

# A study on the value of security services provided to museums in Finland

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Laurea University of Applied Sciences Leppävaara A study on the value of security services provided to museums in Finland

Olli Kääriäinen Degree Programme in Security Management Bachelor's Thesis May, 2018 Laurea University of Applied Sciences Leppävaara Degree Programme in Security Management **Abstract** 

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This thesis is the third installment in a series of theses focused around museum security in Finland. The first two theses written by Wolf Tröh and Lauri Tervonen asked what the current state of security in Finnish museums is, and what kind of service provider could offer suitable security services for those museums. This thesis draws upon those two to present a hypothesis that Finnish museums undervalue security and that value could be added to security services offered to Finnish museums by better integrating those services into the museums' core business.

The thesis primarily utilizes data collected by the core members of the Didrichsen security project, which was a student project aimed at providing comprehensive security solutions to the Didrichsen art museum in Helsinki for the duration of their exhibition "Edvard Munch: the Dance of Life" from August 2014 until February 2015. This data is separate into qualitative and quantitative results, the first comprising of expert interviews conducted by the project group, the second comprising of the results of a survey questionnaire sent out by the project group. Additionally, this thesis utilizes academic research data and attempts to prove its hypothesis by triangulating all of the above.

Ultimately this thesis concludes that the data does not fully support the hypothesis, as museums do in fact exhibit a significant desire to implement more stringent security measures and as such it cannot be said that they undervalue security. However, the second part of the hypothesis is supported by the evidence as despite this desire, museums have failed to fully integrate modern security solutions due to a lack of common ground between the museum and security sectors.

Keywords: museum, museum security, risk management, security management, Didrichsen

Laurea-ammattikorkeakoulu Leppävaara Degree Programme in Security Management Tiivistelmä

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#### A study on the value of security services provided to museums in Finland

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Tämä opinnäytetyö on kolmas ja viimeinen osa sarjassa opinnäytetöitä jotka keskittyvät suomalaisten museoiden turvallisuuteen. Wolf Tröh ja Lauri Tervonen loivat aiemmat opinnäytetyöt, jotka tarkastelivat museoturvallisuuden nykytilannetta sekä kysyivät minkälainen toimija voisi tuottaa museoille soveltuvia turvallisuuspalveluita. Näiden opinnäytetöiden pohjalta tämä opinnäytetyö esittää kaksiosaisen hypoteesin; suomalaiset museot eivät arvosta turvallisuutta, ja turvallisuuspalveluiden arvoa voisi parantaa paremmin integroimalla ne museoiden ydintoimintaan.

Tämä opinnäytetyö hyödyntää Didrichsen turvallisuusprojektin ydinjäsenten keräämää tietoa. Projekti oli opiskelijoiden suorittama turvallisuuskokonaisuus, jonka tarkoituksena oli turvata Helsingissä sijaitseva Didrichsenin taidemuseo elokuusta 2014 helmikuuhun 2015, jolloin museolla oli käynnissä "Edvard Munch: elämän tanssi" -niminen näyttely. Projektin aikana kerätty tieto on jaettu kahteen kategoriaan; kvalitatiiviseen, joka perustuu projektiryhmän suorittamiin asiantuntijahaastatteluihin sekä kvantitatiiviseen, joka puolestaan koostuu projektiryhmän laatiman kyselytutkimuksen tuloksiin. Tämän lisäksi tämä opinnäytetyö hyödyntää akateemisia tutkimuksia, mukaan lukien aiemmin mainittuja opinnäytetöitä, ja pyrkii triangulaatiomenetelmällä osoittamaan hypoteesin todeksi.

Opinnäytetyön lopputulema osittain tukee hypoteesiä ja osittain ei. Haastatteluiden ja kyselytutkimusten tulokset osoittavat museoilla olevan suurtakin kiinnostusta ja halukkuutta varautua paremmin mahdollisia turvallisuusuhkia varten, joten väite että museot eivät arvostaisi näitä palveluita on epätosi. Hypoteesin toinen osio on kuitenkin tuettu samoilla tuloksilla, sillä halukkuudesta huolimatta harva museo on riittävän hyvin varautunut joka johtuu museo- ja turvallisuusalojen välisestä käsitteellisestä kuilusta.

Avainsanat: museo, museoturvallisuus, riskienhallinta, turvallisuus, Didrichsen

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#### 1 Introduction

Few entities possess quite as much valuable inventory as museums. Monetarily, much of that which is on display or in storage cannot even be valued due to its unique nature and relevance to society. The seemingly invaluable nature of this inventory is frequently at odds with the museum sector's purported intent, which is to offer relatively unlimited access to this inventory to virtually anyone who may desire it.

Given the seemingly mutually exclusive notions of having invaluable items whilst simultaneously wanting to present them to the public in an unfettered a manner as possible, one could easily come to the conclusion that the security of this inventory would be of paramount importance to the principal operators in the sector: museums.

Unfortunately, security (in terms of services and products intended to enhance security beyond the mere conservation of inventory), whilst certainly not neglected by any museum, seems to be frequently misunderstood. It is possibly seen as something of a necessary evil rather than a natural extension of the conservation and preservation of a museum's inventory. The consequently lackluster efforts made by museums to adequately secure their inventory place unnecessary risks on their core business, as a piece which is stolen, missing, destroyed or vandalized cannot be displayed.

Conclusions to this effect were arrived at during the Didrichsen security project conducted from April 2014 until February 2015, during which time a student project group consisting of Wolf Tröh, Lauri Tervonen and the author of this thesis were tasked with developing and implementing a variety of security features for the Didrichsen art museum in Helsinki, Finland. From the very beginning of the project, the group found great difficulty in finding relevant information or independent research that would have been of use in attempting to devise client-appropriate security solutions.

From this challenge rose an overwhelming sense that the demands of the museum sector, as they related to security and safety, were not being met by the supply provided by the security sector. In order to assess this and offer possible solutions, the project group's members decided to write their theses on the subject, each addressing a particular aspect of museum security. The first installment was Tröh's, whose thesis focused upon uncovering whether or not museums were in fact adequately protected. The second installment was Tervonen's, whose thesis offered a marketable solution to address the needs of museums. This thesis is the final installment in this series, and will address one key question presented in two parts; do Finnish museums undervalue security and if so, what can be done to improve the value of security services for actors in the Finnish museum sector?

More on the full extent of how these theses relate to one another and how they utilize a common pool of information and collectively conducted research can be found in section 2: Research framework.

#### 1.1 Background

In order to credibly address the issue of security being undervalued by the Finnish museum sector, it is important to firstly establish that it is, in fact, undervalued to begin with. This point will be reinforced throughout this thesis, but a cursory look at the background of the issue of security in museums is necessary to visualize the scale of the issue.

#### 1.1.1 Risks faced by museums

The precise impact of security on museums, or the lack thereof, is difficult to accurately measure. Very few studies have been published on the topic, and much of the data must be extrapolated from multiple sources, with correlations drawn between individual results from varying points in time. For instance, in order to ascertain an estimate of how many pieces are registered as stolen from museums, we can first obtain information from what is presumably one of the leading authorities on art theft, the Interpol. According to the Interpol's (2016) own stolen art registry, there are currently approximately 48,216 items listed as stolen as of April 3, 2016. It is when examining that fact that we begin to see the issues surrounding the field of art theft and consequently security.

Despite the Interpol's seemingly vast registry, the privately-owned Art Loss Register has a significantly different number of stolen art works in its own registry - in fact, they claim to have no less than 300,000 items on their register (Gerlis & Pes 2013). Additionally, we can view data released to the Art Market Monitor (2009) in a general data dump, where it was claimed that they receive an average of 10,000 new entries to their register every year. They also reported that 12% of the items on their register were listed as belonging to museums, so it stands to reason that globally, at least 1,200 items are stolen from museums every year.

This however, only covers those items that were reported stolen by museums to the Art Loss Register. One could justifiably question the general applicability of such information considering that in order for items to be registered the museum must have an account with the Art Loss Register and would presumably have to believe in at least some chance of the item being returned.

The discrepancy between these two presumably reputable sources would suggest that many items are listed in one or the other but not both - and that it is just as likely that many items are not being reported at all. In fact, one of the few estimates that we have regarding that figure claims that as few as 15% of art thefts that occur in Europe are reported (Lawrence et al. 1988).

Based on these figures we can extrapolate some estimates for annual art thefts. If, at best, 10,000 stolen items are registered each year to the ALR and these constitute roughly 15% of all art thefts, then roughly 67,000 art thefts occur annually. Of these, 8,000 occur in museums. Given that any item on display at a museum is by necessity unique and generally speaking irreplaceable, it is difficult to claim that a problem doesn't exist if that many pieces are being stolen every year. Some criticism could be raised at the theoretical nature of this number of course, and locality surely plays some part in the risk of art theft as well - however, it is estimated that 98% of the world's art crimes take place in the United States or Europe (Lawrence et al. 1988).

Perhaps even more disconcertingly than the alarming numbers presented above, art theft itself is not the only risk that museums face when protecting their inventory. Vandalism, accidents and environmental threats are all at least as possible causes of damage to a museum's inventory as art theft itself, if not more so.

Vandalism is particularly difficult to guard against, and many cases of it have taken museums around the world by surprise. From 1977 to 2005, a German national named Hans-Joachim Bohlmann, suffering from apparent mental illness, caused over 138 million euros worth of damage by vandalizing over 50 artworks in museums around Germany (Von Lakotta 2005). Equally damaging and unpredictable are accidents - more recently, according to the Guardian (2015) a 12-year old boy accidentally put his hand through a Paolo Porpora oil painting worth an estimated 1.5 million US dollars when he tripped in a museum in Taiwan. Nor can one underestimate the possibility of art destruction by radicals or politically motivated groups, or the potential damage caused by various environmental factors such as natural disasters, malfunctioning climate controls or even common pest infestations.

It would appear then, that the threats presented to museums are very real and persistent. The need for suitable security services is established by the sheer magnitude of loss felt when a single piece is damaged, let alone stolen or destroyed.

#### 1.1.2 The Didrichsen security project

In addition to the real and present risks faced by museums, this thesis is motivated by the completion and results of a student-led project, henceforth referred to as the Didrichsen security project.

In April 2014, the author of this thesis was recruited by the Laurea University of Applied Sciences to lead a project along with two other Security Management students, Lauri Tervonen and Wolf Tröh (henceforth referred to collectively as the project group), whose aim was to provide security services and plans for the Didrichsen art museum, located in Helsinki, Finland. These services and plans were necessary to satisfy the needs of the many parties involved in the completion of the exhibition; the Finnish and Swedish State Indemnity Boards, the Munch museum in Norway, and several Swedish museums who had also lent pieces for the exhibition, so that the Didrichsen art museum would be able to complete the loan of several pieces of Edvard Munch's artworks for display from August 2014 until February 2015.

As an exhibition of this magnitude had never been previously hosted by a Finnish museum as relatively small as the Didrichsen, the preparations for the exhibition proved extensive and challenging. Aside from the project group, Laurea University of Applied Sciences also provided a group of eight students to act as monitors during the exhibition, and two others to devise and implement a security training program to satisfy national requirements. Additionally, independent contractors upgraded the technical security of the museum, and the police and rescue departments were consulted throughout the exhibition (with the police providing escorts for the pieces on arrival and departure).

Over the course of this project, the project group developed an interest in museum security not only due to the unique opportunity it presented, but also as it had become evident that it was a field of security which had been frequently overlooked by both the museum and security sectors, and felt that the project group had something to offer in order to improve this matter. Consequently, much of the practical research for this thesis was done in conjunction with the Didrichsen security project and is utilized not only in this thesis, but in those presented by Tervonen and Tröh as well. The specific reason for pursuing this path will be elaborated on further below in section 2: Research framework.

#### 2 Research framework

The entirety of this thesis and in fact those of Tervonen and Tröh are based on a collective and multi-staged attempt at uncovering the current state of security services in the museum industry at large, and specifically in Finland. The purpose of this research was twofold: firstly, to uncover the needs of the museum sector as it relates to security services and secondly, to offer solutions on how those needs could be met by a private entity.

The preliminary stage of research consisted of the use of literary sources in order to establish a baseline for museum security principles. During this phase, which was at the time conducted in preparation of the execution of the museum security project itself rather than the creation of the project group's theses, it was evident that relatively little research had been done into the subject. Whilst a Nordic study into heritage crime had been conducted in 2006 (Korsell et al. 2006), it was largely a statistical study which arrived at few conclusions. Beyond this, the project group was unable to find significant amounts of contemporary research which would have related directly to the project at hand, as the majority of literature on museum security was outdated, particularly when considering technological advances in security.

Consequently, the project group set out to perform its own research, by conducting expert interviews and creating a statistical survey to send out to Finnish museums. These are explained in further detail in the sections below, but the aim was to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data on the state of museum security and insights into the issues the project group felt were certainly present, so as to create solutions. In hindsight, the qualitative data was too one-sided in that it presented the views of individuals who are not strictly speaking museum staff - the interviewees consisted of security consultants, security managers, and representatives of organizations working with museums, but no curators, conservators or museum directors were interviewed. As such, the data offered by the expert interviews and the survey (which, in contrast, was sent only to museum staff) offer very different perspectives on the subject of security and may well be skewed towards the benefit of one side of the discussion or the other.




Figure 1: Research relations to various actors involved in the project

#### 2.1 Research idea

The research idea for this thesis was formed alongside those of Tervonen and Tröh, as the project group's vision was to utilize the expertise and experience gained from working on the Didrichsen security project in conjunction with additional research to tackle the problems facing modern museums vis-à-vis security; namely the general lack of awareness and knowledge of security in the musem field, how to implement security solutions in a non-intrusive manner so as to not impede the core business of the museum, and the cultivation of security culture within museum organizations themselves.

This idea was partly formed out of a desire to complete to the "customer's" (Didrichsen art museum's) satisfaction all of the tasks presented to the group, but also to explore the possibility of starting up a security business to address what appeared to be a gap in the market. In order to do so comprehensively, it was decided to tackle the issue in the theses of the project group's members.

Due to the limited scope of Bachelor's level theses, the project group decided to tackle the matter in three phases, dividing the broader issue amongst its members. Hence Tröh's thesis, analyzing the current state of museum security in Finland, followed by Tervonen's thesis, presenting a business model for a company attempting to fulfill the needs of the museum sector, and finally this thesis, whose aim is to expand on the conceptual nature of security services offered to museums in order to make them more desirable to the customer.

#### 2.2 Research hypothesis

Partly due to interest in the field and partly due to a personal interest in starting a business to cater to museums' security needs, a research question had to be established which would both evaluate the genuine perception museums have about security as well as offer insight into how security services could be made more attractive to museums in Finland. As this thesis is the third in a series which provided preliminary answers to questions, the option chosen was to formulate a hypothesis and examine it with the help of the research performed in conjunction with the security project.

Ultimately as a result of the conclusions that can be drawn from Tröh's and Tervonen's theses as well as the research conducted during the Didrichsen security project, this thesis' hypothesis is that security services are in fact undervalued by the Finnish museum sector, and that their value can be increased by better integrating them into the museums' core business.

#### 3 Methodology

As already established in section 1.1, the underlying problem and therefore the necessity for better (or more desirable) security services is evident. Due to each museum being unique however, it is impossible to tackle the issue in an objective, quantitative fashion. That is to say that there is no clear empirical standard that applies to all museums which could be isolated as the universal source of security issues that plague museums. It is partly for this reason that we cannot rely on the results of a singular case study either (more on this in section 3.4). Instead, a combination of research methods must be utilized in order to arrive at a plausible conclusion.

In order to do this, information regarding security services in museums was collected through three different methods; qualitative data was obtained through expert interviews, quantitative data was collected through a survey, and additional data was collected by the project group throughout the Didrichsen security project, both by performing literary research as well as drawing conclusions from real-life and first-hand experiences.

The ultimate goal of these multiple approaches is to utilize triangulation to arrive at the most valid conclusion possible given the limited scope of data on the phenomenon this thesis is studying. As noted by Todd D. Jick, triangulation "can be something other than scaling, reliability, and convergent validation. It can also capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study" (Van Maanen 1984). This particular methodology was selected for two primary reasons.

Firstly, there is very little information on the field of museum security to begin with. As such, whatever information is obtained by any particular method - or from any particular source - cannot be effectively corroborated or indeed countered without sufficiently researching an opposing point of view. To this end, qualitative studies in the form of loosely structured expert interviews were conducted primarily with external entities, such as security consultants and members of governing bodies. In contrast, quantitative studies in the form of a structured survey was conducted with the internal actors, namely museums. As Jorma Kananen expresses in his book "Laadullinen tutkimus opinnäytetyönä", the use of triangulation can be justified when the use of one specific methodology would leave gaps in the information collection process - gaps which could be filled by utilizing additional methodologies (Kananen 2014). In the instance of this thesis, as the research problem involved the study of a perceived lack of understanding between the security and museum sectors, it was immediately evident that studying only one point of view would yield very subjective results.

Secondly, in terms of our research question a qualitative approach is necessary to fully understand the "why" involved in determining the reasoning behind museums possibly undervaluing security, as museums vary greatly in type, size and location, each of which will affect the risks that they face and therefore their attitude towards security in general. For instance, a railroad museum will generally house large, metallic exhibits - railroad cars, tracks and perhaps some photographs. These have little intrinsic value outside of niche groups and are exceedingly difficult to steal, making exhibition security a lower priority than for example, visitor safety. A very small museum might have a small budget and the accompanying staffing issues - some museums do not even have staff present at all, making their security entirely dependent on automated systems. The level of security knowledge which museum staff members have can also vary greatly, with some museums having in-house security guards, whilst others rely on hobbyist volunteers. A qualitative assessment of museums would by necessity have been limited to a specific category of museum due to time limitations, for which reason the project group opted to perform a broader survey to be answered by as many different museums as possible. The aim of this survey was to provide an overview of how museums in Finland perceived museum security.

Due to these two reasons, it was determined that whilst a qualitative approach would yield more significant results from so-called external entities (security sector and governing body entities) due to the limited number of such entities as well as their expertise in their respective fields. However, a quantitative approach would have to be utilized in order to obtain valid results from internal entities (museums and their staff), as museums vary too greatly in a number of ways to be accurately represented by the relatively small samples found using qualitative methods.

Finally, a cursory literature review was determined to be of value mostly in assessing the validity of the claims made by both groups under study, as the conclusions made by other researchers could be used to verify the results of both the qualitative and quantitative studies utilized in collecting information for this thesis.

#### 3.1 Qualitative data collection

In order to obtain a better and deeper understanding of what manner of security-related issues the museum industry faces and what possible reasons exist for those issues, the project group conducted several expert interviews over the course of three months. Interviews were conducted with retired museum security consultant Karim Peltonen on June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015, with retired museum security consultant Mikko Perkko on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2015, with the secretary of the state indemnity board Leea Vartia on August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015, with the Finnish Museum

Association's training manager Leena Tokila on August 25<sup>th</sup>, 2015 and a double interview was conducted with the National Gallery's security manager Rauli Forsblom and facilities' manager Jari Paavilainen on August 28<sup>th</sup>, 2015.

The interviews were conducted with the express purpose of uncovering how various actors in the museum sector viewed the current state of security in museums at a conceptual level; that is to say, how seriously museums take security and how the field as a whole is doing. Due to this rather general approach to the subject matter, the interviews were semi-structured and informal in nature, and as such complete transcripts are not available. On the occasions where the project group requested permission to record the interviews, our requests were denied. A basic interview questionnaire which formed the basis for interviews with Perkko and Peltonen can be found in the appendix of this thesis. Interviews with Vartia, Tokila, Forsblom and Paavilainen were free-form interviews with no specific questionnaire.

The results of the interviews were recorded short-hand by members of the security project group.

#### 3.2 Quantitative data collection

In order to obtain a sufficient amount of data from relevant parties (e.g. museum professionals), the project group decided to create a 19-point questionnaire with questions ranging from the very general (type and size of museum) to the very specific (types of security measures in place). This questionnaire was distributed electronically to all members on the Finnish Museum Association's mailing list on two separate occasions, once in July and once in August 2015, in order to obtain as many responses during the summer holiday seasons as possible. The full questionnaire can be found in the appendix of this thesis (Appendix 2), though individual questions will be brought up in section 4: Data analysis.

Altogether, 56 separate answers were recorded to the questionnaire, which assuming that each was offered by a different museum, would indicate that roughly 19% of professionally run Finnish museums answered the questionnaire, as the Finnish Museum Association Museoliitto (2015) estimates that approximately 300 exist in the country at the time of publication.

The purpose of the questionnaire was to gauge what the consensus among museums in Finland is with regards to security; how they themselves perceive their level of security, how they perceive threats and risks that they may face, and whether or not they feel that they have been adequately serviced by their current security partners.

#### 3.3 Additional research

The project group was exposed to the inner workings of a well-established museum in Finland during the Didrichsen security project. During the project, the group was included in virtually all decision-making processes at the the museum and gained unique insight into the motivations and goals of the museum and its management. This insight has proven invaluable in understanding the challenges faced by museums with regards to their security and formed the basis for the theses of Tröh and Tervonen, which will both be referenced in this thesis as well.

#### 4 Research results

This chapter will provide an overview of the results of the research conducted by the security project group (both qualitative and quantitative) and summarize the results of both types of research.

#### 4.1 Expert interviews

In total the project group conducted five separate expert interviews with six individuals. The interviewees were selected to provide an understanding as comprehensive and diverse as possible. To this extent, interviewees included individuals from both the public and the private sector, working independently, for museums, as well as for the bodies governing them.

Not all interviews followed the same questionnaire and modifications were made depending on the precise role of the interviewee. Additionally, some interviews were more for one project group member's thesis than others, though all members of the project group were given the opportunity to collect questions for each interviewee beforehand. Despite this, the interviews focused around a core group of questions which each project group member felt were central to their theses and designed to answer three general questions; what is the state of security in Finnish museums today, how can the value of security services be improved and what kind of service provider would be able to accomplish that.

Interviews were conducted varyingly by one or two members of the project group. Most of the interviews were conducted in Finnish, and have been translated afterwards by the project group.

#### 4.1.1 Interview with Karim Peltonen

The interview with author and former museum security consultant Karim Peltonen was conducted at the offices of the Finnish National Rescue Association (SPEK) on June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015. The interview was conducted by security project members Wolf Tröh and Lauri Tervonen. An interview with Peltonen was requested due to his involvement in museum security and in particular, his role in the national working group for the adaptation of the Hague Protocol of 1954, which offers various guidelines for the security and safety of antiquities.

Despite the subject of the Hague Protocol offering relatively little of value for the purpose of our research as Peltonen pointed out that the working group's efforts focused almost entirely on disaster preparedness, specifically during times of war (Peltonen 2015. Personal communication.), the interview yielded very interesting observations regarding the relationship between museums and actors in the security industry.

When asked about the potential necessity for more field-specific security training, Peltonen felt that it was necessary and largely because museums focus almost entirely on their core business. He went on to add that a concept which he felt was true, that of security and safety going hand-in-hand with collection management, was for the large part absent in the museum sector.

Peltonen was also the first to remark something which would become a common criticism, at least from the security industry's perspective; there seems to be no common language between museum managers and security professionals (Peltonen 2015. Personal communication.).

#### 4.1.2 Interview with Mikko Perkko

The interview with author and former museum security consultant Mikko Perkko was conducted at the Sello shopping mall's Robert's Coffee in Espoo on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2015. The interview was conducted by security project members Wolf Tröh and Lauri Tervonen. The interview with Perkko was requested due to his experience in Finnish museum security, as prior to his retirement he had worked for roughly 20 years in the field (Perkko 2015. Personal communication.).

Perkko found that whilst museums weren't necessarily unaware of security concerns or even lacked the motivation to improve on their security and safety features, the overwhelming concern was one of budgeting. He stated that whilst working as a museum security consultant, he found a great deal of demand for his services but rarely did the museums in question have the necessary funding to purchase what was required. His view was that museums

preferred to focus on their core business with whatever budget they had, and consequently ran out of money for other expenses - such as security.

The consequence of this, according to Perkko, was that whilst some museums did at the very least have security officers or someone specifically responsible for security, most relied on the discretion of the museum directors - who, in his view, were rarely competent enough in security to be in a decision-making role.

Overall Perkko considered the current state of museum security training to be the biggest pit-fall of museum security, with offerings being too few and far too brief or shallow. Despite the relatively low number of security-related incidents in Finnish museums, Perkko believes that threats are growing in quantity and severity, and should be answered by improving the level of knowledge in museums (Perkko 2015. Personal communication.).

#### 4.1.3 Interview with Leea Vartia

The interview with the secretary of the state indemnity board Leea Vartia was conducted at the Gaudeamus coffee shop in Helsinki on August 11<sup>th</sup>, 2015. An interview with Vartia was requested due to her expertise in state indemnities, which are afforded to exhibitions that typically run a high risk of security-related incidents.

The interview with Vartia focused largely on the requirements for state indemnity, and the general trends regarding those. Vartia explained that her role as secretary of the state indemnity board meant that she received the applications for state indemnity and ensured that they fulfilled the necessary requirements prior to presenting them to the board itself. Consequently, according to Vartia, at the time of the interview all but one application which she had presented to the state indemnity board had been approved (Vartia 2015. Personal communication.).

As the state indemnity is granted conditionally and can be revoked at a later time if the applicant is found to be neglecting their duties, Vartia felt that most museums in Finland take their safety and security seriously. That said, Vartia also emphasized the importance of the transportation period - when items are in transit from lender to recipient, during which time they are particularly vulnerable. She also mentioned fire safety as the most lacking aspect of security precautions in Finnish museums (Vartia 2015. Personal communication.).

#### 4.1.4 Interview with Leena Tokila

The interview with training manager Leena Tokila was conducted in the offices of the Finnish Museum Association (FMA) in Helsinki on August 25<sup>th</sup>, 2015. An interview with Tokila was requested due to the far-reaching influence of the FMA on the Finnish museum sector - the majority of museums in Finland are members, and the FMA provides both guidelines as well as services for museums across the nation.

During the interview Tokila made it clear that she felt the museum sector could use more security-related services, provided that they are of a certain calibre and differ from those presently available. For example, Tokila mentioned that at present there is only one major service provider for training related to museum security, and even that is relatively limited in its scope, offering basic training for museum monitors. Tokila felt that museums would benefit from more tailored, client-specific solutions (Tokila 2015. Personal communication.).

Additionally, Tokila remarked that museums' collections are increasingly centralizing their collections, creating additional risks should something happen to these storage centres. Tokila felt that this could warrant the use of relevant security consultancy services, which were not available at the time.

Finally, Tokila noted that security consultancy services could be needed for the creation of security and safety related documents for museums, as museums themselves frequently lack the necessary competence to produce documents at the required level and are in risk of neglecting essential elements (Tokila 2015. Personal communication.).

#### 4.1.5 Interview with Rauli Forsblom & Jari Paavilainen

The interview with Rauli Forsblom & Jari Paavilainen was conducted in the offices of the National Gallery in Helsinki on August 28<sup>th</sup>, 2015. Due to scheduling issues only the author of this thesis was able to be present for the interview from the project group.

The National Gallery had been selected as a potential interview partner not only because of its size and importance in the Finnish museum sector, but also because it was one of the only museum institutions the project group knew had its own security department prior to beginning its research.

From the beginning of the interview it was evident that this was relatively recent however, as the interviewees, consisting of the security manager Rauli Forsblom and the facilities' manager Jari Paavilainen confirmed that the position of security manager had only been established in the year prior, in 2014. Prior to this, all security matters had been the responsibility of the facilities' manager which explained why Paavilainen was participating in the interview

as Forsblom had yet to be security manager for very long and may have required assistance in answering certain questions (Forsblom & Paavilainen 2015. Personal communication.).

It is worth noting that even after the creation of a separate security department, its budget continued to be drawn from the facilities' department. Whilst this is not necessarily anything more than an administrative oversight, the implication is that security is not seen as a comparable department to facilities or as intrinsic to the core business of the museum.

As Forsblom and Paavilainen explained the administrative structure of the National Gallery, I asked them about the authority held by the security manager in instances that would affect the core business (e.g. exhibitions) of the museums. Forsblom explained that whilst he cannot directly decide what an individual museum (the National Gallery consists of three separate museums) must or must not do, he can appeal to the National Gallery's director to seek a type of executive order which supersedes an individual museum's director's authority. That said, Forsblom added that this happens very rarely as in most instances museum directors are willing to compromise if genuine security concerns are raised (Forsblom & Paavilainen 2015. Personal communication.).

This particular point was returned to later in the interview however, as when asked about the greatest challenges the security department faces, Forsblom noted one major issue; the lack of clear policy which would cover all of the museums and offer the security department the mandate it requires to properly secure all of its charges. Forsblom stated that whilst guidelines exist, they are not set in stone and consequently museum directors and sometimes even artists must be negotiated with to achieve certain concessions to their exhibition plans if they present security risks. Forsblom added that though these instances are simply matters of sitting down and discussing the issue, they highlight the fundamental difference in perspectives of security personnel and museal personnel (Forsblom & Paavilainen 2015. Personal communication.).

#### 4.1.6 Conclusions drawn from expert interviews

The interviewees could be broadly separated into two categories in order to better understand the context of their remarks; those working within museums and involved in their core business, either directly as their employees or as outside contractors: Perkko, Peltonen, Forsblom and Paavilaine, and those working outside of museums and not directly involved in their core business: Tokila and Vartia.

Once this separation is made, patterns are more clearly discernible. It becomes quite clear that those working directly within museums feel that the key issue is the museum staff's

general lack of knowledge of the value of security, stemming from multiple factors. Perkko and Peltonen cited a lack of competency (with regards to security matters) within museum staff, particularly those museum staff who are ultimately responsible for making decisions regarding the security of their museums. This was not directly corroborated by Forsblom and Paavilainen, which is understandable however as they are directly employed by a museum that said, one could understand their comments regarding the necessity for concessions and negotiations with museum directors and artists as alluding to a lack of security competence or understanding on behalf of the museum staff.

Forsblom and Paavilainen emphasized the lack of a common language as the single most critical factor, a point also brought up by Peltonen. Whilst this point was not completely explored in any of the interviews and the concept of a common language could be understood to mean a number of things, if we break it down to its simplest meaning - ineffective communication - then this point supports the view that the security and museum industries are very far apart, and the distinct differences in these industries is the cause of potential friction between professionals from both sides, as they fail to understand one another's points of view.

The interviews with Vartia and Tokila, who perceive the museum industry perhaps somewhat differently as they work in bodies governing or directing museums rather than directly within them, offered slightly different results. Both felt that museums Finland, in general, took security seriously and made efforts in this regard. Vartia, who handled the state indemnity applications, stated that few museums had any reason for leaving an application if they were not prepared to fulfil the requirements, which was one of the reasons why so few were rejected. This would of course imply that museums are more than willing and capable of fulfilling even the relatively stringent requirements of the state, provided that there is a reason tied to their core business for doing so. Without a state indemnity, a particular exhibition may not be possible, as the pieces to be exhibited would not be loaned in the first place. This then begs the question; do museums not see the value provided by security in and of itself, because its impact on their core business is typically not visible?

Tokila on the other hand emphasized the lack of suitable security solutions as one of the main issues, indicating that museums would possibly be more inclined to invest in security were the services on offer more suited to their needs.

The conclusions that we can draw from these interviews then are that there exists a very real and very large divide between the services on offer from the security sector and the needs of the museum sector, as well as a profound perception by the security sector that their services and their value are not understood by the museum sector.

#### 4.2 Survey questionnaire

A survey questionnaire comprising of 19 separate questions was created by the project group, and with the permission of the Finnish museum association a link to said survey (created and stored online using Google forms) was forwarded to all of the members of the Finnish museum association's mailing list on two separate occasions; first in July and then again in August 2015. Two separate notifications were deemed necessary by the project group due to the low number of respondents in the first instance, a fact which was determined to have occurred due to the summer holidays. Fortunately, on the second notification in August 2015, a sufficient number of responses were received for the project group to have considered the survey responses a valid representation of the Finnish museum sector's views on security, with 56 separate registered responses.

The rights to edit and view the results of the survey were restricted to the three members of the project group. As such, recipients were able to respond to the survey but not view the results. This was done intentionally to prevent the possibility of respondents simply copying one another's responses.

Unfortunately, the project group was unable to find a suitable means for restricting individual IP (internet protocol) locals from answering the survey more than once, meaning that there is the possibility of multiple recipients from a single museum having answered the survey on the same museum's behalf, which would skew the validity of the survey's results. This could have been possible due to several museums having a general and shared e-mail address as the main recipient of the mailing list which was used to disseminate information about the survey, or because of several individuals working in the same museum being subscribed to said mailing list. That said, however, no two responses were identical (nor were any two responses identifiable as having come from the same museum based on their answers) and as such the project group felt confident that each response came from a separate museum.

#### 4.2.1 Threats and preparedness

The first points to be examined will be whether or not museums perceive themselves to be at risk, and how prepared they perceive themselves to be to combat the potential threats those risks represent. Given the results of our expert interviews, the results should reflect a general lack of competence, meaning an extraordinarily high or extraordinarily low confidence in tackling risks.

# What level of risk do you believe your museum faces (including safety hazards, criminality etc.)?



Figure 2: Risks as perceived by museums in Finland (Survey 2015)

As expert interviewee Perkko put it, "in Finland, we have been in a type of Shangri-La" (Perkko 2015. Personal communication.), meaning that Finland has been spared from particularly high-profile robberies or damaging incidents involving museums. From the results to this particular question, with nearly half of museums citing minimal risk and the other half moderate risk, we could understand that museums in Finland do in fact consider themselves to be at risk, perhaps even more so than statistically they would be expected to.




Figure 3: Security preparedness as perceived by museums in Finland (Survey 2015)

Despite many museums perhaps even overestimating the risks they face, the majority of Finnish museums feel that they are adequately prepared against potential threats. Provided that, as Perkko pointed out in his interview, most museums do not have security professionals on staff (Perkko 2015. Personal communication.), we have to assume that the definition of being prepared against potential threats is not quite the same here as it would be for a security professional (in terms of having reduced risks to an acceptable level). Worryingly, 17% of respondents did do not know whether or not their museum was adequately prepared, indicating a lack of understanding of the subject matter.




Figure 4: Risk assessments performed by museums in the last 5 years (Survey 2015)

Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, many Finnish museums (49.1%) have conducted a risk assessment within the last 5 years, indicating a relatively up-to-date understanding of the threats they may face. As an anecdotal addendum, it should be noted that when dealing with the Didrichsen art museum, the security project group found the previous risk assessment of that particular museum to have been conducted by a non-security professional, and the assessment itself delving more into art conservation and preservation than holistic security. As such, the possibility exists that some or all of the risk assessments indicated in this response are similar, in which case they would not suffice in determining security threats faced by any particular museum.

#### 4.2.2 Security management in museums

To once again refer to Perkko's point about museum security generally being managed by someone other than a security professional, one of the questions in the survey asked this very question.




Figure 5: Security managers in museums in Finland (Survey 2015)

According to the respondents, almost one third of Finnish museums (30.2%) have a security professional in charge of museum security. This includes both in-house security managers, who were responsible in 18.9% of respondent museums, and outsourced security managers, who were responsible in 11.3% of respondent museums. The number of museums with security professionals in charge of museum security seems relatively high, considering the criticism levelled at them by both of the security consultants interviewed by the security project group. However, there is no denying that the vast majority of Finnish museums either have nobody in charge of security, or the person responsible for it is not a security professional.

It is also worth noting that the term "security professional" could refer to a museum professional with some security training, as the term itself is perhaps not sufficiently clearly defined and the results are the interpretation of the respondents.

#### 4.2.3 Security standards and training

One of the criticisms that the security professionals working within museums interviewed by the security project group was the lack of clear policies to guide security-related decisionmaking in museums.




Figure 6: Security standards in museums in Finland (Survey 2015)

The results of a question pertaining to this in the survey would certainly seem to support their claim, as relatively few respondents had any clear policies or standards in place (such as those provided by the International Council of Museums ICOM), with only 20.8% of respondents citing the use of established international standards. Worryingly, an equal number of respondents cited the minimum legal requirements as being the basis for their security and

safety policies, which whilst relatively robust in Finland, are largely concerned with work and fire safety and very general in nature (Finland 2016).

A staggering 15.1% of respondents did not know what the basis for their museum's security and safety policies were, which when compounded with the 3.8% of respondents who had no policies at all, presents an even grimmer picture.

Curiously, 30.2% of respondents, which is the exact same amount of respondents who stated that they had security professionals responsible for their museum's security and safety (see Figure 4: Security managers in museums in Finland) stated they used in-house standards. It is possible that the presence of security professionals has resulted in the development of site-specific security standards, which would certainly be an improvement over the use of any generic standard, regardless of how well-crafted it may be.




Figure 7: Security training in museums in Finland (Survey 2015)

As standards will largely dictate what training is necessary for staff to be able to comply with said standards, it comes as no surprise that the majority of training requirements that exist are related to work safety, first aid and fire safety. Only 20.8% of respondent museums cited the existence of other types of safety or security related training. Very concerning was that over a third (37.7%) of respondent museums had no training requirements for their staff whatsoever.

One of the possible explanations for the lack of security-specific training is that it isn't available, at least not in a manner which would attract museums. This would comply with the point made about the lack of suitable training programmes for museums (Tokila 2015. Personal communication.).

#### 4.2.4 Security expenditure

One of the main reasons suspected by security professionals interviewed by the security project group for the relative lack of security in Finnish museums was the lack of budgeting or unwillingness to spend on security, which most museums felt detracted from their core business (Perkko 2015. Personal communication.).




Figure 8: Museum security budgets in Finland (Survey 2015)

The responses from survey respondent museums would certainly seem to confirm this point. Nearly half of Finnish museums have allocated 5% or less of their budget on security measures. Given that the budgets of Finnish museums are generally speaking small to begin with as they rely on the state's financial assistance:




Figure 9: Museum funding 2015 (Museovirasto 2015)

and that museums face constant cuts, most recently in 2016 (Museoliitto 2016), this would represent a miniscule amount of funds to spend on security.

It is worth noting that not a single museum responded that they spend over 10% of their budget on security and safety.




Figure 10: Security expenditure perceptions by museums in Finland (Survey 2015)

Despite the fact that the majority of museums spend less than 5% of their budget on security, the majority also felt that they are spending an appropriate amount on security, with 56.6% of respondent museums indicating that they are neither spending too much nor too little.

Whether or not a museum is spending an appropriate amount on security is of course, highly subjective. Considering the lack of major cases of art theft or vandalism in Finland, statistics would seem to support that most museums are spending enough on security. This would seem to be in line with the 54.7% of museums who felt that they are adequately prepared for the risks they face (see Figure 1: Risks as perceived by museums in Finland).

However, a significant amount of museums (41.5%) also felt that they were spending too little on security. This would also seem to support the 45.3% of museums who replied that they were either not adequately prepared for the risks they face, or did not know if they were adequately prepared.

#### 4.2.5 Conclusions drawn from survey responses

The survey responses offer a mixed view of whether or not museums invest appropriately into security, both financially and otherwise. This is perhaps best explained due to the different nature of museums - the very reason why a qualitative study of museum security would have been virtually impossible, and why a case study based on the Didrichsen security project would have yielded very one-sided results. As Perkko stated in his interview, the Didrichsen security project was quite unique in that the museum was firstly relatively well-off (in museum terms), and secondly the project was established to secure a very rare and high-profile exhibition.

The varying nature of responses indicates at the very least, a general discord and lack of unified direction or understanding or security matters in museums in Finland, in general. This would of course suggest that Forsblom and Paavilainen were quite astute in their assessment of a lack of clear policy creating issues, even if their comment was more directly directed at the museums they are responsible for. This point was of course strengthened by the survey responses regarding security standards and policies, which indicated an even broader spectrum of differences between museums.

What is evident from the survey responses is that roughly half of the museums in Finland feel that they either a) face very little risk and are therefore sufficiently prepared or b) have invested sufficiently into security to be adequately prepared to face those risks.

The near-even split between museums that feel they spend the right amount on security and those that feel they spend too little on it further supports the perception of a disjointed sector in which entities perceive security in a very disjointed manner. It is quite evident that museums should be treated individually when it comes to security, a point supported also by Tokila who supported the creation of more sector-specific security services. This is further supported by the survey results regarding security training, which indicated that security training is at best, rudimentary in most museums.

Ultimately, the quantitative research would suggest that the museum sector in Finland is at best, poorly prepared to face potential risks. Any sector which has half of its entities either unaware of how well-prepared they are or understanding that they are not sufficiently well-

prepared cannot be construed to be anything other than unprepared. Similarly, the minute amount of financial investment the museum sector places on security expenditures exemplifies the notion of a sector perceiving their situation as "so far so good", which is of course an illusion.

#### 4.3 Conclusions drawn from other academic research

This section will briefly draw upon the academic research of others who have conducted similar studies or made observations in the same field to draw comparisons and aid in the triangulation of our research findings. The works which will be utilized are the theses of the other two security project members as well as a study by Louise Grover and Suzie Thomas published in 2016 regarding the state of museum security in Finland and the United Kingdom.

It should be noted that all of the expert interviews as well as the survey responses utilized in this thesis were also available to the other members of the security project group.

#### 4.3.1 Museum security in Finland: a case study

In his thesis entitled "Museum security in Finland: a case study", Wolf Tröh uses some of the same expert interviews utilized in this thesis and analyses the current state of security in Finnish museums with the help of literary sources. Tröh's findings are that Finnish museums are not as prepared as they would like to believe:

"The first finding suggests that Finnish museums are not doing enough for security and security service providers could benefit considerably if they make museums aware of this. This finding is to be seen against the background that the museum sector is under the impression that they are doing enough for security, while in fact they are not doing so." (Tröh 2015)

Tröh bases his findings on the fact that the majority of Finnish museums are at best, following the minimum requirements insofar as security and safety standards are concerned, and have failed to present sufficient investments to suggest that they could be considered to be adequately protected.

#### 4.3.2 Developing a business model for company X

In his thesis entitled "Developing a business model for company X", Lauri Tervonen creates a business model for the creation of a private security entity to cater to the needs of the Finnish museum sector. Whilst Tervonen's research focuses much more on the quantitative results

of the survey also utilized in this thesis and his conclusions refer more to the creation of a commercial entity, some of his conclusions are of value for the purposes of this thesis' focus as well.

On the subject of service providers for museum security, Tervonen stated; "the results from the questionnaire and the interviews suggest that there is a need for security/safety service providers in the Finnish museum sector. All of the interviewees believed that the museum sector needs more security/service providers" (Tervonen 2016).

Tervonen also comments on the perception of museums' reticence to invest in security: "the data gathered also suggests that security/safety are seen important in the museum sector and that there is willingness to invest into security/safety. The interviews and results of the questionnaire suggest that one of the challenges for companies trying to offer the services is the lack of resources the museums have" (Tervonen 2016).

4.3.3 The rhino horn on display has been replaced by a replica: museum security in Finland and England

In their 2016 study "The rhino horn on display has been replaced by a replica: museum security in Finland and England", Louise Grove and Suzie Thomas carried out a series of interviews with museum staff members in both Finland and the United Kingdom in an attempt to better understand the key issues surrounding museum security.

Their study begins with a statement which supports the argumentation made in this thesis' introduction; "the true extent of loss or theft from museums is unknown" (Grove & Thomas 2016). This is a conclusion made upon a backdrop of statistics suggesting that a significant portion of museums globally do not keep proper records or maintain sufficient access control.

Of more interest for this thesis however, is the conclusions their study draws. Firstly, they found that the lack of proper training was a major concern; "training was repeatedly highlighted as an area in need of improvement: it was often perceived as being outdated and irrelevant, and particularly difficult for seasonal and part-time employees to attend" (Grove & Thomas 2016). This of course, directly supports the claims made by Tokila in our interview and supports the conclusions drawn from the survey responses as well. Grove and Thomas went on to suggest that "there is much to be gained from developing more tailored programmes for staff in museums" and "museums of different sizes and budgets also clearly need context-specific advice" (Grove & Thomas 2016), further highlighting the lack of services which comprehend and cater to the museums' needs in terms of appreciating their core business.

Their study would also seem to corroborate the claims made by Perkko and Peltonen regarding the lack of a common language between security and museum professionals, as they state, "it is perhaps this reticence to involve outsiders that has left, in many places, a distinct separation between security and museum sectors" (Grove & Thomas 2016) when discussing their findings regarding the security culture of museums and specifically, the lack of communication regarding it.

It is also worth noting that Grove & Thomas' study has had a profound impact on efforts to improve museum security awareness in Finland, according to Laurea University of Applied Sciences' regional manager Anssi Kuusela. In a missive sent during the evaluation of this thesis he stated that as a consequence of the study, Laurea and the University of Helsinki are cooperating to provide a course on the fundamentals of museum security (Kuusela 2017. Personal communication.). The course is to be offered as an elective to security management students at Laurea, and as a compulsory part of their degree to museology students at the University of Helsinki.

#### 5 Triangulation, reliability and validity

In order to assess the reliability of our hypothesis; that museum security services are undervalued in Finland and that their value could be increased by better integrating them into museums' core business, we will compile the results of our three different methods of research and compare the results therein.

First, let us take our primary claim; that security services are undervalued by museums in Finland. This claim is mostly supported by the expert interviews of Perkko and Peltonen. Perkko stated that museums focus more on their core business when discussing museums' finances (Perkko 2015. Personal communication.) and Peltonen stated that museums spend their money on things other than security (Peltonen 2015. Personal communication.). The remainder of the interviews did not offer any direct evidence or claims that museums undervalue security as such, and even Perkko and Peltonen claimed that museums take security seriously or rather would like to - but cannot due to financial restraints.

The survey responses would seem to reinforce this point, with the majority of museums spending 0-5% of their budget on security and most museums not having a security professional in charge of security. In and of themselves, the survey responses do not however support the claim that museums undervalue security - on the contrary, most respondents assessed themselves to be facing a certain amount of risk, and their perception of preparedness

would suggest an overestimation of their security rather than an undervaluation of security in general.

The literary review found little evidence to support this claim either, at most we could conclude that Tröh found Finnish museums to overestimate their security as well (Tröh 2015) which is not precisely the same thing as undervaluing security.

In light of these findings, we can unequivocally state that museums do not in fact undervalue security services and the first part of our hypothesis has proven false.

The second claim, which is that security services could be made more valuable to museums by better integrating them into museums' core businesses, seems to be more supported by the research.

The qualitative research supports this from almost every angle. Perkko and Peltonen offered the suggestion that there is a general lack of competence and understanding of security from the museum sector, which could be corrected by more training - an inverse relation to making security more accessible to the museum sector admittedly, but a concept which abides by the principle of inclusivity nonetheless. Tokila emphasized the need for more tailored security services for the museum sector, citing the lack of suitable services especially in terms of training programmes available. Forsblom and Paavilainen did not directly indicate that they lacked suitable services, but mentioned the difficulty in communicating security needs to museum directors and artists, which could be construed to mean that security should be made more accessible and inclusive to the museum in order for there to be fewer conflicts of interest. Vartia did not directly comment on the topic.

The survey responses would suggest that security should be made more understandable as well. Whilst the nature of the survey prevented the type of in-depth research that the expert interviews afforded, we can deduct from the answers given that museums in general are very disjointed in the manner in which they perceive risks and their capacity to deal with those risks. Those museums which had invested into security, for example in the form of an inhouse security manager, seemed to also be more prepared against potential risks, with up-to-date risk analyses and a higher level of confidence. Security training figures also indicated a high willingness to receive training, but a lack of suitable training options for anything other than the most basic forms of security training.

Our literary review supports the notion that efforts should be made to make security services more context-specific as well. In particular Grove & Thomas cited the need for both more customized training as well as advising services, and stated that the divide between the

security and museum sectors had grown due to an inability or unwillingness to involve one another. Tervonen's findings also suggest that there is not only a high demand for security services from the museum sector, but a suitable gap in the market for an actor to provide the types of services that museums require - specifically, context-specific services. Tröh's results were similar, as he stated that security service providers could add value to their products and services by educating themselves more on museums and understanding the core business, suggesting that the lack of understanding does not simply flow in one direction but rather stems from an inability to see eye-to-eye on both sides.

In light of these findings, we can conclude that security services could be made more valuable to the museum sector by integrating them better into the museums' core business. Some notions on how to do this are presented in the following chapter.

#### 6 Conclusions

The core of this thesis has been focused around a two-part hypothesis; museums in Finland undervalue security, and value can be added to security services offered to museums by better integrating them into the core business of museums. Whilst the first part of this hypothesis has been proven incorrect, with museums showing a significant willingness to improve their security and even occasionally invest in it, we have been able to deduce that the second part of our hypothesis is correct.

The key issue in the conundrum facing the security and museum sectors and their ability to find a way to benefit one another seems to be communication and understanding. Based on the findings of this thesis, we can ascertain that a problem exists between the supply provided by security providers and the demand of museums for their services. The precise nature of these problems is difficult to ascertain and warrants further study; the issue could be in marketing, in regional offerings, in sufficient specialization, in B2B communications or indeed in the perceived value of those services. This conclusion is of course hindered by the limited amount of available data, and as mentioned further study is recommended to fully examine the issue.

Of course, the matter is not quite as simple as sitting both theoretical parties down at a table and discussing the matter. Museums face significant restrictions in their ability to invest in security due to budgetary concerns, and security service providers are reticent to create solutions for customers who are unable to adequately compensate them. However, it is the conclusion of this thesis that solutions that can satisfy both parties do exist. Key suggestions for the real-world application of these findings are below:

 Security training services offered to museums must be made more comprehensive and context-specific.

Virtually all of the research conducted indicated a deep dissatisfaction with the quality and variety of security training on offer for museums. This was brought up by experts in the field - both security professionals working outside of museums as well as by members of governing bodies who act as intermediaries between museums and security service providers. This was also implied by survey responses by museums, who had clearly offered training to staff members and thus indicated an interest in improving their staff's ability to deal with a variety of situations, but focusing on rudimentary and general training as little else is on offer. Our literary review also found that other researchers had arrived at a similar conclusion with regards to the lack of suitable training and the general desire for more of it from the museum sector.

2. Security service providers should take a more thorough interest in museums to better facilitate their needs.

The majority of successful security service providers have long relied upon a model of standardizing a service for quality control reasons, and replicating that service regardless of the client in question. Whilst effective when dealing with clients with similar profiles or needs, museums have a very unique and particular profile in that they require extraordinary levels of protection whilst simultaneously making themselves extraordinarily vulnerable due to the nature of their core business. In order to better facilitate museums and make even basic security services more valuable to museums, security service providers should familiarize themselves with the core business of museums; that is to say, exhibitions, the types of environments in which museums operate, the types of clientele they can expect, and offer security services which strengthen that business rather than detract from it.

3. The museum sector should attempt to perceive security more holistically.

What became evident from the survey responses and the expert interviews was that many museums still perceive security in a very superficial manner - security guards, cameras, alarms and the like. Security is of course, much more than that, it can and does include things like continuity, logistics and contingency preparations. The museum sector should attempt to include security principles more thoroughly into their core business by considering how security professionals experienced in things like risk analyses, crisis communications and reputational protection could assist and even

increase their core business by making their museums more safe and attractive to their clientele.

4. Security must not be seen as an expenditure separate from a museum's core business.

Throughout this thesis, the budgetary concerns of museums have appeared as one of the greatest obstacles for museums having adequate security measures in place. Whilst this will never not be an issue as (with a few notable, largely privately-owned exceptions) museums will likely never be so rich as to not have to worry about financing, museums should attempt to include security expenditures in the very essence of their budgeting plans as a means of ensuring the continuity and security of their core business rather than as a tacked-on and necessary expenditure to satisfy state indemnity board or lender requirements. It is certainly easy to understand the allure of spending a portion of an annual budget on the insurance and transportation of additional pieces for a particularly desirable exhibition rather than additional training or proper security planning, but should something occur during that exhibition to damage those pieces or harm the museum or its clientele, irreparable and irreversible damage could occur. Damage which could potentially have been avoided by including appropriate security measures in the first place.

Whilst this thesis is certainly not definitive in its research nor its findings, it is remarkable to note how much of the research done into the subject yields similar results. There is clear and evident proof of security concerns in museums in Finland (and indeed globally), yet little to no action has been taken by either the museum or security sectors to rectify the situation.

The suggestions and findings found within cannot correct a situation that has existed for as long and as strongly as this particular one has, at least not very quickly. It is however worth noting that the more of this type of research is done, the more of these findings that are corroborated and supported by others, the more likely it is that the security and museum sectors will take heed and begin to take steps to improve the security of museums and the invaluable cultural heritage stored within them.

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Appendix 1: Cover letter for survey conducted by security project group in July - August 2015

#### Tutkimustyön esittelykirje

Allekirjoittaneet ovat kolmannen vuoden Security Management -koulutusohjelman opiskelijoita Laurea ammattikorkeakoulusta, jotka tämän kirjeen avulla pyytävät yhteistyötänne opinnäytetöidensä valmistumiseksi ja suomalaisen museoturvallisuuden edistämiseksi.

Työskentelimme Helsingin Kuusisaaressa sijaitsevan Didrichsenin taidemuseon kanssa huhtikuusta 2014 helmikuuhun 2015, jonka aikana suunnittelimme ja sovelsimme käytäntöön turvallisuusratkaisuja Edvard Munchin näyttelyä varten. Tänä aikana kiinnostuimme myös laajemmin suomalaisen museoalan tämänhetkisestä turvallisuustilanteesta. Sen seurauksena valmistelemme nyt aiheesta kolmea opinnäytetyötä, joiden tarkoitus on tutkimuksen kautta selvittää tarkemmin suomalaisten museoiden tämänhetkistä turvallisuustilannetta, arvioida havaittuja kehitystarpeita ja kartoittaa museoalan turvallisuustarpeiden palveluntuotannon liiketoimintamahdollisuuksia.

Pyydämme yhteistyötänne tutkimustyön tekemiseksi vastaamalla lähettämäämme kyselylomakkeeseen ja järjestämällä aikaa erikseen sovittavaan henkilökohtaiseen haastatteluun, mikäli mahdollista. Olemme tietoisia aiheen luottamuksellisuudesta, ja voimme vakuuttaa teille, ettemme julkaise opinnäytetöissämme yksityiskohtaisia tietoja museoiden turvajärjestelyistä.

#### Täytä kyselylomake painamalla tästä.

Lomake on englanniksi, sillä englanti on Laurean turvallisuusalan kansainvälisen linjan opetuskieli.

Tutkimustyömme tarkoituksena on tuottaa tietoa sekä suomalaiselle museo- että turvallisuusalalle siitä kuinka museoita, museoiden henkilökuntaa ja vierailijoita, sekä näyttelyesineitä voidaan suojella paremmin.

Kiitos ajastanne. Toivomme, että olemme yhteydessä pian.

Mikäli teille herää kysymyksiä tutkimustyöstämme pyydämme teitä ottamaan yhteyttä alla esitettyihin henkilöihin,

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# Appendix 2: Questionnaire for survey conducted by security project group in July - August 2015

		v would you categorize your museum? *
	Plea	ase choose only one of the following
		▼
	Who	ere is your museum located? *
	Hov	v many visitors does your museum receive annually (general estimate)? *
0	0	0 – 1,000
0	0	1,000 — 5,000
0	0	5,000 - 10,000
0	0	10,000 – 25,000
0	0	25,000 - 50,000
0	O	50,000 - 100,000
0	0	100,000 +
	Hov	v many persons are employed by your museum full-time? *
0	0	0 – 5
0	0	5 – 10
0	0	10 – 20
0	0	20 – 40
0	0	40 +
	Who	o owns your museum? *
0	0	Private ownership
0	0	Public ownership
0	0	Joint ownership
	Who	ere does your museum store its pieces/displays?
0	0	On-site storage only
0	0	Off-site storage only
0	0	On and off-site storage
0		No storage

		at level of risk do you believe your museum faces (including safety hazards, crimity etc.)? *
0		No risk
0	C	Minimal risk
0	O	Moderate risk
0	0	High risk
	Doy	ou feel that your museum is adequately prepared against potential threats? *
0	O	Yes
0		No
0	0	I don't know
0	Are	the pieces or works on display at your museum generally insured? * Yes, they are privately insured
0		Yes, they are insured by the government (state indemnity) or other public authority
0	0	No
	Has	your museum conducted a risk assessment in the last 5 years? *
0		Yes
0	C	No
0	0	I don't know
	Who	is responsible for security at your museum? *
0		In-house security manager (turvallisuuspäällikkö)
0		Other in-house management
0		Other in-house staff member
0	0	Outsourced security manager
0		Nobody
0	0	I don't know
	Doe	s your museum employ security staff? *
0		Yes, outsourced security guards
0		Yes, in-house security staff
0		Yes, both outsourced security guards and in-house security staff
0	0	No
	Do y	ou require your staff members to undergo specific safety and/or security train-
0	0	Yes
0		No

If you answered previous question yes, please tick the appropriate boxes for which types of training you have required  $^\star$ 

	If yo	u answered the previous question no, please tick "No training requirements"
0		Work safety training
0		First aid training
0		Fire safety training
0		State indemnity related security/safety training
0		Other safety/security-related training
0		No training requirements
		at kind of physical security measures does your museum have in place (tick all a priate boxes)? *
0		Mechanical locks (perinteinen ovilukitus)
0		Electronic locks (sähköiset lukitusjärjestelmät)
0		Reinforced windows
0		Alarm systems linked to police
0		Alarm systems linked to security company
0		Alarm systems, internal only
0		Motion sensors
0		Surveillance system (CCTV)
0		Fire alarms
0		Smoke detectors
0		Gas detectors
0		Fire extinguishers
0		First aid supplies
0		UPS/back-up generator (varageneraattori)
0		Proper outdoors lighting
0	_	at is the basis for your museum's security and safety policies? *
0	0	Outsourced standard (e.g. consultancy based)
0	0	International standard (ISO, ICOM)
0	0	National standard (KATAKRI)
0	0	Minimum legal requirements
0	0	None
0	0	I don't know
0	Wha	at portion of your museum's budget is spent on security/safety expenditures? * $0-5\%$
0	0	5 – 10%
0	0	10 – 25%
0	0	25% +
0	0	I don't know

	Do you feel that your museum's safety and security could benefit from any of the fol- lowing: *		
0		Additional physical security/safety measures	
0		Additional safety and security training for your staff	
0		Additional security/safety staff	
0		Additional insurance policies	
0		Additional security/safety planning (plans and assessments)	
0		Implementation of recognized security standards	
0		None of the previously listed	
		se indicate your museum's experiences with security service providers and the ices they offer (tick where applicable): *	
0		There are many security service providers operating locally	
0		There are too few security service providers operating locally	
0		The services offered are diverse and suit the museum's needs	
0		The services offered are insufficient for the museum's needs	
0		The services offered are cost-effective	
0		The services offered are too expensive	
0		The services offered are of a high quality	
0		The services offered are of a poor quality	
		you feel that your museum currently spends: *	
0	0	Too little on security/safety	
0	0	Too much on security/safety	
0	O	The right amount on security/safety	

Please feel free to add any comments or suggestions you may have below:

Appendix 3: Semi-structured interview with Karim Peltonen

SPEK offices, Pasila, Helsinki. 1.7.2015, 12.00

Persons present: Karim Peltonen, then under-secretary for the national working group for the Finnish government tasked to look into The Hague 1954 Convention and its applications in Finland.Wolf Tröh, fellow student writing thesis also related to museum security. The interview con-sisted a brief introduction of who we are, what we are inspired to achieve through the thesis re-search and how we got interested in museum security and safety matters.

- 1. Can you describe briefly what you did in the national working group?
- 2. The protocol states that you get everything ready in the event of war, but is what was

done for peace time situations?

- 3. Is there a guidelines and recommendations document that exists to aid people or museums?
- 4. Are you aware of any other training that is available for museums?
- 5. Are you aware of anyone that offers these services?
- 6. Do you think there is a need for more training, especially in this field for the museum sector?
- 7. What do you think their attitude towards museum security is?
- 8. Do they take it seriously enough? Do they concentrate on specific areas?
- 9. What is the perception of security in museums in Finland?
- 10. What do the museum managers or the government think of museum security?
- 11. Do you think there are any specific threats that museums face, especially in Finland?

Appendix 4: Semi-structured interview with Mikko Perkko

Sello, Leppävaara; 2.7.2015, 13.00

Persons present: Mikko Perkko: retired museum security consultant, author of the books on museum security, and a member of the ICOM International Committee on Museum Security; Wolf Tröh, fellow student writing thesis also related to museum security; Lauri Tervonen. The interview consisted a brief introduction of who we are, what we are inspired to achieve through the thesis research and how we got interested in museum security and safety matters.

- 1. You were part of ICOM and ICSM. How did you get involved in that business?
- 2. Did you work in the whole of Finland as a museum security consultant?
- 3. Was there a big demand for your services?
- 4. We understand that the government demands museums conduct a risk assessment and have fire and rescue plans in place. Do the museums implement any additional security measures?
- 5. Do ICOM expect museums to follow their guidelines security-wise?
- 6. Is there any legislation locally that states which guidelines should be adhered to and followed?
- 7. Do you believe that museums take their security seriously enough?
- 8. The State indemnity Board advises what museums must do, but is there any oversight?
- 9. What security training is available for museums?
- 10. Museoliitto Do they offer their own training or do they make use of a sub-contractor?
- 11. If yes, do you know who the subcontractor is?
- 12. Are you aware of this training and how good is it?
- 13. Are Museoliitto affiliated to ICOM?

- 14. Does the National Board of Antiquities have a set of written guidelines?
- 15. Are these publically available?
- 16. What do you think are the biggest safety and security related needs that the Finnish museums have?
- 17. In your opinion, what are the biggest threats that museums in Finland are exposed to?
- 18. What do you think about using security guards in museums?
- 19. Do you feel that security measures in overseas museums are exaggerated?
- 20. I am of the opinion that this is a trend that is going to be seen more in museums in the near future the world over. Do you agree with this statement?