landfall. The cooperation started already in advance. The day after the typhoon the government accepted the UN offer of international assistance and UN disaster assessment teams were deployed alongside Philippine government first responders. The fact that there were over 16 million people living in the affected areas made the response task huge.

Within days of the disaster the UN activated a level 3 response – the highest level of humanitarian crisis. The level 3 declaration immediately made available 25 million USD through the UN Central Emergency Response Fund and 468 million USD was brought in from the Strategic Response Plan (Carden & Clemets 2015). Later on, by January 2014, international donor countries had given over 600 million USD to the response (Lum & Margesson, 2014).

The international response was quickly scaled up. Coordination hubs were established and there was a particular emphasis on information management due to the large scale operation. The Haiyan operation was UN OCHA's largest sustained coordinated military-civil operation. There was 22 militaries alongside the Philippine military taking part in the operation. International NGOs and the private sector was also involved from the early stages. (Carden & Clemets 2015)

The Finnish government

Finland also contributed to the response. By Monday after the typhoon, Finland had decided to send three experts along with an International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) team assisting in the UN operation (Ministry of the Interior, 2013). Finland is a member of IHP (International Humanitarian Partnership) that is a platform for international cooperation and sharing of resources, providing appropriate operational, technical and financial support to multilateral organisations (IHP, 2015). In the UN Haiyan operation, the IHP-team provided tent-accommodation to people attending the relief efforts.

The Finnish Foreign Ministry worked on locating Finnish citizens in the disaster. Everyone known to be in the Philippines was reached by Day 5, 13th of November. Later on, the

Finnish government contributed by donating 2,7 million euros to the humanitarian response (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2013).

NGO response

There is a strong civil society in the Philippines including self-help groups and cooperatives, neighbourhood associations and community organisations, religious and spiritual societies, proffessional associations including trade unions, business foundations, local charities, private voluntary organisations and NGOs. Local NGOs have historically played an important role in meeting humanitarian needs in the Philippines. (Featherstone, 2014)

National NGOs were among the first to respond to the typhoon, but the scale of the disaster outstripped their capacity. International NGOs took a greater role in the response due to access to funding and superior logistics capacity. In its best, there were cooperation between national NGOs and international NGOs. International NGOs benefited from the Philippino NGOs extensive networks that strengthed the effectiveness of the response. (Featherstone, 2014)

The benefit of having a good local network when conducting disaster relief is also emphasized later on in this thesis interview and survey.

There was a lot of international NGOs working in the affected areas and they made a large contribution to the relief effort funding as shown in Fig. 22.


Fig. 22 Example illustrating NGO disaster response in, fundraising of nine NGO-coalitions during the Haiyan relief operation compared to government disaster funding in millions of USD (Global humanitarian assistance report 2014).

Research partner NGO response

Even though the typhoon took the FSPM organization in Finland by surprise, the NGO acted quickly. It took some days to gain information of what was the status of the project and the staff located on the Philippines. The first Asia-committee meeting was held on Day 3, when the Petterssons had been able to establish communications to Scandinavia after evacuation to Cebu. The first Asia-committee meeting was held with a Skype-connection directly to the Philippines so that Andreas Pettersson could report and discuss directly with the committee. There was an immediate decision to start a fundraising project for the relief operation that the Petterssons already had started in the Philippines. Decision was made to do needs assessments of short- and long term needs.

In a few days the fundraising project was communicated to the media in Finland. The cooperation with the media was very good and there was advertisements in the first weeks about the fundraising project.

Within 14 days a two person team from Finland arrived in the Philippines to assist with assessment, reporting, coordination and information management. Some days later, a second two person team arrived, one person a medical doctor that begun to work with the health administration in the municipality of Merida.

The FHDFI lead local relief operation in Merida connected to the UN OCHA network within 14 days. The FHDFI relief operation worked locally in close cooperation with the municipality and villages with distributing relief goods such as food, roofing, education material supply and temporary housing. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

Criticism to the disaster response

There was also a lot of criticism towards the relief operation. The criticism was visible in the media from the first week of the relief operation.

The 14th of November 2013 ABC reported that the president was accused of deliberately downplaying casualties not to create too much panic. The slow pace of aid to Tacloban and other areas became an issue of criticism. Looting of rice stocks and other supplies spread. (ABC, 2013).

The 15th of November 2013 the Guardian reported that the slow pace of relief efforts after the typhoon was now was admitted by the UN in an interview. Some organisations

evacuated their teams from the disaster areas when the security situation became too difficult. For example, a Philippine Red Cross convoy was allegedly hijacked by armed men who were reported later shot dead by the police. (Branigan & Hodal, 2013)

Corruption was another topic of the criticism. The 18th of November 2013 the Associated Press wrote that corruption is a concern after any major natural disaster, as millions of dollars in cash and goods rush in from around the world. Those worries are especially acute in the Philippines, where corruption has been a part of life. (AP, 2013)

The Daily Mail the 15th of November 2013 asked the question: are Philippines officials only handing out food to the people who voted for them? The question was raised in interviews with aid workers. However, a spokesman for the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) said that the DEC has had no reports from member agencies that aid is being prioritised by the Philippines government on the basis of potential political support, in the same interview. (Tornhill, 2013)

Many reports highlights weaknesses in the relief efforts. In the criticism and weakness analyzes it is good to remember that this was in fact for example one of the largest operations ever conducted by the UN OCHA (Carden & Clemets, 2015). Due to the scale of the disaster the chaos and problems during the first weeks of relief efforts can be understandable.

7.5   Recovery in the partner NGO

A year after the typhoon, FSPM sent a monitoring team to visit the Philippines. I was a part of the two person monitoring team together with pastor Stefan Sigfrids. Our team monitored the FSPM ODA projects and did a review on the situation after the typhoon, one year after. As a part of this we discussed and evaluated the events that took place after the typhoon. The interview is found in appendix 2.

The year after the typhoon most of the efforts within the FSPM funded projects in the Philippines was about rebuilding everything that was broken. All the buildings on the farm were damaged and needed to be rebuild. The local people had almost no shelter during the first time after the typhoon. The food distribution became important for the local people's survival. After the first months more and more efforts could be focused on rebuilding. The food help continued and there were roofs built on several school buildings in Merida provided by the FSPM disaster fund. By helping the schools with new roofs, they could

open again soon. The FHDFI also funded and bought school materials to every child in Merida, so that they could return to school. The School director in Merida was very thankful of all the help. FHDFI was the only organization running a typhoon reilief operation locally for a long time in Merida. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

There were a lot of building projects the first year after the typhoon. The buildings that were rebuilt were made typhoon proof, with walls creating windshields for the roof. There has also been 20 small temporary, movable houses built for shelter. FHDFI also bought spare parts for a water pump in Merida, to make it possible to pump clean water from the local well to people that needed. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

The farm is now leasing a land lot with a drilled deep water well so that the farm is not dependant on the municipality waterline. A generator has been bought to the farm. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

From a total disaster all of the projects are practically running and recovered a year after. In the area there is of course still a lot of challenges. Those who have lived of the coconut trees will face challenges years from now, since the coconut tree takes some 6-8 years before it gives new fruit. The general impression when visiting is that the society and markets are re-established and almost back to normal. However, there are reports of a rising criminality and unstability in the security situation on Leyte. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

The efforts of the FHDFI meant a lot for the local people during the time after the typhoon. The foundation was awarded a prize in Tacloban for the relief efforts in Merida when the government awarded organizations for good efforts after the Typhoon. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

The monitoring team recommended, that the organization takes the possibility of future typhoons in consideration when planning for coming project actions. (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014)

8 The survey results

To get a broader view of the international dimension of the disaster management that was done after Haiyan, who were involved in the international, national and local relief operation and if there were experiences to be learned from, a survey was made within this study and sent out by email to 1502 respondents. The questions are presented in appendix 1. There was 89 responses to the survey.

8.1 Organization background within the answers

Fig. 23 shows the respondents organizational background, if they worked within a UN organization, within the Philippine government, for a government organization outside the Philippines, for an international NGO or a Philippine NGO. Within the answers most of the respondents (51 %) had an international NGO organizational background, worked or volunteered for an international NGO. 26 % had worked for an UN organization and other organizations represented were national (Philippine) NGO, Philippine government organization or international government representatives. Fig. 24 shows when the respondent's organization arrived into the typhoon-affected areas, to start with the disaster relief work. The respondents were also asked about how long their organization stayed in the affected areas. The answers are displayed in Fig. 25. Most of the respondent's organizations arrived on site the first week or were already on site before the typhoon (81 %). Most of the respondents answered their organization was still on site one year after the typhoon (69 %) when the survey was conducted.

Organization	N
UN Organization	23
NGO International	45
NGO national (Philippines)	11
Government international	3
Government Philippines	7
Sum	89

Fig. 23 Organizational background of the respondents to the survey

When did your organization arrive in the affected areas? N				
allready on site	first week	2-3 weeks	1-2 months	later
31	40	13	3	1

Fig. 24 Timeframe when the organization was represented on site

How long did the organization stay in the affected area?

Less than 1 month	1-2 months	3-5 months	6-12 months	Still on site
3	9	7	7	59

Fig 28 69 % of the organizations stayed at least a year

8.2 Experience of arriving on site in the affected areas

The respondents were asked to share some of their experiences arriving on site in the affected areas.

There were some 7 pages of comments. To analyze the comments, I decided to organize the comments by timeline and by topic.

The text was sorted under the following headlines or topics: timeline – pre-deployment, timeline – week 1, timeline – week 2, timeline – week 3, timeline – week 4 or later, landscape and environment, feelings and emotion and finally: what we started doing. Here follows a summary on the different topics, first the first impressions and finally in a timeline format.

Landscape and environment on arriving

This is how the respondents described the landscape and working environment when arriving on site.

I led an international rescue NGO. We flew an aircraft from UK to Cebu / Mactan Airbase. Upon arrival (and on the way in) we saw considerable devastation. At Cebu / Mactan, the civilian air authorities handed us to the Military to deal with our arrival. We worked closely with the Philippine Airforce whilst in the Philippines.

Chaos everywhere, no public transportation. There is no functioning government. There were no food, water and place to live in; one would have to be self-sufficient. Many shops closed, lots of debris. There were lots of destruction to buildings and houses. No internet, challenges to get fuel for car, food for team etc.

From the initial assessment, the situation looked very serious, bodies were still strawn in the streets, debris all over, lack of basic necessities, lots of people with injuries still walking in the streets with little help. Many of the NGOs and UN organization were not immediately equipped or resourced to offer meaningful help. Only Redcross and MSF came prepared. Lots of foods donations from other parts of the country was available but no control on what was or could not be distributed.

Chaotic situation in the airport. Debris filled roads going to the City Hall. Dazed and confused community of people. Communication were shutdown. Long lines of people seeking for relief goods and awaiting for medical treatments.

Chaotic situation, people were confused. Many of them needed medical attention, relief goods were at utmost needed. No communication. The good thing was NGOs and emergency workers were already present and addressing the situation.

Humanitarian workers were at a lost on how to respond as there is nobody to coordinate. As a result relief distribution were haphazardly done leaving communities in disagreement as not everybody were able to receive assistance. The most vulnerable population is being left out.

Arrived in CEBU. Difficult to get to Tacloban. Once arrived the road was blocked with debris and dead bodies. After some hours one road was "cleared" but it was difficult to get transport. Never seen such destruction and that amount of dead bodies in one same area.

The scope of the damage reminded me of the Indian Ocean tsunami aftermath. The level of destruction two weeks after was astronomical. With one million cubic meters of debris in Tacloban alone, this was a huge job. As part of the debris management team with the UN, we had a large task ahead.

People in Tacloban and down the coast of Leyte through to Samar and Western Samar were clearly traumatized, yet I was struck by the gracious welcome regardless of situation; poor or rich, old or young, the doors (tents too) were always open.

The sites, especially the physical landscape of Eastern Samar from Basey to Guiuan, were some of the worst conditions I have seen in my humanitarian career. The damage looked like a combination of earthquake, tsunami, flooding and wind damage.

I waded in the flooded streets of our subdivision and upon reaching the Main Street of the city it was so silent , eerie, I saw injured people, dead people, confused people. What came to my mind was the scene in the "Ormoc Flush flood of 1991" where I also responded. So I surmised at that point that the damage must be massive!

There was no food, no water, no shelter. People were chocked, there were dead bodies along the roads and along the seashore. Buildings were totally devastated, there was smoke as if a bomb was dropped in Tacloban, I thought it was like World War. Debris were taller than the people along the main roads.

There was extensive damage to infrastructure and systems such as social welfare, education, health, etc. Basic means for survival such as food and water are scarce. There was a market collapse and a lot of people lost their means of livelihood.

I did assessment surveys on Panay Island and later Leyte. The vast amounts of damage were from wind. Having worked in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami and Japan 2011, I was not shocked by the damage, but was more shocked by how poor the level of housing and economy was prior to the typhoon. The vast majority of villagers had so very little to begin with, the typhoon just wiped out everything.

Feelings and emotions on arriving

Could not believe the site. Overwhelming. Feeling of sadness. At the same time feeling the urgency to act.

Overwhelmed and unprepared to manage the international DR scene.

Total devastation, had not been in an emergency in a few years and was looking forward to working on this one... the presence of the military although very valuable seemingly (accessing and giving access to out of reach zones) did create my side a discomfort.

Expected devastation since I have done a lot of humanitarian work before but not that extensive and so much suffering.

It was devastating to see the aftermath of Haiyan. Being also a Filipino, I really had the urge to do something for my country and deliver our relief as fast as we can specifically to the vulnerable groups (old people, children, pregnant and lactating women, PWD, etc,)

The scene was so depressing for this is the worst disaster i responded ever. It will break every responders heart seeing the situation. I have to walk from Palo to Tacloban city because the road is full of debris. I survive with the crackers i brought because food was no where to be found.

Impressed to see Philipino Authorities capacities.

Small side of the country touched and so enormous generosity and capacity from the rest of the country to provide support.

Disbelief and shock upon arrival at Tacloban Airport.

My first time in a humanitarian crisis. Was shocked by the devastation.

I noticed a very resilient people despite the massive damage and loss of life. Made me feel encouraged to work faster with community. Bit weird as was only black man in the area. Nonetheless all went well.

At first very much disturbing, however later on it was quite okay, knowing you are helping for a cause.

It was heartbreaking. Seeing the people you serve is inspiring since you see their hopeful spirits but seeing how slow the 'supposed' main actors in responding to their needs is very depressing. The government should act as the main responsible.

I arrived early December in Tacloban City. The moment I stepped outside the C130, I felt a heavy feeling of melancholy. It feels like there is very little sense of life in the whole area.

I was touched by the emotion poured out by the beneficiaries in areas severely devastated by the typhoon.

It's pretty obvious that overwhelmingly you don't know where to start!

First things done upon arriving

We immediately coordinated with the military which served as the backbone of the command structure, in the absence of fully performing civilian authorities in many areas, particularly those in Eastern Samar which is infested with communist rebels. The military provided us the needed information, transportation and security. Civilian population were very cooperative, especially when they knew that we are private organizations. We arrived in the area at the time when passion was so high and antagonistic to government authorities because of perceived inaction or delay in the delivery of goods and services.

Most LGUs have acted and provided their assistance with little support from central government. A lot of humanitarian organizations, UN agencies, INGOs, NGOs, organizations, church based organizations where helping people affected.

Arrival was in Tacloban where coordination meeting were held. Many organizations were represented and committed all kind of support and services, but in fact, very few had the capacity to deliver on the ground until late in the operation. Some never delivered what they promised.

The acceptance of communities in Philippines was very good. So UN Agencies and INGOs have delivered their programmes on schedule. No significant obstacles at that moment.

Where to start? How can we access, how can we bring in aid? There were no communication, what is still functioning?

I was menber of fact finding team for medical relief in Philippines. We went to Cebu first. Actually, there was already occupied international and domestic relief team. So, we moved to the west Leyte. The Ormoc also has occupied but around towns were not it.

Many patients and pregnant or lactating women has been coming to the Rural Health Unit. Some barangays especially in mountainous area had been neglected from international relief teams. There were shortage of health care service even two weeks after Haiyan.

Timeline: pre-deployment, day 0

I was pre-deployed on Day 0 (November 7) together with four other in the initial Rapid Assessment Team. I was particularly tasked to assist in the rapid assessment for the education cluster and child protection cluster. In the morning of Day 0, I was already assessing the level of preparations from the regional down to the division and schools level. The cluster felt confident about the preparations done by the cluster. This was shared in the inter-cluster command meeting in the afternoon of same day. Our team was lodged at the DepEd Regional Training Center - within same premises where the Emergency Operations Center for DepEd and the education cluster was set-up.

At landfall all the preparations came to naught. There was total devastation in the aftermath. Our rapid assessment team was just lucky to have survived.

Lessons:

- Pre-deployed teams must be positioned at a safe distance; safety and security must always be assured priority. Only then can responders consider accessibility and mobility.

- Second line teams should be equipped with even more preparations and supplies to cover also first responders who could also need rescue and relief.

Timeline: the first week

I arrived to the Philippines just five days after the typhoon, but was traveling only to Cebu island for the management level discussions and consultations. I was not directly at the affected sites but met people influenced by the typhoon and saw huge volunteers support from other sites (Manila, Cebu city) and it was overwhelming how supportive other people are.

The destruction is massive with vital necessities totally unavailable. Compared with all the emergencies I responded to since 2004 in the Philippines, it is the first time that the local government has failed to function in the first three days and the national government's difficulty of mobilizing resources at the ground level.

I arrived a couple of days after the storm landed (monday) in Tacloban. The city was still in a difficult situation. Looting, dead bodies not disposed, no aid getting in due to logistic constraints. It was amazing that commercial passenger air services were restored so quickly (this is how i arrived)

I am a professional paramedic and do a lot of work with Medical Teams International, based out of Portland area in USA. I have been an active volunteer with MTI since 2006. My team arrived a few days after typhoon hit. As you know it was total devastation. Pretty much as I expected, but I was still quite shocked! No power, water, and food becoming scarce. With little to no communication. Streets were just starting to be cleaned up so people could get around.

Here in Cebu province after 2 days, when the typhoon hit, we had our rapid needs assessment for immediate needs of the affected community. It was quite devastating and the high way road was not accessible but thanks to the help of the people in need they are helping in the clearing of the roads and letting vehicles pass in the areas that were affected but on the mountain areas roads are really unaccessible but thanks to this kind of attitude and approach of the people midst of the devastation of the typhoon they are still willing to aid others and their fellow citizen in their community.

Timeline: The second week

The first time we came to Ormoc City with my colleague from Sweden, two weeks after the calamity to do an ocular, the feeling was very sad as we saw that many structures were destroyed and it seemed like the whole town was hit by a bomb! We didn't know anybody from that place yet thru referrals we were able to get in touch with some key people who helped us with our plan of giving relief aid for the long term and as a phase two operation by means of medical equipment and tools.

I arrived on second week d-day, and still not many INGO work and no electricity, only limited phone acces. Public facility still close and only limited store and trader that already available. Only 1 hotel available but fully book.

Timeline: The third week

I was shocked when I first entered Leyte Island via ferry and took the bus from Ormoc to Tacloban, although it was three weeks after landfall. Many children along this main road (must have been the way of many other NGOs before) were still asking for food, partly running behind the buses to get some little donations. The first signs of international assistance were only seen in Palo and Tacloban. This is a very limited view as I had no chance to leave the bus and see other villages along the road. Nevertheless, this is one of the first shocking personal impressions as I am also working for an international NGOs. I felt quite helpless in these moments although the international donations were huge from the very first beginning. The second strong impression was about the strong solidarity among the affected people and huge capacities to stand up and support each other. Despite the horrible experiences and losses of the people especially during the first days and weeks, the atmosphere and hospitality was amazingly positive!

## Timeline: The fourth week or later

It has been a bit chaotic for the first few week due to the large number of humanitarian workers coming into the country at the same time, however after the first month everyone settle down into their respective area of work.

Located in Manila initially then arrived in Tacloban 1st April. Accomodation was difficult. Contact was made with owner of a restaurant with regard to employment of national staff, which made settling in easier.

8.3 Roles and previous experience

The survey was limited to the people working within the UN cluster-network during the relief operation.

In chapter 8.1 the organization background was presented, where 51 % weres international NGOs and 26 % of the people answered the survey had a UN-background. The following presents the experience of these people and in what roles they worked. When asking about the roles, many of these people have been working in multiple roles, both in the field and also on a strategic level. By sorting the answers by the most high level, you get an overview how many were involved in the different levels. Here I have counted only the highest levels. For example if you have been working both in a strategic level and operative level, only the strategic level is counted in Fig. 26.

What was your role in the work you did?	N
Management/strategic level	32
Management/operative level, field	28
Working in the field/staff	9
Expert	5
Volunteers/field	4
Working in the field/teamleader, field management coordinator	2
sum	80

Fig. 26 The different roles the respondents worked within

Fig. 26 shows that there are only 5 % of the respondents that are volunteering in the field. However, many of the people that answered marked both volunteering in the field and some other level. When sorting out everyone that checked the volunteer box there is a turnout of 11 % of volunteers within the respondents as shown in Fig. 27.


Fig. 27 Number of respondents volunteering (N=9) and having a salary-based assignment in the operation (N=71).

Fig. 27 states that 11 % are working as volunteers within the respondents. The following Fig. 28 presents the experience of the respondents by their organization background. The respondents were asked to check a box in the survey if Haiyan/Yolanda was their first disaster relief operation, if they had been a part of 1-5, 6-9 or 10+ operations.The international NGOs have the highest amount of people with one or more operations in their CV:s, as well as the largest percentage of people with experience of 10 or more operations.

Fig. 28 The experience of working within a natural disaster relief operation. N is shown in the numbers of the graph.

When sorting the answers in Fig. 28 by their role in the operation as shown in Fig. 29, it is possible to look at if the experience was linked to the role given in the operation. Most experience was found in the "Management/Strategic level" of the answers.


Fig. 29 Previous experience sorted by role in the operation. N is shown in the numbers of the graph.

The respondents were also asked to comment freely on the question of experience. In the comments, previous experience was considered important, helpful and made one well

prepared for working in a disaster zone. The respondents mentioned that they had experience from disasters like the 2008 Nargis operation, the 2008 Haiti cyclone, 2010 Haiti earthquake, Aceh Tsunami, Earthquake in Padang-West Sumatera, Earthquake in Jogyakarta-Central Java, Myanmar Cyclon and more.

Previous experience, as well as training, qualifications and good standards of preparation were considered to:

- mitigate against physical and mental stress
- enables efficient working
- reduce need for over managing
- enable team working
- being able to manage welfare of self and others
- assist with coordinating roles and duties, leadership

Previous disaster experience was also considered to help you focus on key problems and know what and why things should be done. Approaching previous funding partners and understanding of the evolving situation was also mentioned as important outcome of previous experience.

There was also a comment on that every situation is different than the other, and the Haiyan disaster was bigger in scope and the needs were extensive.

8.4   The importance of a local contact network in the disaster area

The following graphics, Fig. 30-31, presents the previous contacts and network that the organizations had before the typhoon, and the importance of good local contacts.

Fig. 30 shows that 70 % of the respondent's organizations had a previous contact network within the affected areas.

Fig. 30 Answers showing 70 % of the respondent's organizations having an existing contact network in the Philippines before the typhoon. (N yes=59, No=21, I don´t know=4)


Fig. 31 Previous contact network in the area by organization background, %. (N PHGOV=6, NGOPH= 13, INGO=40, UN=22)

There was a possibility to an open comment to this question. As a total there was four pages of text in the comments given.

The UN organizations respondents had built their previous network mostly through the government. Familiar faces, built trust and good relations was considered important and organizing a helping operation was considered much easier if one had good contacts in advance. The contacts both helped with facilitating the process as well as practical things, such as logistics and accommodation. Good relations and trust helped to save lives.

The interational NGOs also gave a range of examples of how previous contact network helped to work in the affected areas. Trust, credibility, connections with local authorities, language skills and local knowledge, knowledge of the culture, information of the situation on site, communication, logistics and accommodation are things that are mentioned as benefits of having good local connections. Some of the INGOs had been in the Philippines for decades, while one stated that they made friends with a couple of people on site. The international NGOs thought that the contact network speeded up the process and made it possible to reach people on site better. The kind of network varied, some were a part of an international network of organizations, other had friends and family as contacts on site. In general, good local connections was considered a great help.

National NGOs from the Philippines took part in the relief efforts. In the Survey´s comments, churches were mentioned as a good partner to coordinate with. Local churches was considered "reliable and honest". The respondents commented that an existing network makes the work easier with for example data gathering, staffing, distribution, guidance and stay in the affected areas. In some cases there were problems with communication due to the phone network was down after the typhoon.

8.5   Geographical coordination

Up to 70 % of the respondent's organizations had a previous contact network on site (Fig. 30). Still ¼ of the respondent's organizations did not have any previous connections to the affected areas when arriving to help out in the disaster. How did the different organizations coordinate their efforts in the relief operation? After all, when there were some 1500 contact persons and their organizations working within the UN OCHA cluster network in a huge need of help for millions of people in a disaster area, the question of geographical coordination is very hot.

In the survey, this was asked and the respondents were asked what determined the geographical area they did work in. There was a possibility both to choose options from a list and also to fill in any own option. The answers differ between the different organizations as shown in Fig. 32 and Fig. 33.

Fig. 32 Base for geographic coordination wihtin the UN organizations (N=23)

Fig. 32 shows that within the UN organizations 78 % (N=18) of the respondents say that the coordination happened within the UN administrated international operation (UN OCHA cluster network). The other options were represented by one answer (N=1). Some also answered that they went were needed, if their expertise, for example, was in oil pollution.


Fig. 33 Base for geographical coordination within the Philippine government organizations (N=6).

The respondents from the Philippine government are presented in Fig. 33. They mostly used their own contacts within the public sector (government contacts N=4, local government contacts N=1) as well as the UN coordination network (N=1) to coordinate

efforts. There seem not to be any government – NGO coordination in these answers. Within the answers of the international NGOs, 10 % say that they coordinated their activities with the military or government, as shown in Fig. 35.

Fig. 34 Base for the geographical coordination within the national NGOs (N=11).

The Philippine NGOs had a broader range in how they coordinated geographically as presented in Fig. 34. None of these organization coordinated with the UN network to decide in witch area to work. These NGOs worked mostly through their own network and contacts. Some made own assessment plans to coordinate, consulted their own international contacts or worked with the local government contacts. Some also worked based on church involvement, through the church network.


Fig. 35 Bases for geographical coordination, international NGOs (N=59).

For the international NGOs the picture of how the organization coordinated their efforts is even broader. Fig. 35 presents that 24 % of the NGOs used the UN coordination network to decide where to go. Another 24 % of the NGOs used their own local contacts, 20 % planned together within their own international organization. 14 % coordinated with other NGOs in the area and 8 % did independent assessment for their own organization. There were also some coordination with the military or government.

8.6 Experiences from cooperation, coordination and sharing information

When asking whether one thought that sharing information was necessary for a successful operation in the field, everyone answered that information sharing is very necessary (N=52) or somewhat necessary (N=3). No one answered that they did not consider information sharing necessary.

The UN organizations shared some aspects about this topic. The respondents say that cooperation, coordination and information sharing is not an easy task in a disaster response operation. There seems to be both positive and negative observations within the UN organizations.

Initially information sharing was considered slow, but improved over time, especially when people got familiar with each other. There was many examples of good communication, coordination and information sharing. Sharing information saves time.

One challenge in this operation was duplication of the relief efforts. On the con-list there was also the decision making process and competition between organizations. The Manila Headquarter and outsiders to the field gets feedback for having made decisions and statements that had a negative impact on existing relationships on the field.

There was a certain competition between organizations that lead to that some refused to share information to get an advantage and positioning themselves, maybe for visibility purposes. That did not help to respond to the general situation, was stated in the comments.

The respondents representing a Philippine government organization commented that there was coordinative meetings with donors and organizations. They also commented on that previous disaster response had laid a good foundation for cooperation. The distribution of responsibility and tasks was good and they felt there was no overlapping. Some organizations worked slower than others was considered problematic for coordination.

The international NGOs had a various range of experience. The OCHA cluster system was considered to have strengths and weaknesses. Many commented on that coordination and information sharing is an area of development and that coordination activities are good to use time for only if they lead to a decision. The international NGOs answers were more filled with criticism but still generally in a constructive way, acknowledging that it is not easy to coordinate and share information.

There were both good and poor experiences of the OCHA cluster-system. Good aspects mentioned was that for example maps produced and information within the cluster system helps to be able to talk to the right people when planning. However, there was also a comment that good maps were not available before 4 months after in specific regions. The "open door policy" from the UN got some regards.

8.7   Building an overview of the situation on site

The respondents of the survey were asked about their experience of first arriving on site to begin working in the disaster zone. When arriving on site there were a lot of emotions and a possibility to evaluate the situation from a personal perspective. In order to get to work, there was a need for building a situation overview. Almost in every answer of both the interview and survey, information and communication is commented. The lack of communication possibilities made functioning difficult and the coordination efforts, at least within the first weeks, were difficult and in some cases lead to failure to deliver, according to the comments. To be able to function there was a need for preparation and planning.

In the survey the respondents were asked about what kind of tools the organizations used when preparing and to build as good situation overview as possible in advance. One question was about what kind of background information they had when arriving on site. This would tell about preparations in the organization before entering the disaster zone.

Table 7. The respondent's answers on the question of information gathered before entering the operation. The table shows the percent of respondents that checked the box in particular. The top three highest percentage is marked yellow, the poorest knowledge topic in red.

Did you have enough information on the following topics before the operation? Checking the boxes means that you had good enough information before arrival.					UN	PHGOV	GOV INT	NGO PH	INGO
General information about the Philippines					54,5	40,0	33,3	77,8	82,9
General information about climate and health issues					54,5	40,0	66,7	55,6	61,0
Information about the disaster					81,8	100,0	66,7	77,8	80,5
About the international operation					54,5	20,0	66,7	44,4	46,3
About the government					40,9	40,0	0,0	33,3	22,0
About the local government					40,9	80,0	0,0	44,4	36,6
About the army					18,2	20,0	0,0	33,3	14,6
The security situation, status					40,9	40,0	66,7	55,6	51,2
Contact information to others					40,9	40,0	33,3	22,2	53,7
OTHER					0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Only what shared in media					4,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Cultural dynamics					4,5	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Logistics					0,0	0,0	0,0	11,1	0,0
N					22	5	3	9	41

In Table 7 the answers between the UN organizations, Philippine government, international government, local NGOs and international NGOs are compared to each other.

The top three answers are similar in all categories: information about the disaster, general information about the Philippines and general information about climate and health issues dominates the top three. Information on the international operation only came in the top three within the UN organizations and the respondents that represented an international government. Within the NGOs a lower percentage thought they had enough information on the international operation. Information about the army scores the lowest numbers within both UN and international NGOs. Local NGOs could have had better contact information in their opinion.

8.8   To get started on site

The respondents were asked to name the three most important things to focus on, to get started once you arrive. The question considered choices and the possibility to fill in other options (see Appendix 1). The following Table 8 shows all the answers of those who have selected the three most important things to focus on.

Table 8. The three most important things to focus on when arriving on site, top three marked with yellow, the least important marked with red.

When arriving on site in this natural disaster, what did you think were the three most important things to get started?					UN	PHGOV	GOV INT	NGO PH	INGO
General information of the Philippine society					8,7	20,0	0,0	10,0	2,4
General maps					21,7	40,0	0,0	10,0	21,4
Information of the general situation/disaster					56,5	80,0	33,3	40,0	66,7
Mobile communication					13,0	20,0	0,0	40,0	23,8
Internet connection					17,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	21,4
Information about logistics, such as ferries					17,4	20,0	33,3	20,0	19,0
Food and clean water					26,1	20,0	33,3	50,0	33,3
Accommodation for staff members					21,7	0,0	0,0	10,0	31,0
Information on where to buy supplies					0,0	20,0	33,3	30,0	2,4
Contact information within the UN network					43,5	0,0	66,7	30,0	14,3
Contact information to government					21,7	40,0	33,3	30,0	4,8
Contact information to local government					39,1	40,0	0,0	50,0	28,6
Contact information to NGO's					4,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	9,5
OTHER					0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
PSEA Orientation					4,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Internal government system					0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,4
ALL					0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,4
Contact to local counterpart organization					0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,4
Security					0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	2,4
N					23	5	3	10	42

The number of respondents in this question were 23 within UN organizations, 5 Philippine government, 3 international government, 10 local NGOs and 42 international NGOs.

Within the UN organizations the top three priority was given to information of the general situation and disaster (56,5 %), contact information within the UN network (43,5%) and contact information to the local government (39,1 %). The lowest numbers from the list was given to information where to buy supplies (0,0 %), general information about the Philippine society (8,7 %) and mobile communication (13%).

The Philippine government respondents emphasized information. The local NGOs would focus on food and clean water as well as contact information to local government first (50 %) followed by mobile communication and general situation information (40 %). The local NGO respondents considered internet connection not being important (0 %).

The international NGOs priority list was information about the general situation and disaster (66,7 %), food and clean water (33,3 %) and accommodation for staff members (31,0 %). The international NGOs lowest scores is going to general information of the society and where to buy supplies (2,4 %) followed by contact information to the government (4,8 %).

8.9   Map tools used in the relief operation

There were a lot of different kind of maps and infographics available within the international relief operation. Experience of what was presented in different forums at that time lead to selecting some questions about the map tools used by different organizations. The idea was to first test if maps, infographics and aerial photos actually was used during the relief operation by different organizations. Then there was a question of what material would have been considered useful, if they would have been available. The following pictures shows example of the different kind of maps that were available in the UN OCHA network and published online on the website www.humanitarianresponse.info.

Other than these maps, for example NGOs did their own assessments and in some cases even produced own aerial photographs. There was a lot of media coverage as well. The respondents in the survey were asked about their use of information in their work.


Fig. 36 Example of maps available online during the Haiyan/Yolanda relief operation the second day after landfall (humanitarianresponse.info, 2013).

Fig. 37 Example of aerial photographs available the next day after impact (humanitarianresponse.info, 2013).

PHILIPPINES: Summary of Response Activities (as of 19 November 2013) — OCHA

Reg.	Prov.	👪	📖	🏠	📶	🌾	⚕	🤝	🚰	🔧	🍲	🚽	🙂	Total
IV-B	Occidental Mindoro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	Palawan	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	13	0	0	0	0	14
VI	Aklan	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	8
	Antique	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	4
	Capiz	0	5	2	1	2	5	5	7	0	0	1	1	30
	Iloilo	0	1	8	0	5	2	3	7	0	0	0	0	26
	Negros Occidental	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	5
VII	Bohol	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	5
	Cebu	0	3	12	1	25	5	5	29	2	2	1	0	86
VIII	Eastern Samar	0	2	4	0	16	8	17	27	0	0	0	0	74
	Leyte	2	5	23	2	28	16	14	41	3	0	1	0	136
	Northern Samar	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	6
	Samar	0	1	8	0	7	4	2	6	0	0	0	0	28
	Southern Leyte	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	6
	Total	2	19	60	4	84	49	47	134	5	2	3	2	414

Affected Persons (in thousands): 0 - 250 | 250-500 | 500-750 | 750-1,000 | > 1,000

The numbers above represent the number of organizations working in a sector (or in some cases, subsector) by province. The figures above are almost certainly incomplete. Nevertheless the sectoral and geographic coverage shown above can be considered indicative of the overall response.

The Province names are colored based on the number of people affected as reported in the DSWD DROMIC report of 19 Nov 2013.

Data Sources: HCT Cluster lead agencies in the Philippines, contact database philippines.humanitarianresponse.info, information collected from public sources by the Digital Humanitarian Network, Map Action, and Bangonph.com.

Fig. 38 Example of maps available during the Haiyan/Yolanda relief operation day 11 (humanitarianresponse.info, 2013).

Table 9. Use of different map tools in the relief operation, %, top three marked with yellow, the lowest score with red.

| Did you use some of the following information in your work in Haiyan/Yolanda reliefoperation?					
% UN	PHGOV	GOV INT	NGO PH	INGO
Maps and information system	87,0	100,0	100,0	88,9	78,6
General roadmaps	47,8	60,0	33,3	33,3	40,5
Maps of specific areas	78,3	80,0	33,3	66,7	95,2
Disaster impact maps, general situation	82,6	100,0	66,7	44,4	64,3
Disaster impact maps, local situation	73,9	60,0	66,7	55,6	71,4
Relief operation maps presenting relief operation	69,6	40,0	100,0	44,4	64,3
Local aerial photographs of specific sites, such as villages, roads	34,8	60,0	33,3	22,2	23,8
Drone aerial photography or 3 D models of disaster sites	21,7	40,0	0	11,1	9,5
OTHER	0	0	0	0	0
Satellite image	4,3	0	0	0	0
Own assesment, aerial and ground	0	0	0	0	2,4
N	23	5	3	9	42

Table 9 shows that almost every one of the respondents had used some of the map tools in their work within the operation. All of the respondents with a UN organization background answered this questions by checking boxes, 71 % of the respondents representing the Philippine government, all of the international government answers (only three persons answered), 81 % of the national NGOs and 93 % of the international NGOs had used some of the map tools in their work.

The question about what kind of map tools were used in the planning was followed by a question if some of the map tools presented would have been of help if they had been available. Most of the respondents would have liked to use all kind of maps and tools. The difference between used and possible future use was not big. However, there was a difference between the percentage that used aerial or drone photographs to the percentage that would have liked to use them, if available. The results are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. The difference between those who had used aerial or drone material to those that would have liked to use such a material

Do you think some of the following information would have been helpful on site in your work?	UN		PHGOV		GOV INT		NGO PH		INGO	
%	Used	Would like	Used	Would like	Used	Would like	Used	Would like	Used	Would like
Local aerial photographs of specific sites, such as villages, roads	34,8	52,2	60,0	100,0	33,3	33,3	22,2	33,3	23,8	47,6
Drone aerial photography or 3 D models of disaster sites	21,7	65,2	40,0	80,0	0,0	0,0	11,1	22,2	9,5	45,2

Answers, N	UN	PHGOV	GOV INT	NGO PH	INGO
	23	5	3	9	42

In Table 10 there is a higher percentage that thought local aerial photos or drone aerial photography would have been helpful in their work.

8.10 Training for working in a disaster zone

One of this thesis goals was to work on questions on how you can prepare for working in a disaster zone. By mapping the experience of the people that have been working in the Haiyan relief operation another goal was to build a material that can be used in training. In the survey the respondents were asked, whether they had received training within the organization for the work they were doing on site in the relief operation.

Did you receive training from your organization for the work on site?			
N	Yes	No	Sum
UN	9	12	21
PH GOV	5		5
GOV INT	2	1	3
PH NGO	7	3	10
INGO	30	12	42
Sum	53	28	81

Fig. 39 The percentage of the respondents that had received training for the work they were going to do on site and the table showing the number of answers.

The graphics in Fig. 39 shows that 35 % of the respondents had not received any training. 57 % of the respondents with a UN background had not received any training. There were 5 answers from the Philippine government, that all had received training. Within the other organizations some 30 % had not received any training.

Fig. 40 Different kind of training received by the respondents (N=53).

Fig. 40 shows what kind of training the respondents had received. Those who had not received training are sorted out of this graph. Most of the 65 % that had received training by their organization had received training in a broad spectre. 83 % had received a general disaster knowledge training that gave the respondent tools of understanding the situation. This topic was followed by coordination with other organizations, security issues and professional skills within their own cluster. Other training that was mentioned in the "other" box were first aid, humanitarian charter and principles, informal training in daily staff meetings, counterparts in relief and development, international coordination, technical topics, child protection, livelihood and specific organization training packages.

Fig. 41 The kind of training that would have been useful for the respondents that did not receive training (N=28).

The Fig. 41 shows the answers on what kind of training that those respondents that did not receive training would have had use for. General disaster knowledge gets the highest scores along with coordination with other organizations on site. Decision making and leadership along with psychological skills and personal health and hygiene are ranked a little higher in the list of "would-likes" compared to the training received.

The respondents were also asked to select the three most important topics in training. There was also a possibility to comment the question about training. Here follows a summary of the comments of them who had received training. In the comments the respondents speak highly of training and the importance of good training in order to perform.

Without training, the organization would not deliver.

Pros - needs should be contextualized; knew that quality and coordination are important, cons – none.

Training for this kind of situation has to be practical and experiential. Simulations are very useful for some areas.

I had the DRR training which I think is very important to have an appreciation of what's has happened and how to respond to emergencies. I guess the most important thing is to first know the basics and you proceed from there.

I learned my disaster training from IDRN International Disaster Response Network. Communication is very important in every disaster.

It is also important to have a RAT (rapid assessment team) to assess every disaster and forward updates.

It's very important to act fast and be decisive. Gathering all facts and data that you can acquire by communicating with the proper channels in order to make an informed decision so that intervention can be delivered to the intended target group in a proper setting at the most timely manner possible.

We always believe that we cannot prevent disaster but we can prepare people to have the CAPACITY to respond. Many would like to attend training for the sake of the certificates they can get, but most of them you will not be seen on site when disaster come.

(With training) you know what to do, where to go, how to do it and who to talk with.

Cultural sensitivity is VERY important in realizing the overall goal of why you are there.

The trainings mostly provided skills in terms of dealing and providing emergency response relevant to the disaster.

I didn't have an actual training but information on how to do by learning through experience and having listening to my heads and talking to other people who has more experience and by reading some guidelines and doing it in the field.

8.11 Evaluation of the relief operation

As the last questions, the respondents were asked to evaluate the relief operation. The respondents were asked if they were happy with the results of their own organizations relief operation on a scale of 1-5 where 1 meant not happy and 5 excellent. The same question was asked about the international operation and the results of it. There were also a possibility to comment on both questions.

Fig. 42 Respondent's evaluation of their own organization's relief operations results (N=74, UN=23, INGO=42, PH NGO=9).

Fig. 42 shows that most of the respondents, not depending on the organization represented, thought that their own organization had made good or excellent results. Some 50 % of the responses was the number 4 on a scale of 1 to 5.

Within the UN organizations there was a comment that they thought the relief efforts of their specific agency were effective and were fast and far-reaching. On the negative side there was a comment on leadership struggle later on in the operation. When this survey was done, the operation was still going on. One respondent with experience from the 2005 tsunami in Banda Aceh, thought the relief operations have made improvements on response from there on.

The Philippine NGOs commented they felt they could reach far places where other organizations did not dare to go.

International NGO respondents made mostly positive comments on their own operation. There were logistic challenges, good cooperation and coordination and good experiences from local staff. In one comment there was expressed gratitude that there were no security incidents. On the negative side there was in some cases bigger needs than what could be addressed, a need for faster implementation and fewer bottlenecks in transportation would have been better for logistics.

Fig. 43 Respondent's evaluation of the international relief operation results (N=71, UN=23, INGO=39, PH NGO=9).

The respondents gave a little lower numbers to the international relief operation and the results. The Philippine NGOs average is on 56 % number 3, the international NGOs highest percentage number is on 3, while the UN organizations are on a 39 % highest score on a number 4.

The respondents with a UN organization background both praised the international operation, criticised it and commented on what could have been done better. One comment said that the coordination was outstanding, the response was quick and most areas was easy to reach. There was also a comment on that most efforts made a positive impact in the community. Things that could have been done better was better avoiding duplication, there was many people not reached in the upland areas while some areas took a long time to reach. Some also thought there was a lack of leadership, commented on the fact that a number of international NGOs did not cooperate with the local government and that the operation to some extent happened in parallel to the operation lead by the Philippine government.

The comments from Philippine NGOs were both thankful for the international help and at the same time criticised the way some acted on the field. Coordination and working with local agencies needed improvement, better acknowledgement of the capacity within the Philippines. The international operation in some cases had seemed very bureaucratic. One

comment also stated that local NGOs had been pushed away by big international organizations.

The international NGOs gave both positive and negative comments. On the positive side there was comments on that the international operation was very well organized, had a great impact, good formal and informal contacts and that some "new players" were very competent. The UN OCHA and the cluster system got some positive feedback. On the other side, the coordination could have been done better at all levels, the operation in parts had seemed disorganized, slow, unclear priorities and with weak sharing. There was still room for improvement, according to some comments by the international NGOs.

8.12 Lessons learned

The final question in the survey was an open comment box where the respondents could leave open comments about lessons learned.

The respondents with UN background made the following remarks about lessons learned in the Philippines and the Haiyan relief operation:

- Coordination remains a challenge.
- Some NGOs are good at getting information, but not in sharing information.
- Huge area to work in spreads out the personnel and leads to shortage in manpower.
- The Haiyan response was an operation with an extended timeframe. As different members of the organization are deployed for different lengths of time, there is a problem with continuity as personnel gets relieved by another team member.
- A problem is the organizations refusing to work with the UN coordination. Relief efforts that are not coordinated will reduce the effectiveness of overall relief operations and sometimes even bring negative effects.
- The openness and cooperation with the local and national authorities as well as the mind-set of the local population was the key to success.
- There should be a centralized location for coordination where NGOs, government and security forces can meet.

The local NGOs commented that it would be good to ease and localize criteria on who deserved help in the communities affected. If you partner with a local organization like for

example a local church, be sure to provide help for them (the local organizations staff) as well. There was also a comment on that there should be a more pro-active pre-disaster program needed to minimize casualty and avoid duplication.

The international NGO respondents made a list of lessons learned, summarized in a list:.

- Learn the culture first.
- Prioritize areas based on local information, not Manila deciding.
- The staff needs to be flexible and ready to take on new roles.
- It is important to coordinate with other humanitarian actors and the government as well as the local government and people. Coordination and communication is important to maintain as the operation goes on.
- Scaling up relief teams and logistics capacity is a key to achieving more.
- Securing funding is important.
- Media communication and information sharing should be a higher priority and done far better.
- Avoid sensationalism and politics.
- It is always of great value to help others.

9 Implementation study: DRR planning in FS

In the case study analyse of the decisions made, it was found that the partner NGO had not done any planning in advance for how to respond to a natural disaster. Still, the disaster response, recovery and recovery process was a success and the local NGO FHDFI was awarded for their efforts by the government (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014). Still there are lessons to be learned in the organization.

As mentioned in the interviews and personal communications, there were concerns on the way that could be addressed and prepared for. By doing simulations and planning, the risks that are involved in natural disasters can be reduced. When prepared, response and disaster management will work better or at least ease the pressure if one knows what to do. In this chapter a pilot implementation study is presented how crisis management, Disaster Risk Reduction, DRR, training and policy could be implemented in the FS organization, projects and networks. The plan is based on the thesis background study, workshops, interview and personal communication. Fig. 44 illustrates how the organization should plan for DRR by implementing experiences and lessons learned from past events to future plans.

Fig. 44 Natural hazards turning into disaster response and disaster management. When lessons learned from disaster management is turned into disaster risk management, future risks of hazards turning into disasters will be reduced.

9.1 Crisis management planning in FS and member organizations

In a workshop held 25th of November 2014 in the FS Global organization it was decided to start a project of crisis management planning based on the experiences within the organization. FS global stated that there should be a crisis management plan, instructions for the member organizations and suggestions for organizational changes, if needed. It was decided that this thesis would be a base for the planning.

During the spring 2015, before FS had adopted any crisis management plan, the next crisis situation was a fact when the earthquake in Nepal hit areas where FS's partner organizations were working. FS also had a Finnish team in Nepal at that time, and there was a need for crisis communication of different kind during that time. The Nepal crisis just emphasized the urge for having a simple enough, but proper plan for such a situation, how to respond within the organization. The Nepal crisis was followed by a decision of appointing a Crisis Management Special Adviser to the organization. This voluntary person would be able to help facilitate future situations.

Leadership in a crisis situation

Fig. 45 The current FS organization in 2015

Fig. 45 shows a graph of the current FS organization. The FS NGO consists of member organizations (MOs) and the member organizations of member churches. The MO's manages the ODA-projects that are financed by member churches and ODA. The projects are managed by MO boards or committees. The umbrella organization FS has its own board and president.

Because of the nature of the organization, it is good to consider leadership and responsibilities within the organization. The member organizations are not equally large in budget or number of project or staff, so responsibility cannot be delegated in a way that the head of FS is not in charge. Leadership is needed in a crisis situation, and the top organization must be the responsible actor in a crisis situation.

Proposal to crisis management organization

Fig. 46. Proposed crisis management organization for FS

It is important in a crisis management situation that there is a mandate for decision making. As presented in the timeline of the first two weeks after the typhoon in chapter 7, the FSPM Asia-committee was quite fast in decision making right after the typhoon. The Asia committee held a meeting where decisions were made on Day 3, as soon as communications were established to the Philippines. However, the FS organization took no role in decision making in this process. When analyzing this particular event, an FS decision was not needed to manage this crisis, but the role of FS was not clear. Due to this fact, a clarification of the FS role in a crisis situation is needed.

As the ultimate responsibility to act in a crisis situation should rest on the top organization and the person in lead, the FS president is the person that have to have the authority and responsibility to activate the crisis management plan. The president activates the crisis management and appoints the crisis management team. This does not mean that MOs should be passive, just waiting for the president to act, but of course to take action when

needed. The MO's should be active in suggesting an activating of the crisis management plan to the president.

To save time, the president should have the authority to activate the plan without consulting the FS board. However, the FS board should be notified by the activation.

The crisis management team should be planned in advance by every MO. The group should consist of people having the best knowledge and know-how of the projects, the situation and the persons involved. The FS mandate is appointed in advance or by the FS president. FS crisis management advisor and information manager should be a part of the crisis management team. These roles can of course be combined. The MO Mandate is represented by the normal decision making groups, the boards or committees. By no means is it meant that the crisis management team overruns or takes over command, the idea is to enforce the normal decision making group by additional mandatory and advisors. By doing this, there is always a mandate of the whole FS organization within the crisis management team.

Information management

Fig. 47 Information management in the crisis management team

There is a lot of need for information in a crisis situation, both to the project involved, authorities and ministries, internal and external communication as well as to families and relatives to people involved in the crisis. Therefore, there should be a special information manager that facilitates the communication needed. Fig. 47 illustrates the information

manager and the information flow within the crisis communication. The information manager is a trained person with skills of crisis communications, media communication and well informed about the FS organization and projects. The information manager can be but is not necessarily the spokesperson of the organization in every communication direction. The information manager plans, facilitates and works as an expert and advicer to the crisis management team. The information management is planned in a way that the crisis management team is always informed what's going on.

The members of the MO boards and committees should have a working routine how to be able to communicate even if a physical meeting is not possible. The FSPM uses a communication program for meetings over the internet, which is a good way of arranging meetings so that time consuming travel can be avoided.

Crisis management funding

In a crisis situation there can be a sudden need for extra funding. In the case of the typhoon disaster, there was of course a need for funding for relief goods. FS has not developed certification or access to humanitarian funding within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland so the organization is dependent on other funding for extraordinary events. ODA-funding cannot be used in crisis situations. In the typhoon case, there was a public collection of money that funded most of the response and recovery project. The media exposure helped a lot and the possibility to do advertisements in several newspapers about the fundraising broadened the public pledge for funds. This made the relief and rebuilding efforts possible in the typhoon case. The lack of possibilities to receive governmental humanitarian funding can be a question worth considering in the organization. Humanitarian funding could be a valuable resource and possibility in a future relief operation.

However, in the early stages, the first week after the typhoon there was a decision to send a small team to the Philippines. At that point there was a possibility to fund only one airline ticket for the team, the second was financed by private donations that came afterwards. This was a great thing, but for the future capacity to respond quickly, a special crisis fund within the FS Global should be appointed. This capacity for fast decisions on smaller extra costs like visas, airline tickets, evacuation, emergency accommodation and first response before other fundraising is activated, can be of use. This can especially be the fact if the crisis nature is of a nature that is not enough of public interest to generate external funding.

Checklist for the FS NGO in a crisis situation

When a crisis is a fact or is about to erupt, the member organization check list

- If the crisis is severe and affects the personnel or contacts to the projects, the crisis management team should be activated
- Contact the field personnel, let them know we are working on the crisis, assess needs and build a situation overview. Read local and international news to support the situation overview.
- Contact the FS president and report, activate the crisis management plan and organization
- See that you know who is the FS representative in the crisis management team
- Gather the MO board or committee that is responsible for the project involved in the crisis
- Assess the needs in the project
- Contact family and establish communication

FS president checklist

- Recieve information from the MO and build a situation overview
- Decision about activating the crisis management team, see that the CMT is called to its first meeting
- Decide who is representing FS in the CMT
- Notify the FS board members
- Keep updated of the situation development

First meeting of the crisis management team check list

- Build a situation overview, what has happened, what is the status on site
- Short term needs assessment and decisions
- What authorities needs to be contacted?
- Do we need to contact family members?
- Do we need to establish media relations?
- Preliminary long term needs assessment and discussion about impacts
- Decisions about what actions need to be taken
- Proper documentation of every decision

Communication check list

- Who needs to know what has happened?
- Involved families need to be informed before the media
- Decisions who comments on the situation to the media
- What questions needs to be answered for us in order to be able to talk to the media
- Do we know enough in order to comment on the situation to media?
- Do not guess or exaggerate when speaking to the media, keep to the truth and what is known facts
- Respect the integrity of the people involved

After the crisis

- See that people involved is provided with crisis support and a possibility for debriefing
- Talk about what happened
- Evaluate decisions made
- Update the crisis management plan and the organizational structures if necessary based on lessons learned

9.2   DRR planning in FS Global projects

The disaster risk reduction needs to be done on a project level and by the people involved in the projects. Even a simple DRR plan is better than no planning. This chapter presents some points for building an easy DRR plan for the projects based on the typhoon experience in the case study earlier in this thesis.

The DRR planning should first start with a risk analyzing process. What hazards are threats to the area we are working in? In what way can it affect our lives on site, the project and people? Make a list of the hazards and the situation that can follow. In the typhoon example the list could look like the following:

```
Project: Example project
Hazard: Category 5 Typhoon
Environment: +240 km/h winds, breaking houses, flying debris, falling trees,
heavy rain, cold temperature
Disaster impacts:

    -   No shelter, destroyed houses
    -   No communications
    -   No clean water
    -   No food supply
    -   Blocked roads
    -   No fuel supply
    -   No electricity
    -   Injured people
    -   Hazardous environment
    -   Bad security situation
```

In the next phase we can simulate how to respond to each possible situation that follows the disaster. The analyzing could look like this:

```
Project: Example project
Hazard: Category 5 Typhoon
Environment: +240 km/h winds, breaking houses, flying debris, falling trees,
heavy rain, cold temperature
To survive: Follow warnings, prepare and evacuate to nearest typhoon safe
building, bring water, food, dry clothes, flashlights, first aid kit, crisis bag or
kit. Before the storm, secure buildings and inventories in a best possible way
for winds and rain.
Disaster impacts:

    -   No shelter, destroyed houses – purchase a tent, build better houses
    -   No communications- satellite phone to the crisis kit
    -   No clean water – keep a spare amount of bottled water, water
        purification kit
    -   No food supply – keep cangoods and dry food for at least 14 days
    -   Blocked roads- purchase chainsaws to be able to cut trees
    -   No fuel supply – keep a spare fuel for at least 250 km
    -   No electricity – purchase a generator
    -   Injured people – first aid supplies and first aid training
    -   Hazardous environment – working clothing, boots and gloves to clear
        up debris
    -   Bad security situation – plan for locked spaces for inventories and
        cooperate with authorities. Low profile moving around. Evacuation
        plan.
```

This box is an example of how to do this planning and simulation in an easy way that would suit the project management in every project running in the FS Global network. Note that this should be done for every different kind of hazard that possible could be a threat to the project and personnel.

Now, this assessment of how to cope with the immediate emergency situation in the project should be followed by a plan of what needs to be done, who does what in what timeframe to meet these needs. Take this in consideration when writing project plans and purchasing lists. There should be a timeframe when these preparations should be done.

The immediate emergency is followed by a response to the situation, the project and people involved in the project actions. How many people can be affected? What could the needs be in the first 14 days? Which contacts do we need to respond? How do we fund the response? What kind of training is needed for our staff? These are all questions that needs answers when preparing for the worst. It is also good to look over the networks you work in within the projects – how will these function in a crisis situation? What will the government do? What about the international aspect? Which other NGOs work in this area? If there are partner NGOs or neighboring NGOs in the area or country, it is a good idea to network with them. The disaster planning process should also contain contacting the local government and authorities.

The response period can be followed by a longer rebuilding or recovery process. In this stage we need to ask how a rebuilding process would look like. What is our capacities in a recovery process and what funding do we need one year after a disaster?

The last part in the plan should be an implementation plan, timeframe and evaluation plan. When the plan for disaster risk reduction is put to action, there should be a date set when a first and second evaluation is to be done. In the evaluation there can be adjustments to the plan if needed.

The DRR plan should be followed by training that considers the topics found in the assessment.

9.3   Training plan for the staff

As the personnel working in the projects need training, the crisis management teams also should be trained by the organization. Even though some 35 % of the respondents in the survey that worked with the disaster had not received training by their organization, the

message is clear: planning, training and experience enhances the capacity to cope with a crisis situation. This goes for both the project staff as well as the homeland organization, in this case the FS Global, the MOs and the crisis management teams.

The experiences and interviews presented in this thesis draws a picture of what to expect in a natural disaster. There is also the documentary movie made by the Andersson and Hellström team two weeks after the typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The training needed is of course dependent of the specific project, crisis or task the crisis management team has to cope with, in other words what hazard is to be handled. This is a proposal for training plan framework.

Training plan framework proposal

- General knowledge of the project and country specific ODA projects
- General knowledge of the country, risk profile and cultural differences
- General knowledge of the FS Global organization and crisis organization
- NGO policy papers
- Natural disasters in general and global trends
- How is a natural disaster experienced?
- The psychological aspect of a natural disaster and to work in a disaster zone, importance of training and experience
- What can you do locally? The local network and checklists
- What can be expected of the international community?
- Disaster Risk Reduction planning, how can this be done?
- Homeland crisis management: decision making, information management, authorities, funding and network, assisting crisis on site team

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9.4 Proposal for policy paper development

In addition to crisis management planning, DRR planning and planning for training, it would also be good to discuss the need for policy development in the NGO. As the organizations ODA-project are located mostly in areas that have a higher natural disaster risk index (Fig. 5) than the Nordic countries, it is motivated to think also in terms of organization policy when it comes to planning and working routines. Based on this thesis two policy papers are proposed to be developed in addition to the crisis management organization, DRR-plan and training plan.

1) Climate Change and resilience policy in the ODA projects

2) Adopting the Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief as organization values for future operations

As we see more of climate change related changes in the working environment on the field where the ODA projects are carried out, there is a need to take climate change and resilience issues in consideration when planning and carry out projects. Climate change adaptation and mitigation as well as building resilience in the communities where the FS projects work is important in order to consider the sustainability in the projects. Therefor an organization policy for taking Climate Change and resilience building in consideration is motivated. Such a policy paper would help future planning for sustainable projects in the MOs.

Secondly, it is likely that the organization will be in a similar situation like the typhoon disaster in the Philippines in 2013. Already in the spring in 2015, a FS team was in the middle of the Nepal earthquake disaster and the need for crisis communication was a fact. The FS organization has been working with crisis management planning the last two years in parallel to this thesis research project, and the work should be continued. When the organization work with situations and projects that can in some cases develop to a disaster response and relief operation, it is good to give the ethics of disaster relief some thought. One way of making a strong ethical statement for future work in disaster relief would be to adopt and sign the Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief, as described in the following chapter.

9.5   Ethical values in disaster relief for the NGO

In 1994 some international NGOs with the lead of the international Red Cross decided to put down the principles of good humanitarian work in disaster relief in a code of conduct. The result became a document that states ten points in the "The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief". As of today, 565 international NGOs have sign the Code of Conduct. The document and agreement is voluntarily and have a nature of commitment and statement of an organization, is not legally binding and have no international central administration that monitors the agreement (IFRC, 2015). Still, it can be seen as a valuable policy act by the NGOs that commits to the Code of Conduct and the list can be usable both in planning and monitoring operations by NGOs.

Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind.

3. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.

5. We shall respect culture and custom.

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.

7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.

10. In our information, publicity and advertizing activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects

Intenational Federation of the Red Cross
http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/

10 Discussion

The methods used in the thesis worked well in general. There was a lot of background material available but it was not easy to find access to research material that focus on NGOs. The interviews, personal communication and case study served the purpose of documenting what happened during the typhoon Haiyan, what decisions were made and how they affected the outcome of the relief operation and the recovery of the projects. Decisions made in the FSPM organization were well documented and easy to track in the committee minutes. The workshops held within FS organization served the purpose of developing a crisis communication plan that was suitable and usable in the organization. The crisis management plan was accepted in the FS Global board in October 2015.

The survey was sent out to a large number of respondents, 1502 email addresses. Several hundreds of messages with delivery failure or "out-of-office" replies came back after the survey was sent. Many people that worked in the Philippines in 2013 year ago were in new positions by 2014, no longer connected to the operations going on a year ago. Unfortunately it was not possible to count the failed messages since the email service I used crashed due to so many messages not working and an out-of-office reply may still mean that the message is going through. Nevertheless, 89 persons answered the survey. The response that came back to the email sent including the link to the survey, were all positive and encouraging.

89 persons replied to the survey. As a percentage, that might not be considered so high, but the respondents gave a lot of their time writing long open responses. This meant a lot of valuable experiences and stories collected that is presented in this thesis. Still the low percentage of respondents did not make it possible to do much of statistical analyses.

Another challenge in the survey material is that the respondents that have answered might also be from the same organizations. Therefore and unfortunately that means that the graphics of organizational background tells about the background of the respondents, and cannot be considered as statistics on the percentage of organizations presents on site.

Another fact is that the email addresses collected are of course people that have such a role in the organization that they are a contact person of some kind. Persons working on the field are probably registered in a lower rate than people working in leading or coordinating roles. This can be the reason why there are quite low percentage of volunteers (11 %) that

answered the survey. Still, the survey results were interesting information about people and organizations working in the relief operation, their recommendations and experiences are registered and can be valuable for NGOs in their future planning.

The research data was used both in a quantitative and qualitative way. The interview, personal communication and open questions in the survey was possible to evaluate in a qualitative way. The quantitative results are presented in chapter 8. The qualitative results are summed up in text in within the results in chapter 8. The research questions and both the qualitative and quantitative results are discussed in this chapter.

10.1 Natural disasters and general trends

Natural hazards that may cause disasters can be classified in geophysical (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis and volcanic activity), hydrological (avalanches and floods), climatological (extreme temperatures, drought and wildfires), meteorological (cyclones and storms/wave surges) or biological (disease epidemics and insect/animal plagues) (International Red Cross, 2015).

There is a possibility that natural hazards and following disasters can happen in every part of the world (Maplecroft, 2010), even in the Nordic countries (SMHI, 2011). When discussing risk and analyzing what events could be possible in a certain area, there are a number of methods to use. On way is to look on historical data. In the literature study, an overview on where events has taken place in a certain year on the world map gives an idea of the distribution of disaster by classification.

NatCatSERVICE
Loss events worldwide 2013
Geographical overview

Munich RE

Fig. 48 Distribution of different kind of natural disasters over the globe in 2014, events registered followed by economic loss. (UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library Research Guides, 2013)

It was possible to identify six trends of natural disasters in the literature study (Coppola, 2015): 1) the number of people affected by disasters is rising 2) disasters are becoming less deadly 3) disasters are becoming more costly 4) that poor countries are disproportionately affected by disaster consequences 5) the number of disasters is increasing each year.

The trend of the number of disasters increasing is supported by data collected in the EM-DAT database (Fig. 4). IPCC (2014) suggests that there is a likely link between climate change and natural hazards and that natural hazards are a result of the climate change.

The trend that more people will be affected by disasters is supported both by the trend of population growth and urbanisation (Coppola, 2015) but also by the climate change consequences. Climate change is likely leading to more extreme weather (IPCC, 2014) and in turn lead to more severe hydro-meteorological natural hazards. The data from EM-DAT database also support this trend (Coppola, 2015).

The trend of less deadly disasters is supported by data from the EM-DAT database in terms of lower number of deaths in disasters over the years 1900-2011 (Coppola, 2015). When connecting this to the fact that the number of disasters has increased (Leaning & Guha-Sapir, 2013), the conclusion is that the deaths per disaster has decreased dramatically. This

can be seen as a result of the disaster management development during the 20th century. More lives are saved in disasters today than before.

That the disasters become more costly is also supported by the statistics from the EM-DAT database figures (Fig. 4). The trend of that poor countries are affected more than the rest of the world is also supported in the distribution of disasters (Fig. 51) and the distribution of disaster risk (Fig. 5).

10.2 Disaster consequences on societies

The typhoon Haiyan created a complete devastation that affected over 16 million people (Mercycorps, 2013). The respondents in the survey describe the situation in the community on site as very chaotic, with a collapse of both government functions such as social welfare, education, health systems as well as a market collapse. Basic needs for survival such as water and food were scarce, disaster responders had to be self-sufficient. Infrastructure and buildings were destroyed, creating tons of debris all over the area. In the streets there were a lot of dead bodies. The respondents also report of a lot of traumatized people and injured people in need of medical care. The immediate disaster consequences on a society can be dramatic depending on how severe the hazard is. A disaster can create both chaos and collapse of a society, depending on several factors. The specific society's general resilience condition like economic, political, social situation as well as environment, infrastructure, preparedness, ability to respond and recover in combination with how hard the society is hit by the specific natural hazard will determine the severity of the consequences for the society.

In the literature study various stories of recovery was found and generalisation is hard to do because of the fact that every disaster impact is individual. Coppola (2015) states that a society is deeply disrupted due to impacts in the complex social system and that disaster also affects a far broader geographical area than only the direct affected areas. Chains of business are broken and subcontractors from a large area is affected. Disaster also lowers quality of life for the population. Examples of this can be reduced ability to move around and travel, interrupted education, loss of cultural heritage, economic losses, communication difficulties, homelessness, hunger and starvation, unemployment, loss of community tax base, damage and pollution to the environment. (Coppola, 2015) Based on the thesis research, the quality of life was lowered dramatically for people affected by the Haiyan typhoon at least in short terms.

Recovery after a disaster refers to activities when countries, people, families repair and regain what has been lost. Ideally, the rebuilding process reverse the impact of the disaster and building back is done better, so that the disaster risk is smaller in the future. Recovery consists of activities such as building homes, infrastructure, strengthening economic drivers like employment and businesses, resumption of social services, health care and rehabilitation of injured. (Coppola, 2015)

There was some good examples of recovery and rebuilding in the case study. One year after the typhoon the FHDFI projects were all running again (chapter 7.2) and the NGO-based relief and recovery efforts in the local community had made a difference. This was verified by the local school director in a meeting held on site and by the fact that the FHDFI was awarded by the government for their local efforts after the typhoon (Andersson & Sigfrids, 2014). Everything was not built up in a year, but the large part of the community was back to normal. Lessons was learned; buildings were built back in a storm resistant way.

10.3 The role NGOs in international disaster management

In the literature the NGOs play a role in a broad range of sectors within and in cooperation with the UN (UN, 2009) and the NGO sector carries out a complete range of disaster related work (Yoder-Bontrager, 2014) (Frandsen. 2002). This is also visible in the thesis survey answers. The NGO respondents in the survey had worked within logistics, nutrition, protection, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, camp coordination and camp management, education, emergency telecommunications, food security and health cluster, all the different alternatives in the survey. Coppola (2015) makes an even broader list of roles, including for example agriculture, human rights and microfinance. Combined with the fact that there are a lot of experience of disaster work in the NGOs (Fig. 28) and the fact that NGOs can be on site already before disaster (Fig. 24) makes the NGOs important for international disaster management.

The roles of a NGO can also vary due to the fact that they vary in size and objectives. Frandsen (2002) found that NGOs share the same interests than other participants in disaster management: they want to reduce excess mortality, reduce or minimize excess disease, disability and unstable health conditions generally, provide infrastructure rehabilitation, ensure and protect return passage for displaced populations.

The strength of a NGO that works locally and have good local networks is that the organization can have the right connections that is needed to carry out a successful local relief operation. 73 % of the international NGO respondents in the survey had a previous contact network to work through. They thought that the contact network speeded up the process and made it possible to reach people on site better. This is a possibility for the international disaster management. The NGOs can provide a link between international help and donations and local networks and people in need of assistance.

10.4 NGO benefits for an international humanitarian relief operation

As concluded above NGOs can provide a link between local need of assistance and the international humanitarian operation in a disaster. When looking at the answers in the survey, four points benefit can be found:

1. NGOs have experienced people working in their organizations

The respondents in the survey were asked about their experience (chapter 8.3). There were a little more first-timers in the UN-organizations than in the NGOs. There was also over 20 % of the NGO-people that have an experience with over 10 operations. Previous disaster experience was considered to help you focus on key problems and know what and why things should be done. When working through an international operation, this experienced NGO human resource can be useful.

2. NGOs can have a strong local network and contacts

In the survey both UN and NGOs had good previous contacts to the area (70 % of the respondents had a previous contact network, Fig. 30). However, considering that there was also comments on that rural areas that was not reached at all, shows that there could have been a need for an even larger contact network. In the case-study, the FHDFI showed a good example of how to work through local networks and in cooperation with the municipality to deliver the relief operation.

3. NGOs can provide valuable information

Due to local connections, NGOs can be a resource of information what is going on in the field for the international operation. In the literature this is also recognized. NGOs are said to have specific on-the-ground data, they can detect community instability, health dangers or outbreaks and know the lay of the land (Frandsen, 2002).

4. NGOs can have volunteers and human resources for meeting needs

Other than contacts, the NGOs can mobilize volunteers through their networks and contacts, as was the case in the FHDFI relief operation case.

10.5 Local project based risk assessment for NGOs

In the literature there are various methods to assess risk and how to calculate risk. The depth of the risk assessment is dependent on time and resources available (Coppola, 2015). In the research partner NGO implementation study, there was neither monetary nor time available to create a complicated risk assessment system in the NGO. The NGO has to use the free information that is available. The PreventionWeb website information on risk information, country profile and GIS-tool could be used when assessing the risk profile of a certain project.

The method developed in the implementation study is to simply list possible hazardous events based on information available and brainstorm possible consequences on the local project. When the consequences are listed, the following step is how to address these consequences in order to be able to respond to, reduce their impact or prevent them.

To do a deeper analysis of for example the economic risk for the NGO the cost of consequences on property, assets, buildings, project results, loss of development etc. could be added to this. This was however not possible to achieve within the timeframe of the thesis work. The very basic examples of how to workshop on hazards, consequences and addressing identified needs before a disaster can serve as a first step in disaster risk reduction within a local project.

10.6 Important points and challenges for NGOs in a natural disaster

The result of the thesis research shows that planning ahead, training and experience is important. The literature points out that disaster management is not only responding and recovery to a sudden event, but also contains of prevention and mitigation, preparation including risk assessment and planning (Fig. 1).

In the case study in chapter 7 it is shown that the research partner NGO organization was taken by surprise by the disaster. The organization jumped directly into disaster response

with no previous experience. Planning ahead for the future in the research partner NGO was done through the implementation study presented in chapter 9.

With good risk assessment and DRR-planning, disaster risk can be lowered. Training was considered important by the respondents in the survey, as well as experience. 65 % of the respondents had received training in various topics related to disaster management (Fig. 39). The three highest "would-like training topics" between those who had not received training was disaster knowledge and understanding the situation, coordination with others on site and decision making. Participants in disaster management should make training plans and programs for their staff and provide training before deploying on the field.

The respondents in the survey represented lots of experience in disaster management and considered experience to be very important. Over 20 % of the international NGO respondents had experience in over 10 operations. Experience was considered to

- mitigate against physical and mental stress
- enables efficient working
- reduce need for over managing
- enable team working
- being able to manage welfare of self and others
- assist with coordinating roles and duties, leadership

It was also possible to gather a list of what is important to pay attention to in disaster response and management, based on the interview and survey:

- Try to get some information – communication is important
- Take care of food and shelter
- Consider concerns of the safety in the environment
- Do everything in an organized way and maintain order
- Take care of the staff you are working with
- Connect to other organizations that might cooperate or provide help and assistance
- In the rebuilding process, the psychological strain can be very challenging

In the interview with the partner NGO staff, a list of ten pieces of advice for NGO's in the Haiyan disaster relief operation by Jacobs (2013) was discussed. Eight of the ten points advice list could be verified as working well in the field. They were:

- Focus on the priorities
- Understand the role of the army and the government
- Work with local municipality/city leaders and other community leaders. They know who lives (or lived) where and how things work
- Keep the public (in affected communities) informed
- Work collaboratively, not independently
- Find the most vulnerable and worst affected people.. They are likely to have specific needs and to be easily ignored or side-lined by mainstream relief efforts. NGOs can play an important role in making sure they benefit fully from official relief.
- Don't underestimate the importance of mental well being
- Building permanent houses is difficult. Don't rush into it!

The Jacob's list was considered not so good on a couple of points in the discussion with the staff. Supporting local markets can be a problem leading to rising prizes if you shop locally with a large international budget. The NGOs should be advised to avoid disturbing the market. Secondly, the location of food and supply storages should not be shared with everybody in a chaotic situation. Such a way of working might cause problems for a NGO.

When planning on how to get started in the operation on site, it is important to build an overview of the situation. The responses in the survey indicates that entering a disaster zone as a relief worker can be an emotional experience. Most of the respondents highlighted the need for information and communication. The lack of communication made functioning difficult. Almost everyone had prepared by gathering enough information about the disaster in advance. The international NGO respondents thought that the three most important things to get started on site was to have enough general information about the situation and disaster, access to food and clean water as well as accommodation for staff members. The Philippine NGOs prioritized food and clean water following contact information to the local government and third, mobile communication. The respondents from the UN organizations prioritized information about the general situation and the disaster followed by contact information within the UN network and third, the local government.

In the international relief operation in the Haiyan operation there was a lot of different kind of map tools and infographics available, examples are presented in chapter 8.9. Almost every respondent had used some kind of map tool during the operation. Most of the respondents would have liked to have access to even more map tools, such as aerial photographs and drone photographs. This would be good to emphasize in future development of the disaster map tools used.

There is of course a lot of different kind of challenges that can be expected in disaster management that is dependent on both the kind of disaster you are dealing with and where in the world you operate. In the thesis study there was several challenges mentioned in interview and the survey. Challenges can be:

- Information shortage
- Information sharing
- General chaos
- Psychological strain
- Coordination challenges
- Slow processes, bureaucracy
- Duplication of relief operation activities
- Ethical challenges
- Rural areas not reached
- Leadership challenges
- Parallel operations
- Transportation problems
- Lack of everything, starting with clean water, food and shelter

10.7 NGOs in coordination and cooperation

Coppola (2015) devides disaster management into command, control and coordination. Coordination is different than command and control, since the purpose of coordination is achieve consensus on efforts taken and to solve problems. With coordination, the idea is to overcome for example the challenges listed above in chapter 10.6.

The answers in the survey shows that coordination and information sharing is not an easy task. The literature also recognizes coordination being difficult (Yoder-Bontrager, 2014)

and that there is still often a lack of cooperation between NGOs (Coppola, 2015). Yoder-Bontrager (2014) lists seven barriers for cooperation between NGOs:

- NGOs are accountable to their donors
- Coordination requires too many institutional resources
- No agreement on who should be coordinating
- NGOs may come and go quickly in a disaster zone
- No agreement on what kind of coordination
- Coordination detracts from individual identity
- Competition among NGOs

In Yoder-Bontragers (2014) study of NGOs in Honduras, these barriers existed but was not impossible to overcome. Coppola (2015) notes that the trend of NGOs resisting widespread coordination has changed over the last two decades and today many NGOs are required to participate in coordination by their funding governments or international organizations to increase their capacity. NGOs cooperate and coordinate among each other as well as within UN or governmental networks.

Evidence of that some of these listed barriers existed to some extent also in the Haiyan operation was found in the thesis research interview and survey. For example, there was comments about competition between organizations, that some refused to share information to get an advantage and positioning themselves, maybe for visibility purposes. There was also a comment on that coordination activities are good to use time for only if they lead to a decision and that coordination and information sharing is an area of development. However, everyone in the survey agreed on that information sharing was either very necessary (N=52) or somewhat necessary (N=3). This shows that the need for coordination and information sharing is recognized, but the actual coordination itself remains difficult and challenging. The comments in the survey states that cooperation is easier in a network that is established prior to the disaster. Good personal contacts with "familiar faces" built trust and connections with local authorities was considered important. Personal relationship in NGO cooperation was also highlighted in the Yoder-Bontrager (2014) study in Honduras.

In the Haiyan operation, according to the survey answers, there was several layers of coordination, and not necessarily a good communication between these layers. The international operations framework was based on the UN OCHA cluster network and

officially OCHA was in charge of the coordination of efforts. Still the survey answers register none of the local NGOs and only 24 % of the international NGOs that say they were coordinating geographically within the international operation. The international hubs were established in the cities with a large population (Tacloban and Ormoc), and some comments in the survey indicated that rural areas were not reached in the operation.

11 Conclusions and further studies

The NGO sector play a key role in many ways in natural disaster operations, for example in implementing international relief to local people. The NGOs activities varies from local to international and the quality of their work in cooperation, information sharing, delivery and ethics varies as well. There are both highly professional players with years and years of experience as well as new-comers and first-timers on the field. According to the survey there is a certain need for more training and preparation for people attending relief operations. Research about the NGO sector in disaster management is highly relevant due to the combination of the importance of the NGO sector and the fact that natural disasters are affecting a rising number of people and are becoming more costly for the society.

The disaster situation can be a very chaotic event and the survey respondents witness a collapse of the official society functions in the beginning of the case disaster. To reduce the chaos in a disaster situation and reduce the risk of consequences to a natural hazard, disaster risk reduction planning and preparing can provide an answer regardless of the organization type or size. Local contacts and networks are important when conducting a disaster relief operation. Free resources on the internet can provide useful information for smaller NGOs with limited resources for risk analysing.

Coordination and cooperation in a disaster situation remains an important challenge between every participant. The research highlighted many challenges that NGOs meet in disaster management. The fact that many seemed not to have a 100 % coverage in for example training shows that there is still a lot of work to do in terms of preparing and capacity building in both NGOs as well as in UN and governmental organizations. The barriers for cooperation identified in the literature were visible in the survey answers, which should be taken in consideration when continuing the development of the cooperation and coordination structures in both UN and the network of NGOs. Coordination should be effective, aim to not be time consuming for the participants and lead to results that benefit the people that the NGOs work with, otherwise the NGOs might

lose interest in the coordination efforts. Chaos is to be accepted in some degree, but if chaos continues too long in coordination, the participants might abandon the coordination network or send people without a decision mandate to coordination meetings.

To continue the research in this topic the focus could go several ways, some interesting questions or topics for future research could be:

1. Risk reduction within NGOs

2. Management, training and leadership in a crisis situation

3. Cooperation between governments, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations

4. Climate change and the future megatrends of natural hazards and disasters

5. Resilience in natural resources management on a global scale

6. Technical devices and GIS-application in DRR, crisis management and resilience

All these questions are interesting with future research in mind. Disaster risk reduction is important for NGOs as well as governments and local communities to prepare to meet the future challenges set by more frequent natural hazards. The DRR-concept was only considered very briefly in this thesis study. By analysing best practices and events, there could be more useful tools and training packages for NGOs to develop. Management, leadership and training is critical for operations to succeed, and research for more knowledge in this field can be helpful for future NGO engagement in disaster response.

When a large scale international humanitarian response operation is deployed in a disaster with a lot of different organizations doing different things, there is a need for coordination and optimizing resources. To be better in the difficult task of coordination, more research and evaluation could provide more knowledge and understanding of how to work together.

On the other hand, there is also a need for more understanding of climate change, natural hazards and following disasters. There are for example stronger typhoons now than before, but why is that? Does the pattern of hazards change over the years?

Since both climate change and extreme weather phenomena impacts world food supply by changing conditions for farming, agriculture, aquaculture, fisheries and forestry as well as seems to increase the natural hazards, there is a question of how to create better resilience in managing natural resources. In the FHDFI model farm there was for example discovered

that the dwarf coconut tree was very resilient to extreme winds. The dwarf cocos did not break in the typhoon Haiyan as the regular coconut trees did. The short dwarf coconut trees continued to bear fruit after the typhoon when the regular coconut trees crops were lost for the following eight years.

There is a lot of resilience issues related to farming and forestry as well as the use of natural resources. What measures people take and decisions are made about species and methods in managing natural resources will affect the resilience, how a community recovers from a natural disaster and ultimately the sustainability of the community. This was not a part of this thesis research, but is a question that is of high interest when it comes to create resilient communities, sustainable food supply, livelihood and building a future for the globe.

As for the questions of what kind of maps were used in the Haiyan response, there was a certain demand for local aerial photographs or drone photography compared to in what extent they were used (Table 10). This would be an interesting topic to dig in to a little more. Light and easy transportable drones could help mapping local unaccessable areas in a disaster and maybe even find people in need. In a disaster, where the local NGO are not able to get outside assistance with assessments from the air, drones could provide an answer. As the drone prizes are coming down, it would be possible to use drones in even smaller NGOs with lower financing resources. The use of aerial photographs to do assessments is a question of knowledge, skills, technics and developed applications. Drones could also be used to deliver medicine and other relief goods in areas with low accessability, if there would be a developed methodology for this.

12 Acknowledgements

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Survey about the reliefwork after Haiyan/Yolanda, Philippines

This survey is a part of my masters thesis project at Novia University of Applied Sciences in Finland www.novia.fi The goal with the thesis is to collect and analyse feedback, best practices and experiences for a better NGO work. I myself was a volunteer on site 2 weeks after Haiyan/Yolanda, helping out with relief work. Thank you for your help! - Niklas Andersson, master's studentNovia UAS

Basic information about the organization you workedfor during the operation

○ Philippine government

○ Philippine Local government unit

○ UN organization

○ Government international

○ NGO - national (Philippines)

○ NGO - international

What was your role in the work you did?
You can choose multiple roles.

☐ Management/strategic level

☐ Management/operative level, field

☐ Working in the field/teamleader

☐ Working in the field/staff

☐ Working in the field/volunteer

☐ Övrigt: [   ]

When did your organization arrive in the affected areas in the Phillipines and start the reliefwork after Haiyan/Yolanda?

○ Allready on site before Haiyan/Yolanda

○ The first week

○ 2-3 weeks after

○ 1-2 months after

○ Later

Would you like to share your experience of arrivingon site in the affected areas?
I would like to study the first impressions for aid workers when arriving on site.

> [?]
>
> [?]

How long did the organization stay on site in the affected area?

○ Less than 1 month

○ 1-2 months 3-5 months

○ 6-12 months

○ Still on site

○

Would you like to share your personal experience within your work in the affected areas?

> [?]
>
> [?]

Did your organization have previous contact network within the affected area?

For example field office, contact persons, friends, other cooperation network.

○ yes no

○ I don't know

○

Would you like to share some experiences of the relevance of previous contacts to the local people in the area you worked in?

> [?]
>
> [?]

Within which clusters have you been working?

These are the same clusterspecification used by UN OCHA in the operation.

☐ Logistics

☐ Nutrition

☐ Protection

☐ Shelter

☐ Water, Sanitation and Hygien

☐ Camp Coordination and Camp management

☐ Education

☐ Emergency telecommunications

☐

☐

Food Security

Health Cluster

What determined what geographical area you did work within?

○ The UN coordination within the international operation

○ The international coordination within my own organization

○ Consensus with other NGOs in the area

○ Previous contacts in the affected area or already established network in the area

○
Government contacts Local government contacts Övrigt: [   ]

○

○ **When first arriving on site, did you in your opinion have a good picture of the situation?**

Yes, good enough

Yes, but the situation overview got better on site

○ No, we build the situation overview on site

○

○ **Would you like to share some experience of how you experienced the situation?**

```



```

When arriving on site, did you have previous experience of working with a natural disaster like Haiyan/Yolanda? no, this was my first time

○
Yes, I have worked with 1-5 natural disaster relief operations before this Yes, I have worked with 6-9

○
natural disaster relief operations before this

○
Yes, I have worked with over 10 natural disaster relief operations before this

○

Would you like to share some personal experience on the relevance of having previous experience of natural disaster relief operations?

```



```

Did you receive training from your organization for the work on site?

○ Yes

○ No

What kind of training did you receive, and if not, what kind of training would have been useful in your work?

You can check multiple boxes.

☐ Professional skills within the cluster

☐ Communication

☐ Coordination with other organizations on site

☐ Culture

☐ Disaster knowledge, understanding the situation

☐ Leadership

☐ Decision making

☐ Psychological skills to meet a disaster

☐ Security issues

☐ Personal health and hygien Övrigt: _____

☐

In your opinion, what would be the most important three topics in training:

You can check only 3 boxes.

☐ Professional skills within the cluster

☐ Communication

☐ Coordination with other organizations on site

☐ Culture

☐ Disaster knowledge, understanding the situation

☐ Leadership

☐ Decision making

☐ Psychological skills to meet a disaster

☐ Security issues

☐ Personal health and hygien

☐ Övrigt: _____

Would you like to share some personal experience of these training topics, pros and cons, open comment?

☐
☐
☐
☐
☐
☐

When arriving on site in this natural disaster, what did you think were the three most important things to get started?

☐ You can check only 3 boxes.

☐ General information of the Philippine society General maps

☐ Information of the general situation/disaster

☐

☐

☐

☐

Mobile communication

Internet connection

Information about logistics, such as ferries

Food and clean water

Accommodation for staff members

Information on where to buy supplies

Contact information within the UN network

Contact information to government

Contact information to local government

Contact information to NGOs Övrigt: _____

Did you or your organization work with and or cooperate with other You can check multiple boxes.

☐ NGO - national (Philippines)

☐ NGO - international

☐ UN organization

☐ International government

☐ Philippine government Local government unit

☐ Worked independently

☐

How many other organizations did you cooperate with?

○ 1-5 6-10 over 10

○

In what areas did you cooperate?
○ You can check multiple boxes.

☐ Within own cluster

☐ Working in the same geographical area

☐
Sharing information Övrigt: _____
☐

How did you coordinate your efforts?
You can check multiple boxes.

☐ Using the UN network or cluster coordination

☐ Coordinate with other organizations working in the same geographical area

☐
Traveled to specific areas by request from other organization Övrigt: _____
☐

Do you think it was necessary to share information for a successful operation on the field?

○ Yes, very necessary

○ Somewhat necessary

○ Not very necessary

○

Not at all necessary

Would you like to share your experience within the cooperation, coordination and information sharing in the relief operation, what was good and what negative aspects did you experience? What could have been better?

```
[                                                    ] [?]



                                                     [?]
```

Did you have enough information on the following topics before the operation?
Checking the boxes means that you had good enough information before arrival.

☐ General information about the Philippines

☐ General information about climate and health issues

☐ Information about the disaster

☐ About the international operation About the government

☐ About the local government

☐

☐

☐ The security situation, status

☐ Contact information to others

☐ Övrigt: [   ]

Did you use some of the following information in your work in Haiyan/Yolanda reliefoperation?

You can check multiple boxes.

☐ Maps and information system

☐ General roadmaps

☐ Maps of specific areas

☐ Disaster impact maps, general situation

☐ Disaster impact maps, local situation

☐ Relief operation maps presenting relief operation

☐ Local aerial photographs of specific sites, such as villages, roads

☐ Drone aerial photography or 3 D models of disaster sites

☐ Övrigt: [   ]

Do you think some of the following information would have been helpful on site in your work?

You can check multiple boxes.

☐ Maps and information system

☐ General roadmaps

☐ Maps of specific areas

☐ Disaster impact maps, general situation

☐ Disaster impact maps, local situation

☐ Relief operation maps presenting relief operation

☐ Local aerial photographs of specific sites, such as villages, roads

☐ Drone aerial photography or 3 D models of disaster sites

☐ Övrigt: [   ]

In your opinion, were you personally happy with the results of your organization's relief operation?

        1   2   3   4   5

Not happy ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Excellent results

Remarks and comments about your own organization's relief operation:

About the army

[ ]

In your opinion, were you personally happy with the results of the international relief operation?

	1	2	3	4	5	
Not happy	○	○	○	○	○	Excellent results

Remarks and comments on the international operation

[ ]

Lessons learned and challenged met, free comments:

[ ]

OPTIONAL. You can leave your emailadress if you wish to recieve a summary of the results of this survey and thesis.

This email will only be used to post a summary of t he results and thesis one time, to you.

[ ]

[Skicka]

Skicka aldrig lösenord med Google Formulär

APPENDIX 2 – INTERVIEW WITH PARTNER NGO STAFF

Interview section 1: The day following the typhoon, survival

This first section of the interview focuses on the actual event and the time right after the typhoon. At that time there was an issue of saving yourself along with the people around you.

- *The first thing I remember after the typhoon was that everyone was soaked in rain and everyone was frozen.*

- *Everyone was freezing and I had a plastic cabinet with clothes, and we took out the clothes and distributed the clothes to all people so they got a warm change of clothes. We took all children and some mothers to sit in the car so that they could get back the warmth.*

Soon after that they started to clear up the area within their house.

- *We cleared the area from glass, metal sheets that the children could cut themselves on when playing. We started to set up temporary tents from the car, so that they would have some place to take refuge, because it was still raining, and people would need a place to sleep.*

- *All the trees were down, all the roofs were gone, there was no place to escape.*

The rain after the typhoon continued the whole night and the rains also continued the next day.

- *There was a long period of rain after the typhoon, says Andreas, who spent the night sleeping in the project´s car that had survived the typhoon. The volunteers on the farm also slept in the car.*

- *I slept on the ground where the pigs ran around.*

They had some water, bisquits and can goods in the house, that they used the time right after the typhoon. It took the people on the farm three days to clear the way from the farm to the main road. On the question of their first decisions made after the typhoon, they say their first concern was about getting information.

- *I tried to turn on the radio to get to know what has happened and then to get information about, what does it look like around us? What is the situation? First of all concerning the people Merida: are they still alive? How can we find out what the situation is for the people?*

- *So we sent out some boys that walked all the way from the farm to Merida. You could not ride a motorcycle, because everything was down. We sent them to find out, are they still alive. They came back the next day with the good news that everyone was still alive, the houses were broken, but the school was ok, and they were staying in the school.*

The telephone network was down. They managed to get a sms away to Sweden, saying they are alive.

- *We had no information at all and did not realize the extent of the disaster.*

- *There was nothing on the radio, it was a scary feeling.*

- *I was concerned about the volunteers that were traumatized. When we didn´t know the extent of the situation we thought: perhaps it is fine in Ormoc (the biggest town nearby).*

They tried to clear out the road so that they could go with a motorcycle to Ormoc and accommodate the volunteers in a hotel. But when they had cleared the way to the main road, enough for a motorcycle to go by, the first to try to go to Ormoc did not pass through. The road was blocked and the motorcycle got only half way. There was a lot of debris on the road and electric wires lying around.

- *Then we realized that everything in Ormoc is also down. That was 1,5 days after the typhoon.*

- *I realized that we have to get to the road with the car so that we can bring supplies, we had a little supplies for the feeding programme in Merida. So we had food here. We continued to clear the road.*

- *We also had some leftover rice that we gave to the people in Merida.*

- *There was no outside response yet so we gave the rice we had, we started already the first day after the typhoon.*

On Sunday they saw that the boats from Cebu were going again. The boats can be seen from the farm as they sail from Cebu to Ormoc.

- *By then we knew, that if we can make by car to Ormoc, I could evacuate the volunteers to safety in Cebu. In Cebu we can use the bank, buy gas, I can contact Finland and Sweden and start to receive help. On Sunday when we left, our rice storage was running out. We were also a little bit worried about the security situation. When we saw the ferries going, we decided to go to Cebu. The safety of the volunteers was a priority, if they had stayed it would have been very hard to guarantee their safety. We couldn't guarantee water and food supply. We didn't know if we would have enough food and if the quality would be safe for foreigners to eat.*

- *The goal became to evacuate the volunteers to Cebu and start sending back aid to Merida. We planned for this before we left to Cebu so we brought with us two guys to Cebu to help us with sending back help. In Cebu we bought cellphones, bought generators, cangoods, noodles, water purifier.*

On Sunday it was possible to drive to Ormoc by criss-crossing between debris and electric lines laying on the road. It was still easy to get a ticket to the ferry to Cebu. Later on there were a lot of people fighting for the tickets and the ferryrides became harder. There were a lot of people stranded in Ormoc and there were known to be riots between people upset not to be able to get to safety.

The first two days there was some helicopters seen in the area, but no response was given. The local people started the clearing of the roads.

- *The advice we would give to someone in the same situation the first days would be to try to get some information of what kind of mess you are in. How serious is it? Then gather the facts and contacts that you have and try to establish communication. Second thing to worry about would be survival of the stomach, food and shelter.*

The main safety concerns was about the environment that the typhoon left, with all debris such as glass and metal.

- *Our first concern was that there was a lot of children running around and the environment was dangerous with all the stuff lying around. We moved the children*

to a safe place. The concern was also that there were no transportation. What would we do if someone hurt themselves? How could we arrange a transport to a hospital in Ormoc or even Cebu if that would be needed?

Interview section 2: Communication and planning of the relief operation

Communications was essential to be able to respond to the crisis situation in Merida.

- *We established contact to Finland and Sweden when we got to Cebu. We had to go to Cebu, because everything was down on Leyte. There was no internet, you couldn´t buy food, you couldn´t even take out money from the bank to pay, so it was necessary to get to get to Cebu to be able to communicate and arrange with shipments successfully.*

- *We needed to establish something in Cebu to be able to help people successfully. We needed to have access to banking services, to communications. So when we got to a hotel in Cebu, we started to contact people in Finland and Sweden, and posting on Facebook.*

- *The response of the communication (from Scandinavia) was great and very fast. At least one month after there was a great support, people asking how they could help. There was also a great coverage from media in Scandinavia. We were contacted several times a day, mostly during the night. It was important to get the news out, so that people would know about the situation and help could come.*

The scale of the destruction became clear when they were able to drive to Ormoc.

- *It was a devastation. There was not one house that was remaining. The drive was 38 kilometers, that was 38 kilometers of damage. Then we started to see on the news in Cebu that the situation in Tacloban was even worse.*

They immediately started to expand the relief work they started the day after the typhoon in Leyte by distributing the food available in the ongoing feeding programme. The reliefwork became a local operation run by the FHDFI foundation.

- *We gathered the funds that we had and started to buy food. We started with the staff and made contacts to the Barangays and the municipality office. From the municipality office we got information of the number of families living in every*

Barangay. Then we started to buy rice, packing it and distributing packages by every Barangay.

The distribution was done in a very organized way so that there was a name list of the families living in the Barangay, and every family received a package. The first distribution took place in the week after the typhoon, while there were smaller scaled distribution already the days after.

- *It was hard to get transportation at first and it was a very important decision for us to buy a truck to be able to do transportation of our own. There was no other way to get the help to go through. There was no trucks to be borrowed, because every other truck that was not destroyed was busy doing something else. You are also not allowed to rent a truck and drive it to another island.*

- *The response of the people was very good and the cooperation with the local Barangays and people was good. We did the distribution in an organized way and there was no chaos because of the lists.*

If they would have to do everything all over again, they would emphasize to operate in an organized way and maintain order. That would be most important advice for planning and decision making. There were also a lot of local people from the FHP foundation workers, the local church and other interested people that volunteered in the relief operation. It was also important to take care of the staff during this kind of operation.

- *It was important to do things in an organized way even though it was an emergency situation. The people managing the operation were good in gathering information and plan the actions in an organized way, maintaining order.*

- *It is also important to take care of the inside first to be able to go out. When you feel settled and calm yourself you are better able to help others. The church network was very important at this point and most of the people in the relief operation were church members. The church was the most important network regarding volunteers.*

Interview section 3: After two weeks

During the interview session in section 3 the teams that was sent out from Finland to the Philippines shortly after the typhoon was discussed. It was considered being a good idea to

have a team that could work with reporting, communication and networking. The connections made were good. Two persons in the first team was manageable and suitable for the first team. The medical doctor in the second FSPM team did a great job in Merida. There was also a very good cooperation with the NGO Star of Hope.

The need of information in a situation like this was discussed in the interview and it was considered that the most important information for the project personnel was local. For example, one might need information about where you can get gasoline and the flow of material to sites where it would be accessible for relief operation use. If connection with the international operation would mean getting access to the international help and goods shipped in, it is helpful to connect to the international operation.

Interview section 4: Rebuilding process and the personal psychological process

The interview section 4 focused on the project rebuilding process. Initally, some money was spent to set up an administration in Cebu, because the foundation was not able to function as a foundation on Leyte as long as the communications was down. Until March 2014, they were traveling back and forth from Cebu to Leyte in order to rebuild both their own home and the re-establish the aidprojects.

- *I can't even describe how much strain that brought on us as a family and on the foundation, traveling every week. It was very hard doing this also personally, with no time for dealing with a certain amount of greeve.*

Both the disaster and the need to deal with the people suffering was adding to the strain. The fact that they also had lost their own house and home in the disaster, something that they had dreamt of for years, was a big thing to deal with. Psychologically the times were very tough on the FSPM staff, their family and the foundation.

- *In a couple of hours everything we had hoped and dreamt about had just blown away. At some times you would just go around feeling your tears flooding, and you would have to say to yourself, just swallow it, you can deal with that later.*

- *The feelings are intense. Sometimes you just wanted to run away.*

- *You had no place to sit down and have a meeting and work, no office, you had to sit in a hotel room, we had meetings in a coffeshop. It was chaotic to work like that, very out of the ordinary. Still there was a need to do clear decisions.*

- *It was a tough run. For a couple of months it was very hard. The situation on Leyte with a lot of families living in the school (the project's preschool built) was even worse. Still, they woke up in the morning and go for to execute all the plans we had made to rebuild. We sent rice from Cebu, but they had to receive the supplies and yet not have an own home to live in.*

Things started to change when the electric power came back in Ormoc city. That was sort of a turning point for the situation, since the city was completely dark in the night. There had been both shootings and stealing going on. Another turning point was when the office was established on Leyte and the planning meetings was possible to do there. The third point was when they were able to move in to their repaired home late in April and stop commuting to Cebu in March.

- *In March we first started to stay in a hotel in Ormoc City. That was a really depressing time.*

The psychological strain was hard for both of them, hard to bear and witness the other person´s depression. When this interview was done, one year after the typhoon when the situation was quite good again, the question of when you started to see hope that times will change for the better is hard to answer.

- *It´s a crazy question, in that time the only thing that you can have is faith. In December before the end of the year I said to myself that I'm going to face a rough year. But with the people around me that loves me and God that is with me always, we will recover and be ok.*

- *I turned to God with all the things going on, not only in the physical world, but also the inside world in my person.*

- *I think the thing to go to Finland was important for us. When we left in June, we were running on the fumes in the tank.*

When they were asked about touring in Finland, sharing their experiences, it was clear that they needed some time off to charge their batteries. Looking in the mirror, it was important to get some time off in Scandinavia to be able return and the decision not to tour in churches to speak was important for the return.

- *I was wondering about what to say. We were so low on fuel. But after being in Scandinavia for two months, at the return I really felt like myself again, ten months after the typhoon.*

- *Still after one year the situation is straining, there are so many challenges. Even though we have come very far and the situation is so much better now, we are not yet there and we still can´t function like before. For example, there is still problems with the internet connection and when we came back in September there were water interruptions. We then connected to the well. Then there started to be power interruptions, and we had to bring the generator. So there is still (one year after) things that is needed to get normalized again.*

Interview section 5: Advice to other NGOs

In the fifth interview section 10 pieces of advice to other NGOs in a similar situation were discussed. There is of course a lot of material and experiences collected and gained through other natural disasters in different places in the world, so there was and is not a need to invent and develop everything from scratch. In this section we decided to discuss "Ten lessons for NGO´s responding to Haiyan" (Jacobs, 2013) that was written by Alec Jacobs on his blog right after the typhoon hit. The lessons are based on a workshop with Roger Yates, Plan International's Director of Disaster Response, with over 25 years of experience. Alecc Jacobs runs the website ngoperformance.org, a blog site where he shares his experience from 20 years of working with NGOs in the humanitarian field. In this section the ten lessons were discussed in the interview.

> 1.   Focus on the priorities. Don't try to do everything at once.
> Accept initial levels of chaos and confusion. Immediate priorities
> probably include: (a) understand how things are working in the
> Philippines, and who is doing what; (b) develop initial plans based
> on local needs not what donors have to give; (c) think ahead when
> organising initial work, so it will be relevant in the coming weeks.
> Prepare to adapt priorities as circumstances change in the coming
> weeks.

This first lesson was considered a very good piece of advice in the interview.

> 2.   Understand the role of the army and the government. The
> army will probably play a leading role in the initial response, with
> international assistance. They may run the airport, clear major
> routes, oversee logistics and provide security (in due course). NGOs
> should understand how the army is organised and what they see as
> their role – as well as how government is organised. NGOs may be

able to influence what they are doing and define complementary roles. For instance, NGOs may be better at running distributions and engaging with marginalised people.

In the area that FHP worked, we did not see so much activities of the army. The army was seen mostly in the air (helicopters) and in Ormoc City. In the discussion in the interview, the army was considered being a good help maintaining order in a chaotic situation.

> 3.   Work with local municipality/city leaders and other community leaders. They know who lives (or lived) where and how things work. Though they probably do not have strong capacity to deliver relief. NGOs should listen to city, municipality and barangay leaders when they are (a) designing relief activities and identifying who to give relief to, and (b) reviewing how to improve their activities.

This was considered a very important piece of advice. It is very important to coordinate not to do double work and the municipalities also have very good information of for example the Barangays.

- *We would say that one should keep them well informed about what you are doing. The FHP operation had a very good cooperation with the local municipality.*

> 4.   Keep the public (in affected communities) informed about: (a) when and where NGOs are going to provide assistance; (b) key public health messages, (c) how people can give and get information about missing people / mortalities, and (d) other priorities that emerge for affected people (e.g. transport options, role of authorities). NGOs can put up notice boards, distribute leaflets, broadcast messages by radio and use local media & networks.

The FHP operation did most of its information about ongoing events thorough Barangays. Otherwise the discussion in the interview concluded that it seems like a good advice.

> 5.   Work collaboratively, not independently. NGOs should recognise their role as one part of a locally-led, wider effort. All NGOs should consider other actors' plans when they design their own activities and share information about their activities. They should publish their needs assessments and plans on-line (using co-ordination websites like Humanitarian Response or GDACS). They should support local partners and organisations. All NGOs should be prepared to adapt what they're doing in the light of what other actors are doing. And donors should support this flexibility, when necessary.

In the FHP operation, information of the general situation was gained through the international operation's contact network and updates were received by email. It was good to know what was going on by email, but for the actual operation, the local municipality contacts and cooperation was more important.

> *6.   Go the extra mile to find the most vulnerable and worst affected people (e.g. adolescent girls). They are likely to have specific needs and to be easily ignored or side-lined by mainstream relief efforts. NGOs can play an important role in making sure they benefit fully from official relief. Though this will likely need specific resourcing.*

This was considered true and good to take notice to.

> *7.   Don't underestimate the importance of mental well being. People need help in dealing with immediate shock, trauma and grief – as well as help in coming to terms with what's happened to their families and their plans for the future. NGOs can help reduce stress, for instance by encouraging practical mutual support within communities (e.g. around accessing aid), avoiding huge life changing decisions and treating people with kind dignity.*

This was seen as true in the interview discussion, and it should be taken in consideration when planning for example training. It is good to have an opportunity to for example talk about the experience if you had experienced the typhoon.

> *8.   Support local markets and move to cash transfers as soon as possible. Local markets are probably working better than assumed. They will improve rapidly as opportunities arise and create jobs, dignity and normality. NGOs should support local markets as much as possible. For instance, they should buy goods locally wherever possible and give people money (through cash transfers) so they can choose what to buy for themselves.*

This was considered as that this depends much on the situation. If you would be an organization coming in with external financing, you could easily be a part of what disturbs the market and encourages overprizing. In the FHP case, they could see that prizes were rising very much in Ormoc City and it was better to buy supplies in a municipality little further away. This might not be so good advice, although it depends on the situation.

> *9.   Build up two-way communication with the local public. In the coming weeks, NGOs should provide more information to the public about how to get in touch with them. Every time an NGO logo or noticeboard is put up, it should include contact details of named members of staff. NGOs should be transparent about their plans and budgets. They should make use of local media outlets. They should*

ensure that local people are involved in designing projects. And they should systematically ask local people for comments and feedback about the relief they provide – and respond to their comments. Donors should support this flexibility.

This might not be so good advice. If one would publicly announce the location of food storages, supplies and money in a chaotic situation where the need is unlimited, it could potentially lead to security issues and adding to the chaos. It is better to work through networks in an organized and secure way.

10.   Building permanent houses is difficult. Don't rush into it! Thoughtful construction takes time, involving many social and legal issues as well as technical ones. NGOs shouldn't expect that people can move from temporary shelter (like tents) to permanent houses in a year. They may be stuck in tents for a long time. Interim housing may be an important option. NGOs should consider providing people with reasonable quality housing materials – or money to buy their own.

This seems to be a good advice, not to rush in to it. The FHP project operation did just this in the rebuild process. There were small "light" houses built that was temporary but still stable and good enough that the people living in them could stay there for quite some time as long as they could stabilize their own lives.

In addition to these ten advices, other good advice was also discussed in the interview. Other than these ten above, there was a suggestion in the interview to emphasize that you need to know the people you are working with good and that it is very important to take care of and encourage the volunteers you are working with.