IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPABILITIES (IEC) IN EU CONFLICT PREVENTION
CONTENTS

1. ABOUT THE IECEU PROJECT ......................................................... 6

2. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
   CAPABILITIES IN EU CONFLICT PREVENTION ................................. 8

3. IECEU DISSEMINATION .................................................................. 11

4. LESSONS FROM IECEU CASE STUDIES ........................................... 21

5. COMPARING APPLES AND AIRPLANES:
   CASE STUDY ANALYSIS IN IECEU .................................................. 44

6. LEARNING APPLICATION TO SUPPORT EU
   CRISIS MANAGEMENT TRAINING .................................................... 47

7. INTEROPERABILITY – WHAT EFFECT TO
   EFFECTIVENESS OF EU EXTERNAL ACTIONS? ................................. 52

8. APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE
   THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU CSDP CRISIS
   MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS AND EU’S CONFLICT
   PREVENTION CAPABILITIES ............................................................ 63

9. RESEARCH MEETS POLICY – TOWARDS A
   CULTURE OF EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT ......................................... 70

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................. 72

AUTHORS ......................................................................................... 76
1. ABOUT THE IECEU - PROJECT

The IECEU, which stands for Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU) is a multinational project aiming at enhancing conflict prevention capabilities. This project has received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, HORIZON 2020. The IECEU Consortium itself consists of a diverse group of civilian, research and military organizations. The members consist of 12 partners, from 7 different countries, and they are:

- Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Finland, Consortium Coordinator, www.laurea.fi)
- Safer Globe (Finland, https://saferglobe.fi/)
- University of Ljubljana (Slovenia, https://www.uni-lj.si/eng/)
- Centre for European Perspective (Slovenia, www.cep.si)
- National University of Ireland Maynooth (Ireland, www.maynoothuniversity.ie)
- Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (Austria, www.aies.at/english/)
- Royal Danish Defence College (Denmark, www.fak.dk/en)
- Enquirya (The Netherlands, www.enquirya.com)
- Crisis Management Centre Finland (Finland, www.cmcfinland.fi)
- As associated partner: European Security and Defence College (Belgium, www.esaf.eu)

Through analyses and evaluations the project aims to identify the best practices and develop new approaches and solutions. In order to achieve the set goals, the IECEU project aims to strengthen cooperation between different actors, in the operational context. The project looks to provide recommendations for the EU to guarantee long-term stability. The project had three main objectives and they are:

- to analyze the current situation of on-going and past EU CSDP missions and operations
- to learn from the lessons provided by these CSDP missions and to assess the different options
- to provide new solutions, approaches and recommendations for the EU, in order to guarantee long term stability, through conflict prevention and peacebuilding

The responsibilities of IECEU research and development activities were spread among the IECEU Consortium partners. The methodology was co-created within all partners in the beginning of the project implementation as well as comparative analysis were finally concluded with participation of all partners. The work division within IECEU Consortium was as follows:

- Laurea UAS: lead of management, coordination, IECEU Learning Application, contribution to analysis
- Safer Globe: lead of methodology, comparative analysis and capabilities
- University of Ljubljana: lead of research conducted in Balkans (Kosovo and BiH), research and analysis
- Centre for European Perspective: lead of dissemination, research in Balkans, contribution to analysis
- National University of Ireland Maynooth: research in Afghanistan, contribution to analysis
- Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy: lead of new approaches and solutions, research in South Sudan, contribution to analysis
- Royal Danish Defence College: lead of research conducted in Africa, research in DR Congo, contribution to analysis
- University of Roskilde: lead of effectiveness analysis
- Enquirya: lead of interoperability and pooling & sharing research, contribution to analysis
- Crisis Management Centre Finland: lead of research conducted in occupied Palestinian territories and Afghanistan, research in occupied Palestine Territories and Libya, contribution to analysis
- Finnish Defence Forces International Centre: research in Central African Republic, research of civil-military synergies, contribution to analysis
- European Security and Defence College: participation in facilitation policy dialogues and integration to training
2. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CAPABILITIES IN EU CONFLICT PREVENTION

Kirsi Hyttinen, Laurea UAS

The current global geopolitical changes, impacts of crisis and conflicts, radicalization and global interconnectedness are growing potential for security threats and landscapes inside and outside of the European Union (EU). EU and its Member States have showed the commitment to CSDP after Lisbon Treaty. The key for EU is to aim towards improvement of its conflict preparedness and response capabilities to create long-term impact and use the current resources even more effectively. With the research, the security challenges must be approached multidisciplinary and holistic in order to provide a solid foundation for information gathering and evidence-based studies. The needs for effectiveness analyses of CSDP missions and operations as well as improvements towards more successful conflict prevention capabilities were addressed by European Commission in early 2014. IECEU –project Consortium was established in 2015 in order to meet with these needs and to investigate solutions and approaches for longer term interventions and impacts.

The researchers of IECEU –project Consortium studied the best practices and lessons identified of CSDP missions and operations (during years 2015-2017) with a view to enhance the civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding capabilities of EU. The analyses were conducted with use of comparative methods and set success indicators. IECEU conceptual framework and effectiveness (success) indicators built an overall understanding among researchers to examine the current EU capabilities in both military and civilian crisis management. The main data collection methods were desk study research, surveys, active observation and qualitative interviews of personnel representing EU CSDP operation, EEAS, EU institutes, other international organisations, local authorities, and local population. In total 12 different operations (EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo, Operation Artemis, EUCAP, South Sudan, EUFOR Chad/RCA, EUFOR CAR, EUBAM Libya, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah) and 265 interviews were analysed during years 2016 and 2017. Further, a deeper focus related to pooling and sharing, interoperability and civilian military synergies was built with use of mixed methods in data collection. Currently, under CSDP, EU has currently sixteen (16) on-going military and civilian operations or missions. Most of the mandates focus on assisting, monitoring, capacity building and training.

The EU can have the biggest influence in the early stage of the conflicts and crisis. The improvements for conflict prevention mechanisms and more effective preparedness in early stage of the conflict can benefit EU long-term. The current conflicts and crisis cannot be overcome solely by military or civilian means alone, which requires better civil-military synergies, potentials for pooling and sharing and integrated approach. IECEU research led towards a catalogue of practices in CSDP missions, and proposal of new solutions and approaches. It found out how to increase the interoperability of resources in the crisis management and peacebuilding and what the potential for pooling and sharing of EU capabilities and technologies. The studies of IECEU show the necessity of further implementation of mechanisms and tools for conflict prevention whereas the lessons identified in CSDP missions and operations may benefit these processes. The developments in planning capabilities, understanding of grassroots causes, civil-military interoperability process, promotion of local ownership as central for the sustainability and legitimacy of the CSDP efforts in host country, and support of technologies and information sharing systems in CSDP, were addressed by IECEU research. Since CSDP missions are implemented by civilian means with understanding of “soft power”, the improvements for soft skills and competences of the personnel deployed in operations were highlighted. Hence, IECEU case studies with use of similar conceptual framework were just a peak; an establishment of overall system for measuring the effectiveness of EU’s CSDP activities could further identify the possible shortfalls and potentials.

This publication summarises the work of IECEU Consortium and its deliverables. The content of this publication is summarised based on the work conducted by different organisations and researchers of the IECEU. Firstly, we introduce our unique approach for H2020 project dissemination through extensive networks. Secondly, the case study findings and recommendations in terms of effectiveness and practices are introduced in order. Thirdly, the results of use of co-created conceptual framework will gather the comparative analysis from case study findings. Fourthly, the potentials for interoperability in CSDP are described as key findings from analysis completed in IECEU work. The implementation of H2020 funded project requires a set of new skills and competences from personnel participating to large research, innovation and support activities. In IECEU –project we identified a tailored model...
for project management and coordination. The Project Management Handbook describes the methodologies and activities implemented from the project management perspectives and gathers the good practices from this project. As IECEU Consortium Coordinator, I sincerely hope the readers to benefit of different results of IECEU, from project dissemination and management until research findings on effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations as well as policy level and academic recommendations. Moreover, I kindly thank for all contributors in this publication and throughout the IECEU –project implementation in years 2014-2018.

IECEU Consortium. From left: Kieran Doyle (Kennedy Institute), Ivana Boštjančič Pulko (CEP), Blaž Grilj (University of Ljubljana), Jyrki Ruohomäki (CMC Finland), Kari Sainio (FINCENT), Markko Kallonen (Laurea UAS), Kirsi Hyttinen (Laurea UAS), Arnold Kammel (AIES), Mascia Toussaint (Enquirya), Thomas Mandrup (RDDC), Elisa Norvanto (FINCENT), Hanna Nyqvist (Laurea UAS), Maria Mekri (Safeglobe), Jyrki Ruohomäki (CMC Finland), William Matchett (Kennedy Institute), Raffaele Marchetti

References:


3. IECEU DISSEMINATION

Meliha Muherina, CEP & Kirsi Hyttinen & Peter Österlund, Laurea UAS

A dissemination plan for the IECEU-project was delivered on 2 July 2015, as a part of Work Package 8, by the Centre for European Perspective (CEP). After successful implementation of dissemination activities in IECEU, we aim to present the IECEU Dissemination Framework to the reader, in a shorter, more concise form. “Development of dissemination plan and relevant dissemination tools is a fundamental part of the IECEU project in order to keep the ongoing activities of the project visible to audience and engage the main partners in an interactive approach, to receive relevant feedback.” (IECEU, 2015 D8.1 Dissemination Plan)

Dissemination activities are one of the most relevant features of a project, as they amplify the engagement of different stakeholders in order to reach the set project goals. Dissemination done in IECEU has been keeping the ongoing activities of the project visible to audiences, engaging the main stakeholders and end-users (academic as well as practitioners) in an interactive approach, and receiving relevant feedback. Main objectives of the dissemination of IECEU have been:

- to ensure the end users, stakeholders and beneficiaries of the information are actively involved and to enhance their interest
- to ensure efficient dissemination of the project goals, activities, progress achievements and findings between project participants and wider public
- to gain relevant feedback and constant evaluation of the project achievements and preliminary research findings
- to participate and report in relevant forums to disseminate results, achievements, findings and recommendations

References:

• to provide the consortium with a strategic framework to allow dissemination of work and results of IECEU
• information collected from each partner enabled the consortium to notice gaps in reaching specific identified end user groups and different dissemination tools so that performance could have been improved during the project duration.

IECEU dissemination has started with establishment of the

- Website [http://www.ieceu-project.com/]
- Facebook page [https://www.facebook.com/pages/IECEU-Improving-Effectiveness-of-Capabilities-in-EU-Conflict-Prevention/10271927286450]
- Twitter account [https://twitter.com/ieceuproject]

Social media accounts have been used to share all the most important developments in the project, publications and participation at various seminars, conferences and lectures. Facebook has 399 likes on its page, while 407 people are following it. Average reach of our Facebook posts was 1000 people. Twitter account on the other hand has 506 followers and 156 likes.

The dissemination plan represented an important tool when trying to ease the dissemination of results and activities towards relevant actors. In the Horizon 2020 Rules for Participation, dissemination is, roughly defined, as publicly disclosing the results by any means accepted, including scientific publications. Another important goal is to spread information and knowledge to a well-targeted, wider audience. The main objective of IECEU Dissemination and Exploitation was to provide information, in a more general way, on the project and its results to the interested public and, of course, to the relevant stakeholders. The development of a dissemination plan and relevant dissemination tools is an integral part of the project, in order to keep ongoing project activities visible to audiences and to engage the main stakeholders and end-users. IECEU Dissemination was an important tool for raising awareness about the project and importance of research in the field of CSDP as a systemic approach to information sharing among stakeholders.

The Dissemination Methodology

The dissemination was divided into three phases, before the project, during the project and not so surprisingly, after the project. The specific objectives of the methodology were:

• To develop differentiated communication tools, addressing various stakeholders and end-user groups (for example EU policy makers, CSDP mission representatives, academia, training community) in communicating project objectives, activities, results and their relevance
• To carry out the dissemination of project results through a variety of different communication tools. Tools such as the project website and social media platforms, just to mention a couple of examples
• To define the activities to be facilitated before, during and after the IECEU project

To be able to address the project objectives and achieve the above-mentioned aims effectively, the dissemination plan provided an overall framework for managing and coordinating communications that directly and indirectly take place within the project. The selection for network based approach and use of extensive networks of each beneficiaries in the Consortium ensured the success of dissemination. Moreover all beneficiaries had the resources committed only for dissemination. Already in the early stage of the project implementation, the dissemination plan identified more specifically:

• the key stakeholders and end users
• who are the target groups of the information
• what messages does IECEU want to convey to each target group
• the use of proper tools
• how the messages will be communicated
• who will communicate the messages and how
• when will the messages be communicated
Proper dissemination tools allow easier access to project information, activities, findings and results. In the IECEU project these tools are combination of the following activities: (1) The developing of a communication and dissemination strategy, (2) Setting up the digital online channels, such as IECEU website, social media tools and discussion boards, (3) Preparing communication material, such as press releases, PR letters, newsletters and videos, (4) The organizing support and coordination activities such as events, workshops, round table discussions, trainings, policy dialogues, expert discussions, on online discussion and arranging a final conference, to mention the most relevant ones, (5) And finally to integrate it all with relevant training and education in the field.

The most important part of the project dissemination and communication was the development of differentiated communication tools that address various stakeholders (e.g. EU policy makers, CSDP mission representatives, academia, training community, think tanks, NGOs) in communicating project objectives, activities and results. The active communication through communication tools (e.g. project website, the media, social media platforms, developed communication material) played a crucial role to reach the relevant end users. The website aims at assuring sustainability and also, to encompass relevant information about the project and its activities. The website includes the secured internal website for Consortium use only. The social media tools will support the dissemination and the project has its own Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn accounts.

**Tools Used**

IECEU Dissemination productions

**IECEU DELIVERABLES:**

D1.1 Review: from short term stabi-

D1.2 Review from short term stabil-

D1.3 Study report of Kosovo and

D1.4 Balkans: Discussion report (best

D1.5 Study Report of RD Congo, South

D1.6 Africa: Discussion report (best

D1.7 Africa: Conclusion report, Royal

D1.8 Study Report of Palestine

D1.9 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D1.10 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D2.1 The Kosovo review, University of

D2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina review,

D2.3 Study report of Kosovo and

D2.4 Balkans: Discussion report (best

D2.5 Balkans: Conclusion report,

D2.6 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D2.7 African Union review, CMC Finland

D2.8 South Sudan review, AIES

D2.9 Central African Republic review,

D2.10 Libya review, CMC Finland

D2.11 RD Congo review, Royal Danish

D2.12 South Sudan review, AIES

D2.13 Central African Republic review,

D2.14 Libya review, CMC Finland

D2.15 Study Report of RD Congo, South

D2.16 Africa: Discussion report (best

D2.17 Africa: Conclusion report, Royal

D2.18 Study Report of Palestine

D2.19 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D2.20 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D2.21 Study Report of Palestine

D2.22 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D2.23 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D2.24 Balkans: Discussion report (best

D2.25 Balkans: Conclusion report,

D2.26 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.1 Review: from short term stabi-

D3.2 Analysis of the current preventi-

D3.3 Review of civilian and military

D3.4 Identifying the success factors

D3.5 IECEU conceptual framework,

D3.6 Review: from short term stabi-

D3.7 African Union review, CMC Finland

D3.8 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.9 Central African Republic review,

D3.10 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.11 RD Congo review, Royal Danish

D3.12 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.13 Central African Republic review,

D3.14 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.15 Study Report of RD Congo, South

D3.16 Africa: Discussion report (best

D3.17 Africa: Conclusion report, Royal

D3.18 Study Report of Palestine

D3.19 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.20 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.21 Study Report of Palestine

D3.22 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.23 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.24 Discussion report (Palestine Ter-

D3.25 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.26 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.27 African Union review, CMC Finland

D3.28 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.29 Central African Republic review,

D3.30 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.31 RD Congo review, Royal Danish

D3.32 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.33 Central African Republic review,

D3.34 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.35 Study Report of RD Congo, South

D3.36 Africa: Discussion report (best

D3.37 Africa: Conclusion report, Royal

D3.38 Study Report of Palestine

D3.39 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.40 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.41 Study Report of Palestine

D3.42 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.43 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.44 Discussion report (Palestine Ter-

D3.45 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.46 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.47 African Union review, CMC Finland

D3.48 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.49 Central African Republic review,

D3.50 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.51 RD Congo review, Royal Danish

D3.52 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.53 Central African Republic review,

D3.54 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.55 Study Report of RD Congo, South

D3.56 Africa: Discussion report (best

D3.57 Africa: Conclusion report, Royal

D3.58 Study Report of Palestine

D3.59 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.60 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.61 Study Report of Palestine

D3.62 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.63 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.64 Discussion report (Palestine Ter-

D3.65 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.66 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.67 African Union review, CMC Finland

D3.68 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.69 Central African Republic review,

D3.70 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.71 RD Congo review, Royal Danish

D3.72 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.73 Central African Republic review,

D3.74 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.75 Study Report of RD Congo, South

D3.76 Africa: Discussion report (best

D3.77 Africa: Conclusion report, Royal

D3.78 Study Report of Palestine

D3.79 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.80 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.81 Study Report of Palestine

D3.82 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland

D3.83 Afghanistan review, NUJM –

D3.84 Discussion report (Palestine Ter-

D3.85 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.86 Middle East and Asia: Concussion

D3.87 African Union review, CMC Finland

D3.88 South Sudan review, AIES

D3.89 Central African Republic review,

D3.90 Libya review, CMC Finland

D3.91 RD Congo review, Royal Danish

D3.92 Design and development proces-

D3.93 NMLA Handbook, LAUREA

D3.94 Training for the trainers curricu-

D3.95 Evaluation report, CEP

D6.1 Standardisation review: Compa-

D6.2 Identification of the overlap,

D6.3 Review of the interoperability of

D6.4 Policy Dialogue, AIES

D6.5 The potential for pooling and

D7.1 The improvement of the effecti-

D7.2 New Policy Approaches and so-

D7.3 Preventive activities for pre-exis-

D7.4 Minutes of the Policy Dialogue,

D8.1 Dissemination plan, CEP

D8.2 Advisory and Integration Wor-

D8.3 Website and online discussion

D8.4 Press Releases and Recording of

D8.5 Integration plan (to the relevant

D8.6 Conference agenda, Laurea

D9.1 Steering Committee, Laurea

D9.2 Project Management Handbook,

D9.3 Assessment of the project deve-

D9.4 Project Quality Plan, Laurea

D9.5 Conflict Resolution Procedures,

D9.6 Copies of ethical approvals by

14 Kirsi Hyttinen, Pasi Hario & Peter Österlund (eds.) Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention
IECEU Lectures, Round Tables and Policy Dialogues:

- Policy Dialogue organized by Laurea and AIES on 2nd May 2017 in Helsinki focused on CSDP crisis management operations, training organisation and staff competences as well as CSDP crisis management operations and the comprehensive approach.
- Policy Dialogue organized by Enquirya, NUIM Kennedy Institute and Laurea University of Applied Sciences took place in Brussels on 27th April 2017, discussed the findings of eight IECEU case studies with special focus on planning and technologies in CSDP civilian and military crisis management.
- Policy Dialogue organized by AIES and ESDC took place in Brussels on 27th March 2017, and presented findings related to civil-military interoperability of the EU’s crisis management interventions and civil-military interface in its approaches to crisis management.
- End User Advisory Working Group organized by CEP and University of Ljubljana, took place in Ljubljana on 25th January 2017. It presented the preliminary findings of IECEU project research on eight different CSDP missions and gained relevant feedback from the stakeholders.
- CEP organized a Round table discussion of experts in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on 24th May 2016, to gain experts feedback on conclusions from two field trips (BiH and Kosovo).
- “IECEU End User Advisory Working Group event” was organized by Laurea University of Applied Science in Tikkurila, Finland on 13th September. The aim of it was to keep stakeholders of the project involved and updated, as well as to receive feedback from them in order to ensure high-level dissemination for all the relevant stakeholders and end-users.
- Royal Danish Defence College organized a panel of experts to discuss the issues related to EU Common Security and Defence Policy initiatives in Africa. Event was held in Copenhagen between 31st October and 1st November 2016.
- National University of Ireland, Maynooth held a round table discussion on the field research - examining the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan, on 5th of October 2016.
- IECEU Advisory Board Meetings were organised by Laurea UAS in Brussels (2015, 2016, 2017)

IECEU participation to international conferences in order to present findings of the project:

- KMIS – 9th International Conference on Knowledge Management and Information Sharing, 1-3 November 2017 in Portugal: presentation of the article “Human-centered design model in the development of online learning tools for international security training – case IECEU NMLA”.
- Belgrade Security Forum, panellists on a panel “The EU as a crisis management actor: CSDP in neighbourhood”, held in Belgrade, between October 11th and 13th.
- UACES (Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies) – 47th Annual Conference ‘Exchanging Ideas on Europe’ held in Krakow, Poland, 4-6 September 2017; presented findings on EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea and EUAVSEC, South Sudan.
- ‘The EU and Global Challenges’, held in Florence, Italy, 3rd – 5th May, presented the activities and milestones of the CSDP peacekeeping missions and operations research.
- ISA Annual Convention, presented an article “EU crisis management: a meaningful contribution to preventing (further) violent conflict?” in Baltimore between 22nd and 25th February 2017.
- Centre for International Policy Studies, Ottawa, Ontario on 13th of October 2016. Participated as a panellist on a round table “South Sudan: Breaking the Conflict Trap? The latest developments & options for Canada”, presenting findings from his field research in South Sudan.
- Belgrade Security Forum, 12-14th October 2016 in Belgrade, Serbia; participated as a panellist in a round table “Civilian capabilities in peace operations”.
- European Studies Day, 9th October 2015 in Helsinki, Finland; project presented.
IECEU scientific and academic publications:

- Scientific article by Kirsi Hyttinen (2017) Human-Centered design model in the development of learning environments for peacebuilding training, case IECEU, New Media Based Learning Application (NMLA).
- Scientific journal European Perspectives was published containing five articles based on IECEU project research of the Western Balkans missions, EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea [http://www.cep.si/journal/latest-issue](http://www.cep.si/journal/latest-issue) and contains the following articles:
  - The European Union and the (R)Evolution of its Strategy of Conflict Prevention by Dr. Rok Zupančič, University of Ljubljana
  - The International Community and the European Union in the Western Balkans: from ‘Disinterest’ to ‘Active Participation’ by Jana Arbeiter and Dr. Boštjan Udovič, University of Ljubljana
  - Assessing the Planning and Implementation of the EU Rule of Law Missions: Case study of EULEX Kosovo by Blaž Grilj and Dr. Rok Zupančič, University of Ljubljana
  - Analyzing the Effectiveness of EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Ivana Boštjančič Pulko and Meliha Muherina, CEP and Nina Pejić, University of Ljubljana
  - Drawing Lessons Learnt on Operational Capabilities of EU’s CSDP Missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina by Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, CEP and Nina Pejić, University of Ljubljana
- Article “Analysing the effectiveness of EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” written by Ivana Boštjančič Pulko and Meliha Muherina, CEP and, Nina Pejić, University of Ljubljana has been published in English and Bosnian by Centre for Security Studies BiH [http://css.ba/research/1499525234180-bvdkde75-xxx]
- Nina Pejić and Dr Rok Zupančič, University of Ljubljana, Artmir Galica, Laurea University of Applied Sciences and Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, CEP published an article in Albanian on the effectiveness of EULEX Kosovo in shunjer [https://sbunker.net/teh/88810/a-eshte-i-mundur-krijimi-i-nje-ndikimi-te-gendrueshem-analize-e-effektivitetit-te-eulex/]
- Article on effectiveness of EULEX Kosovo written by Dr. Rok Zupančič and Nina Pejić from University of Ljubljana and Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, CEP was published in Serbian at Beogradski Centar Za Bezbednosnu Politiku [http://bezbednost.org/Sve-publikacije/6541/Trajni-uticaj-EULEKSa-Analiza-efikasnosti.shtml]
- An article written by Dr. Rok Zupančič and Nina Pejić from University of Ljubljana, “Challenges of (academic) fieldwork in post-conflict societies”, reflected upon his field study in Kosovo. [https://eu-civcap.net/2017/07/01/challenges-of-academic-fieldwork-in-post-conflict-societies/]
- An article written by Kirsi Hyttinen and Markko Kallonen (2015) “How to improve EU’s conflict prevention activities to achieve long-term impact?”
4. LESSONS FROM IECEU CASE STUDIES

Kirsi Hyttinen & Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS

Foreword

IECEU –project analysed the effectiveness of eight different case study areas where the CSDP mission or operation has taken place. The analyses were conducted with use of comparative analysis and set success indicators. D1.5 Conceptual Framework and D1.4 Effectiveness (success) indicators built an overall understanding among researchers to examine the effectiveness of EU capabilities in both military and civilian crisis management operations. The main data collection methods were desk study research, surveys, active observation and qualitative interviews of personnel representing EU CSDP operation, EEAS, EU institutes, other international organizations, local authorities, and local population. In total 12 different operations (EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo, Operation Artemis, EUAVSEC, South Sudan, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR CAR, EUBAM Libya, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah) and 265 interviews were analysed by IECEU –project Consortium researchers during years 2016 and 2017. Further, a deeper focus related to pooling and sharing, interoperability and civilian military synergies was built with use of mixed methods in data collection.

Joint Final Conference with WOSCAP -project

IECEU [Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention] and WOSCAP [Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding] together organizes their Final Conference "Effectiveness and Inclusivity of EU Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention" that starts with an evening reception on November 7 (venue tbc) and continue on November 8, 2017 at the Scotland House in Brussels, Belgium. The conference aims to present both H2020 projects’ research results and recommendations as well as to contribute to further debate and improvement in EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions through sustainable, comprehensive and innovative means.

The speakers will include representatives from various EU institutions such as the EEAS (PRISM), DEVCO, and the ESDC, alongside academics and peacebuilding academics and practitioners from around the world, who have contributed to these projects. Civil society representatives and practitioners from different partner regions in the world, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mali, Georgia, Yemen and Ukraine will also participate in these debates. Various EU Member States, as well as representatives from the UN and OSCE are also expected to take part. We expect around 150 participants. The conference will specifically focus on:

- Main aspects of conflict prevention
- Integrated approach
- Effectiveness of EU missions and operations
- Potential for pooling and sharing in CSDP
- Civil-military cooperation in CSDP
- Inclusivity, local ownership and civil society perspectives in peacebuilding

For further reading:

D8.1 Dissemination Plan. 2015. IECEU, 653371.
ANNEX 1: List of dissemination results
European Union CSDP missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The EU’s aspirations to become a global actor, which also means the provider of security and stability, have most significantly materialized in the region of the Western Balkans. There the EU has launched its most extensive, external involvement, including several CSDP missions and other forms of engagement, supporting countries which have undergone a period of bloodshed in their very recent history.

The central point of its engagement has been aimed at Kosovo. Besides the CSDP mission (European Rule of Law Mission - EULEX), the EU has introduced numerous complementary activities, with a view to providing relevant incentives for long-term peace-building. The EU’s role in Kosovo since 1999 can be divided into four major sections: coordination of economic reforms, institution building, political reform, and ensuring security. To this, we should also add substantial humanitarian and developmental assistance from the EU, as well as its role in the reconstruction of Kosovo. Overall, “Kosovo is the biggest recipient per capita of EU assistance in the world.”

On the other hand, EUFOR Althea is often referred to as the first major military operation of the EU and after twelve year of functioning, it is also known as the longest EU mission in its history. The EU’s relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) can be perceived to fall under two main elements; (1) EU’s political agenda seeking to support the country’s EU integration process and (2) security focus seeking to enhance the safe and secure environment in the country through the CSDP.

The EU’s diplomatic relations are represented in the country by a Delegation from the European Union. The EU Delegation promotes the EU’s interests and these are embodied in common policies relating to, among others, foreign and security issues, commerce, agriculture, fisheries, environment, transport, health and safety. The EU Delegation plays a key role in the implementation of the EU’s external financial assistance. This primarily relates to the funds allocated under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). In particular, IPA helps to strengthen democratic.

Case Studies in Balkans

Nina Pejic, University of Ljubljana, Ivana Boštjančič Pulko CEP, Elisa Norvanto Finnish Defence Forces International Center & Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS

This chapter summarises the IECEU Work Package two’s (WP 2) deliverables and research conducted by University of Ljubljana, Center for European Perspectives and Finnish Defence Forces International Center during IECEU – project implementation. The main objective of this chapter follows the D2.5 – Conclusion report, which assess the current state of three security institutions – the Kosovo police, the Kosovo Customs and the Armed forces of BiH – that benefited from two CSDP missions/operations in the Balkans (EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea). The main contribution of this paper are the identified lessons and recommendations pertaining not only to EULEX and EUFOR Althea, but also to CSDP in general. The intention of this approach is two-fold: first, to provide the argumentative deliberations for future action with regard to the eventual modifications in EULEX and EUFOR Althea (implementation in practice), and second, to serve as a point of departure for the work in the subsequent Work Packages of the IECEU-project (WP5, WP6, WP7).
Union has mandated a European Union Special Representative in BiH (EUSR) and the European Union Force Althea (hereafter referred as EUFOR Althea). The EU’s Special Representative has the mandate to reinforce the EU’s political support for its policy objectives in BiH. The EUSR offers advice and facilitation support in the political process to institutions at all levels, aimed at ensuring greater consistency and coherence of all political, economic and European priorities – particularly in the areas of the rule of law and security sector reform. The EUSR is also responsible for the co-ordination of the EU’s public communication in BiH, and for contributing to a culture of respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms. The EUSR reports to the Council through the High Representative for EEAS/Vice President of the Commission.

Identified lessons and recommendations for EU CSDP

When CSDP military operations and civilian missions begin, the expectations of local communities, as well as the ambitions of the EU and its member states, are usually high. This does not come as a surprise, as they are often seen as a remedy coming from the developed world to heal all the problems of conflict- and post-conflict society. Nevertheless, if the mission or the operation from its beginning steps does not aim at creating a functioning state, or at least providing a higher degree of safety, security and the rule-of-law, then such a mission or operation is doomed to fail. However, also the political environment in the receiving country (aspirations to improve the current state of affairs) must be positive, allowing the mission or operation to conduct the tasks within its mandate. This means that the local security providers must be able to contain any disruption that might occur. However, these ambitious goals, cannot be achieved solely by the efforts of a CSDP civilian mission or military operation. They require a strong political commitment of major actors on the ground, local ownership, economic development, functional state institutions and a coordinated will and actions of other international actors involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in the conflict or post-conflict society.

As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the analysis of EULEX’s performance in Kosovo focused on two ‘beneficiary institutions’ only – the Customs and the Police - while the Judiciary, which on one hand symbolizes EULEX in Kosovo, was not specifically addressed, as this was not envisaged in the Grant Agreement. The reasons for choosing this approach are explained in the deliverables of WP2. Therefore, this conclusion and the above-mentioned recommendations should be read with this in mind.

To summarize WP 2 “The Balkans” and to understand the findings, it has to be emphasized that CSDP missions and operations were primarily devised as a short term conflict prevention and crisis management instrument. However, as we have

---


The lack of a clear end-state or exit strategy for both EULEX and EUFOR Althea does not help in preventing the CSDP engagements from being seen as ‘eternal’ and without ‘feasible goals’ by the local communities that should benefit from CSDP. Another challenge hampering the effectiveness of both EULEX and EUFOR Althea, is the issue of adequate pre-deployment training of personnel, as there are significant differences in the levels of preparedness, situational awareness, and professionalism among the staff representing ‘the EU flag’. Moreover, the challenge of providing the deployed personnel with the necessary language skills - English and local languages - has persisted ever since the inception of CSDP more than a decade ago.

In spite of these shortcomings, there are certain successes in regards to both EULEX and EUFOR Althea that are explained more profoundly in the Work Package deliverables. The authors of this report thus challenge the popular (or better, populist) belief that CSDP does not work (or even exist) at all, by providing quite a few examples proving that the EU’s engagement did contribute to several positive results within the Kosovo Customs, the Kosovo Police, and the Armed Forces of BiH.

We continue to question the EU’s engagement in the rule of law reform in Kosovo, when its success was limited and related to only two institutions – the Police and the Customs -, thus leaving judiciary as the crucial institution mainly unreformed and without real power, as the most serious crime allegations have not been addressed adequately. If the EU (through EULEX and other engagements) seems not to be fully committed to the reform of the rule of law, prioritizing stability to the actual reform of the rule of law, it is logical to question the sense of this reform, as it is impossible to implement the rule of law without a functioning, professional and independent judiciary.

Among the findings that should be put into a comparative perspective, it was noted that in both Kosovo and BiH, that the factors threatening security and safety have, first and foremost, for several years been socio-economic, starting with unemployment and health-care issues and extending to the processes contributing to terrorism. Therefore, the discrepancy in terms of security is obvious. The current fields of EULEX and EUFOR Althea’s work are - with a notable exception of EULEX’s engagement in establishing the rule-of-law in Kosovo - to a large extent, far from people’s everyday life.

Furthermore, the analysis of EULEX and EUFOR Althea has shown that the EU’s engagement, be it civilian or military, cannot succeed without the alignment of the policies of major international actors in the area. With regard to the Balkans, this would mean the EU-US alignment in particular, while the alignment of CFSP/CSDP with the Russian Federation, like it or not, might be more challenging to achieve due to the reasons pertaining to the domain of the ‘realpolitik’. If this strategic alignment of major actors is not reached, the positive contribution of the EU’s engagement remains limited to the tactical (low) level (e.g. improving the work of police in dealing with the traffic safety and petty crime, better performance of customs, certain administrative reforms …), while the main objectives of the missions or operations, which are of a more strategic nature (e.g. fighting corruption and organized crime), remain unsolved.

Even substantial financial and human resources spent on CSDP missions and operations by the EU cannot be of great help in the absence of a genuine aspiration from the EU (including its member states) and the US, to go after those political and economic elites facing the allegations of criminal activities.10 This would however, as argued by many authors, require renewed negotiations between the US government and the Europeans. If this level of misalignment between influential actors persists, then the criticism arguing that the EU (and the West in general) should either strengthen its level of intervention to bring about a real change in the governance, or withdraw substantially and continue providing only limited support, remains justified.

On the other hand, it comes as no surprise that the EU and its member states, or even the US, in general, do not get involved strategically and comprehensively, as the problems, at least for now, seem to be “locally contained” from a security perspective. Political leaders of the countries in the region, with some rare exceptions, generally enjoy the support of the West and are well aware what the EU, drowning in its own problems, wants: this is the Balkans, where problems are contained within the territory without imminent spillover potential to inflame the wider region (again).

10) The allegations and rumors that certain members of political elites are involved in criminal activities echo also in the reports of credible institutions. Let us mention, for example, a 2010 Council of Europe report, which, quoting two German intelligence analyses dating from 2005 and 2007, argues that much of the current leadership of three main political parties in Kosovo are key personalities of organized crime. Although the elites who are rumored to be involved in criminal activities often say that if there are allegations, then it is correct that the court cases commence, this might be difficult to implement, as much of evidence has been destroyed or that the key persons who could have brought the evidence forward have no reason for doing so, as also they enjoy certain benefits from it, or do not dare to point fingers at misconduct.
But, this certainly comes at the expense of the rule-of-law, a lower level of corruption, and a general democratization and stabilization in the EU’s neighboring countries, remaining more wishful thinking than reality. This might be one of the most important conclusions of the Work Package.

In spite of these shortcomings, there are certain successes in regards to both EULEX and EUFOR Althea that are explained more profoundly in the Work Package deliverables. The authors of this report thus challenge the popular (or better, populist) belief that CSDP does not work effectively and successfully at all, by providing quite a few examples proving that the EU’s engagement did contribute to several positive results – they are visible in the case of the customs and police work in Kosovo, as well as the in the functioning of the Armed Forces of BiH.

For further reading:
D2.1 The Kosovo Review. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D2.2 The Bosnia and Herzegovina Review. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D2.3 Study Report on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D2.4 Round-table Discussion of Experts. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D2.5 The Conclusion report. 2016. IECEU, 653371.

References:


Case Studies in Africa: DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya

IECEU studied four different case countries and seven different missions and operations in total. The African Case Study Work Package (WP3) was led by Roskilde University and Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC). RDDC also conducted the research on DR Congo. The contributors for this research task in IECEU were Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES, conducted the research on South Sudan), Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland (conducted the research on Libya) and Finnish Defence Forces International Center (FINCENT, conducted the research on Central African Republic). The variation of the mission nature, size, objective, budget, priority, context of operation and so forth was huge within the case studies. The analysed military operations of EU “had the feature in common that the medium to long term impact on the security situation in host countries were limited, but that was not the objective of the operations. The four other missions analised in the different studies in this report are all directly or in-directly part of post-conflict capacity building efforts in South Sudan, DRC and Libya, and therefore involved in precisely the longer term objective of creating lasting peace and security, and therefore having a long-term impact.”.

A key feature of the African case studies in IECEU –project, were the findings related to lack of information sharing and expertise of EU personnel especially in terms of language skills. “Basically the French speaking missions constitute a challenge especially to the countries in Northern and Eastern Europe and can explain why it was difficult to get troop and staff commitments from these states in these missions.” The summary of the African case study research in IECEU consolidated the case study findings into the strategic level “EU is still an alliances of independent states, and cannot be analyzed without taking the national interests into consideration.”

EUAVSEC South Sudan – a relatively unknown EU mission in a difficult environment

Arnold Kammel, Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES)

Immediately after South Sudan became an independent country on 9 July 2011, all major international actors including the EU pledged their support for the development of the new-born country. Within the framework of CSDP, the decision was taking to deploy an aviation security mission to Juba International Airport (JIA). As South Sudan became a landlocked country after independence and thus keeping JIA open under the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was of utmost importance. The mission, however, never reached its full operational capacity and due to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan after the

---

outbreak of the civil war had to be evacuated. The chapter will look into the main challenges the mission was confronted with as well as highlight some lessons learnt out of EUAVSEC.

Introduction

South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 after decades of civil war and ethnic violence in the former common territory of Sudan. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 set the provisions for a government of national unity, new governance institutions needed to be set up from scratch and reconciliation became crucial between those that were already participating in the government of national unity in Khartoum and those who fought for freedom and independence. As a consequence of the strong role of the tribes in South Sudan, the country has never had an effective central government and it has struggled with recurrent insurgencies and ethnic violence. Despite the assumption that most of the tensions would continue to exist between the two then divided nations Sudan and South Sudan, it turned out that shortly after the independence of South Sudan, the clashes within the tribal structures of South Sudan led to turmoil and weakened the stability of the country. However, despite the efforts of UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South Sudan) to provide for stability, the majority of the international actors focused on state and institution-building, thus partly neglecting other developments within the country.

In preparation for South Sudan’s independence, the EU upgraded its representation to a full delegation in May 2011 and inaugurated the European Union compound in Juba. At the independence celebration of 9 July 2011, the then HR/VP of the EU, Lady Baroness Ashton, declared that “[W]e will be your partner in achieving this, not just now, but for the long term. This partnership will be focused on helping the people of South Sudan, through working together with their government” (Ashton, 2011). Already before the independence celebrations took place, the Council agreed on 20 June 2011 to follow a comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan with, inter alia, the aim of assisting South Sudan to become a viable, stable, and prosperous state (Council of the EU, 2011, p. 2). Thus, four options regarding the mandate were presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU (Jandl, 2012, p. 495): improving aviation security at the airport of Juba, supporting the border management between Sudan and South Sudan, establishment of a river police and customs authority on the Nile and establishment of a criminal police force and of criminal investigation authorities and institutions in South Sudan. The PSC decided to go for the first option, an aviation security mission for the airport of Juba.

The setup of the mission and its impact

EUAVSEC South Sudan followed the usual paths of establishment. The three most important changes were the failure or unwillingness by the Government of South Sudan to build a new passenger terminal according to ICAO standards, the lack of commitment by senior officials to participate in the trainings and thirdly, the high illiteracy rate of the people to be trained. According to mission staff, the trainings had to start from scratch instead of providing basic civil aviation security training. Furthermore, the mission lacked from the beginning the basic security and IT equipment and in terms of interoperability, the mission personnel underlined that the relationship between EU institutions in Brussels and the UN Headquarter was not properly working and the UN in New York was not at all willing to assist the mission in setting up the headquarter close to Juba International Airport.

Already the Council Decision made it clear that EUAVSEC South Sudan would not have an executive capacity which limited the impact of the mission once the ethnic tensions started. This became obvious when EUAVSEC South Sudan had to be evacuated as a consequence of the outbreak of civil war in December 2013 and could not terminate its mandate on the spot as foreseen by the mandate.

Regarding the training impact, the mission was confronted with a lack of will to support the training activities by the Government of South Sudan and its senior officials and also by a proper level of education and training of the personnel to be trained thus the mission moved beyond its mandate by providing trainings in areas that were originally not foreseen in the mandate, such as public administration and basic management training and soft skills. In total, the mission issued more than 600 training certificates. Approximately 160 individuals received a basic AVSEC training, 16 JIA AVSEC staff participated in intermediate AVSEC trainings and around 70 AVSEC
officials were trained in specialized courses, such as screening of individuals and vehicles. Although steps towards a higher degree of sustainability and inclusion were taken, the number of adequately trained personnel remained limited.

When the civil war broke out in December 2013, the mission had to be evacuated and no extension of the mandate could be agreed.

Conclusion

The case study of EUAVSEC South Sudan has shown that it was the very first type of a technical assistance mission in the framework of CSDP. It also demonstrated that the EU and its member states simply wanted to have a stake in this new-born country, having only limited ambitions and political will to go for a real CSDP mission which could have had an impact on the overall situation of the country. Thus, also the local ownership remained limited. The EU therefore missed a chance in having a decisive stake in South Sudan by not translating its comprehensive approach for South Sudan into a more concrete CSDP action.

References


Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the South Sudan’s Independence Day celebration, 9 July 2011, Brussels, 9 July 2011 A 273/11.

D3.1 The South Sudan Review

The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya - Strategic Shortcomings and Lessons Identified

Gitte Højstrup Christensen, Royal Danish Defence College

The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM), with the objective of supporting Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders, was launched in May 2013 but suspended during the summer of 2014, because the security situation in Libya deteriorated. Therefore, the mission’s contribution was, for most parts, limited. But why did the EU Assistance Mission fail, and what, if anything, could have been done differently? In hindsight there are important lessons to be learned from the mission’s strategic shortcomings. This chapter provides a summary of the IECEU project’s assessment of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, EUBAM Libya, and its contribution to the country’s overall security situation. It takes departure in the complete deliverables of the Work Package 3, with The Libyan Review as the main source of reference. The aim of this chapter is to outline the mission’s most significant strategic shortcomings and lessons identified, which are important in improving the effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention.

Introduction

In the beginning of the 2011 Libya revolution, there were promising signs of a transition towards democracy. However, due to the country’s long history of “institutionalized statelessness” and division between three self-governing provinces with little contact to one another, this transition encountered severe challenges early on. This un-institutionalized character of the country had led to a system in which all power was concentrated at the top and lacked cohesion at all levels of governance. This factor had allowed Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi to rule, but it also made the Libyan state volatile. Therefore, when al-Qadhafi, the leader of Libya since 1969, was removed from power by revolutionaries aided by an international (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervention based on Resolution 1973, Libya lost its only stabilizing factor. The security apparatus collapsed and a power vacuum was created which provided fertile ground for different interests and groups – some of which were armed. This escalated into violent conflict, uncontrolled weapons flows and attacks by Islamist extremist groups.

It soon became clear to the International Community that the situation in Libya was escalating out of control. The conflict began to spill over into neighboring states, which were likewise of great concern to the EU. Therefore, in May 2013 EUBAM

12) IECEU deliverables: http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=187
15) IECEU D3.7 Africa: Conclusion Report.
18) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review.
Libya was deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy. The objective was to provide support for Libyan authorities in improving and developing border security, however, due to an escalating security situation, the mission had to be prematurely withdrawn and subsequently put on hold. This raises the following questions: why did the EU Assistance Mission fail, and what, if anything, could have been done differently? This article does not consider or include all factors and elements needed to answer this question, but highlights the IECEU project’s most significant findings in this case. The EUBAM Libya mission failed, and in hindsight, there are important strategic lessons to be learnt.

Strategic shortcomings

In 2013, the EU established EUBAM Libya with the purpose of developing an Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy together with the Libyans to support and train the Libyan border control. However, by the time the mission was deployed the conflict had escalated further, institutional and political arrangements had collapsed and Libya had experienced a fractional takeover. This systemic fragmentation was one of the main obstacles to EUBAM Libya, as it prevented the establishment of systemic affiliation between the mission and Libyan counterparts. This meant that there was no single Libyan recipient that the mission could partner up with, which was a significant drawback, as it prevented strategic planning. This left the mission in a catatonic state, partly due to the risk that if “the EU would have used its power to push a move by either of the parties in conflict to take a more aggressive approach, it would have risked undermining that particular party and perhaps destabilizing the situation and even escalating the conflict”.

Another major setback for mission planning was timing, as the EU had to wait for an invitation, a so-called Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), from the Libyan authorities, which was difficult to obtain because there was no single state structure in Libya at the time, from which the invitation could be given. This delay influenced the mission’s effectiveness, as it lost momentum, whilst the security situation deteriorated further. In February 2012 Amnesty International described that hundreds of armed militias in Libya were “largely out of control”. When an invitation finally arrived, from the government of Prime Minister Zidan, the EU rushed to launch the mission, and therefore did not follow the normal procedure for constructing an Operation Plan (OPLAN). CDSP border related missions as standard require comprehensive assessment, such as evaluation of the country’s present border capability, management needs, security, social, and political risks and vulnerabilities. This assessment is required to take place before a mission is established. The quick mission launch, and lack of a proper situational assessment, was problematic as some of the political aspects, like the situation in Libyan politics, had changed since the original plan, and was not properly considered. Another essential element blocking mission planning, was that in ultimo 2012, the south of Libya was declared a military zone, which meant the area was off limits for any international mission. This, according to Libyan interviewees, made the whole matter of border control insignificant.

20) IECEU D3.7 Africa: Conclusion Report.
21) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 9.
22) ibid. p. 36.
23) SOMAs are bilateral or multilateral treaties that define the legal position of military forces and civilian personnel deployed by one or more states or by an international organization in the territory of another state with the latter’s consent. See Aurel, Sari “Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: The EU’s Evolving Practice” The European Journal of International Law Vol. 19 no. 1. (2008), p. 68. http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/19/1/180.pdf
When evaluating the mission, it is fair to argue that the EU’s level of ambition was disproportionate to the challenge at hand. As EU-BAM Libya’s task was to build government capacity in terms of border control, it fell directly into a minefield of fractional elites pulling and pushing in different directions, all with the interest of using the mission for their own advantage. Due to these circumstances, The Libyan Review argues that: “in hindsight, simply looking analytically at the situation at the start of the EU-BAM mission, the mission was doomed, at least in terms of achieving its ambitious, strategic level mandate”. Furthermore, it is argued that: “state-building and other large scale development missions should have taken place in tandem”. This implies that the mission’s goal was off from the beginning, and focus should have been directed elsewhere. Following this line of thought, it can be argued that the EU strategy might have had more success if it had focused its assistance on establishing fora and structures addressing Libya’s internal conflicts, rather than focusing on constructing systems against external threats, based on the false idea of a Libyan state.

Too little too late

There are multiple lessons to be learned from the failure of EU-BAM Libya mission. These are “primarily related to the strategic level thinking and planning structures of the EU. It is not hindsight to argue, that the EU-BAM Libya was a mission that was timed and placed wrongly, and that the errors that led to this were not unavoidable.” Conclusively, The Libyan Review argued that if improvement is to be made, more emphasis must be put on careful and thorough strategic planning, by first and foremost including a comprehensive assessment of the context to which a mission is deployed. This chapter pinpoints three major strategic shortcomings, which had significant influence on the failure of EU-BAM Libya: (1) not appreciating the complex nature of the “state” in Libya - problems could have been better anticipated by looking at history to understand Libya’s institutionalized statelessness; (2) excessive ambitions on part of the EU, and too little action when required - the mandate was overly optimistic and should have been downscaled to improve effectiveness; and (3) reality was against the mission - by the time of EU-BAM’s evacuation, conducting a civilian crisis management operation in Libya was beyond the political capabilities of the EU.

32) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 23.
33) Ibid p. 20.
35) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 29.
36) Ibid p. 50.
37) Ibid.
38) IECEU D3.6 Discussion Report on Libya, South Sudan, CAR and DR Congo.
Case Studies in Afghanistan and occupied Palestinian Territories

The Work Package 4 (WP4) of the IECEU project covered the case studies of the European Union’s CSDP engagement in the Middle East and Asia, in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) and Afghanistan. The five reports of WP4 have covered desk reviews on previous literature (D4.1 and D4.2), a study report on the findings of the IECEU field research concerning the six capabilities influencing the effectiveness of EU crisis prevention (D4.3) and a discussion report describing the two roundtable events, organised by the Crisis Management Centre and the National University of Ireland Maynooth (D4.4). The deliverable D4.5 draws together the above-mentioned reports and presents the main conclusions of the IECEU case studies on the OPTs and Afghanistan. It provides an outline on the current status of security sector reform and the related criminal justice sector reform in the two places, as well as of the main elements of EU engagements in these areas. The report also includes some recommendations on how the EU engagement in these two conflict contexts can be improved.39 This chapter concentrates on the effectiveness of the EU’s missions in Afghanistan and suggest recommendations to enhance the EU’s impact.

IECEU study findings in Afghanistan

Kieran Doyle, NUIM - Kennedy Institute & Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS

The EU has had a Special Representative (EUSR) in Kabul since 2002. Its mission is to assist in stabilising the country. In 2007 the EU started the Afghanistan police mission (EUPOL) under the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and Comprehensive Approach of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). EUPOL Afghanistan will finish in December 2016. Initially, there were difficulties with co-ordination between EUSR and EUPOL. Both missions, in contrast to the US contribution, are small and for the most part geographically restricted to the capital. The effectiveness or otherwise of an EU police mission in a developing nation suffering an ideology-based threat like Islamic State, is in many ways a microcosm of the political turmoil in Europe. Deeds that bring about stability need to replace words that excuse instability. The stage has passed where member states can view a mission as symbolic. The effectiveness of EU crisis prevention (D4.3) and a discussion report describing the two roundtable events, organised by the Crisis Management Centre and the National University of Ireland Maynooth (D4.4). The deliverable D4.5 draws together the above-mentioned reports and presents the main conclusions of the IECEU case studies on the OPTs and Afghanistan. It provides an outline on the current status of security sector reform and the related criminal justice sector reform in the two places, as well as of the main elements of EU engagements in these areas. The report also includes some recommendations on how the EU engagement in these two conflict contexts can be improved.39 This chapter concentrates on the effectiveness of the EU’s missions in Afghanistan and suggest recommendations to enhance the EU’s impact.

The IECEU study provides 25 recommendations for a way forward. Where issues have been identified a corresponding solution is offered. The majority relate to EU bodies like the CPCC and PSC responsible for setting up and managing a police mission. Two key questions underpin the recommendations and a ‘way forward’. 1) Is the current EU setup in Brussels - policy, institutions and civilian policing approach – capable of increasing the stability of a nation experiencing an irregular war through a police-building mission if it excludes security? And if not, what measures needs to be implemented to make it fit the purpose? 2) How did EUPOL contribute to the EU’s goal of increasing the stability in Afghanistan? In other words, can a mission that leaves a nation, in a less safe state, than when it arrived, be deemed a success? The recommendations that follow are all interlinked, without this being spelt out in WP4 deliverables. They contribute toward a unified approach that includes security and everything this means for a police mission, from planning and strategy to implementation and activities.

Since 2002 the international community has been engaged in SSR efforts in Afghanistan. The overarching aim was to achieve a rule of law approach as the basis of increasing security and stability. This desired end state has not been attained. Fifteen years later, and after enormous investment, Afghanistan is still blighted by violence. It remains highly unstable part of the world where the military, not the police, continue to lead on the security front. While most nations and coalitions, such as the EU, that were part of these efforts can rightly claim success for the individual programme or mission they implemented, such claims ring hollow for Afghans. The migrant crisis today that fuels political discontent across Europe is a consequence of the international community’s inability to stabilise places like Afghanistan. An effective rule of law approach in an armed conflict environment means a robust police model to lead a security effort that the military can support. As it stands, identifying and branding a police model to cater for this reality is an urgent challenge the EU needs to address.

For further reading:

D4.2 IECEU Afghanistan review. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D4.3 IECEU Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report. 2016. IECEU, 653371.


Kirsi Hyttinen, Pasi Hario & Peter Österlund (eds.) Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention
IECEU Case study in Palestine Territories: lessons identified

Jyrki Ruohomäki (Dr.), CMC Finland

Foreword
The research conducted for the IECEU project at CMC Finland by Dr. Leena Avonius concerning the effectiveness of the EU in the Middle East, focused on the two EU missions, the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah). For her work, Dr. Avonius conducted e.g. a desk study and a field trip to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This short chapter is a compilation of this previous work done by Dr. Avonius in separate deliverables, but the final responsibility of the interpretations presented here lies with the author.

EU in the Occupied Palestine Territories
The research done in the IECEU project concerning the OPT’s focused on the EU support to the Palestinian security sector reform and the related criminal justice reform. The EU started its engagement in Palestine already after the Oslo Accords in the 1990’s, but the second intifada in 2000 forced the EU to put its SSR (Security Sector Reform) support on hold. The EU returned in 2005 with the two above mentioned missions, the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah). For her work, Dr. Avonius conducted e.g. a desk study and a field trip to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). This short chapter is a compilation of this previous work done by Dr. Avonius in separate deliverables, but the final responsibility of the interpretations presented here lies with the author.

The EU involvement is focused on the SSR process. Its main impact, broadly speaking, has been the improvement of the PA’s security sector in terms of it being now better equipped and skilled. The overall picture of the progress in the security sector is, however, much more complicated. The intra-Palestinian division has also led to diversification of development and effectiveness in the security and justice reforms in the PA-led West Bank and the Hamas-led Gaza. Also, in general terms, the hindrance that the Israeli occupation continues to have on the Palestinian security and justice sector has to be taken into consideration when making an overall assessment on the situation.

The EUPOL COPPS mission started its work on the 1st of January 2006. It was grounded upon the UK police assistance mission, which was launched already in 2003. EUPOL COPPS follows a so called programmatic approach, which means that the mission carries out a high number and a wide range of activities to implement the objectives defined in the mission documents, such as OPLAN. Currently the mission has expanded its tasks from the police sector to the justice sector, and is advising Palestinian justice sector actors in matters related to criminal justice.

The EUBAM Rafah mission was launched in 2005 and it had its origins in the AMA agreement, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) concerning the reopening of the border crossing point in Rafah, which the EU was asked to monitor in addition to building the capacity of the PA’s border management. Since 2007 the mission has not been able to execute its mandate, but on a very limited extent and the office of the mission in Gaza is manned by local staff, while the mission’s international members are visiting Gaza approximately only once in a month. The emphasis of the mission is currently in supporting the PA administration on matters related to borders and crossings.

Strategic shortcomings and lessons identified
There are three thematic aspects that were raised as paramount in the analysis conducted on the missions: Respect for local ownership (1), democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, and where applicable, international humanitarian law (2) and coherence with other areas of EU external action (3). These aspects are now further elaborated for further discussion.

Respect for local ownership
Based on the interviews conducted in the research, it appears that the EU CSFD support to the Palestinian SSR is based on a narrow understanding of local ownership, which is surprising, when considering the universal acceptance of the concept and the thinking behind it. This raises the question whether the role of the concept is different on a rhetorical level and on the operational, mission, level. Local ownership, like any other political concept, whether normative or not, is continuously contested and open to different political interpretation and manoeuvres. For a normative concept, these contestations carry an added political weight.

The lack of executing the principle of local ownership may result from simple lack of experience and knowledge on how to reach out and act with non-state actors. The research points out that for example community policing, a current support focus area of EUPOL COPPS, is simply viewed very differently amongst the international experts of the mission. It is also a fact that inclusiveness, which is an integral element in the local ownership, is time consuming and would require the mission to develop a thorough and better understanding of local context. This would require mapping out actors and maintaining contacts, thus multiplying the number of local contacts held by the mission. A next step from establishing a more thorough contact network would also be a deeper analytical approach to new and existing sources of information. Both of the above mentioned points of development are, however, difficult to reach, if the mission members do not have the required cultural understanding. It is important to note that the Palestinian respondents in this research assessed that the overall the mission members had poor knowledge and understanding of the Palestinian history, society and politics as well as the impact of the long
conflict. This is most definitely partly due to the short rotational cycle that the international experts follow. As the knowledge base of an individual has accumulated, her one year deployment might be over. This aspect of the research therefore raises several points to consider, varying from rotational aspects to training in terms of improvement of the cultural awareness and the so-called soft skills of the mission members.

Democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, and where applicable, international humanitarian law

This aspect connects to the wider political and academic discussion, which critiques the ‘security first’ approach. This approach tends to intentionally and unintentionally depoliticise the conflict and frame the security matters as technical, neglecting to connect to the fundamentals of the conflict. As noted in many case studies, unhelpful depoliticisation can build structures that actually cement the conflict and sustain it, in contrast to breaking it down. This happens, when the depoliticising, technical approach neglects addressing the societal, cultural, economic and political root causes of the conflict, failing to mediate the conflicting narratives that lay the foundations for the conflict. In reference, in the interviews it was noted that the EU should apply a broader, comprehensive but agile view, instead of being locked on surface level of constitutional, state-building two state approach.

In connection to this aspect it is also important to note the room of improvement in terms of information sharing. The study notes a non-existence of reports and publication by the two EU missions. This leaves the Palestinian, as well the international, audience unaware of what the mission has accomplished and/or what they are trying to accomplish. The mission, however, does use multiple methods to make European laws, policies and practices available for the Palestinian beneficiaries, by providing them actual documents or organizing study trips to European countries and conducting trainings. In terms of human rights and gender elements in the mission, it seems that progress on the streamlining has to be made. Human rights and gender experts are customarily commenting the planning documents only on the last phase of planning, which is typically not a very mainstreamed and effective way.

Coherence with other areas of EU external action

As there are several EU actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the comprehensiveness and coherence is highly important. In addition to the two missions analyzed in the project, there are two offices of EU’s political representative (EUREP, UNRWA), an office of EU Special Representative, and the EU delegation to Israel. This multitude seems to create a situation in which the borderlines of the missions are becoming less clear. Some respondents argued that the change of the CSDP instruments towards a more development side is not the right direction to go and that the missions should limit their activities to immediate response, such as monitoring ceasefire or peace accords and providing material assistance. Stepping into development work with unexperienced staff and without such capacities would be counterproductive. If the missions seem to need areas of extensions, perhaps it would be necessary to address the question of a possible exit.

For further reading:

D4.1 Palestinian Territories Review. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
Comparative analysis of crisis management operations and missions is complicated but possible. Understanding broader trends, strengths, and challenges requires comparative analysis, especially as there are large variations in crisis management. The IECEU project used a conceptual framework, which was the basis for comparative analysis of 8 case studies. In very general terms, it can be said that the strengths of EU crisis management lie in expertise and ability to cooperate and coordinate with a number of actors. On-going development is needed in strategic planning.

IECEU study

Comparative analysis of crisis management operations and missions is extremely rare but also increasingly important as it lays the foundation for understanding broad trends, strengths, and challenges in crisis management. The challenges of conducting even one case study in the field are often nearly insurmountable. Documentation may be inaccessible, confidential, secret or non-existent; the changes in security situation may limit physical movement and access to potential interviewees, and previous contextual knowledge is needed to understand how the research should be best conducted. For multiple case studies, these challenges are expounded, making comparative study of crisis management challenging but not impossible.

To create sufficient material for comparative research requires not only several case studies but also a mechanism to reconcile and integrate the enormous variation within crisis management operations and missions. Early in the IECEU project, we quipped that comparing missions and operations was like “comparing apples and airplanes” but only in conducting the research did we understand how true the original sentiment was. Missions and operations diverge significantly regarding the number of personnel, their skillset, the purpose and mandate of the mission, the budget available, the geographical area of operation, the security situation, the length of the operation and so forth. As much of the EU’s crisis management must be focused on EULEX, the results of a comparative study are also easily skewed to reflect the bias.

The mechanism or conceptual framework needed to be both sufficiently flexible to be applicable in different contexts, and sufficiently rigid for comparative analysis. The conceptual framework created is built like a wall of blocks. Each block consisted of a focus (one of the six capabilities chosen for IECEU), a perspective (EU or NON-EU) and a level of analysis (Field-Operational or Politico-Strategic), and had some predetermined thematic questions to guide the researchers. No one case study was expected to fill all the blocks, but with the 10 case studies analyzed in the IECEU, there was enough overlapping material for a comparative study whatever challenges would be encountered in carrying out the case studies.

In the analysis of the case studies, we found 56 potentials for increasing the effectiveness of EU crisis management, many of which mirror already on-going policy development within the EU. We also found that the variability that we had foreseen was even greater than we had expected and extended to the capabilities of each of the missions and operations. The variability necessitates nuanced conclusions as any overly generalized statements are unlikely to be valid. For example, the crisis management operations and missions have extremely capable personnel—but also some large challenges in recruitment and human resource functions. Some missions and operations were very well equipped, and others had considerable problems with sourcing.

However, some generalised points can be made. In terms of strengths, EU’s crisis management still relies on the original corner stones of EU crisis management; the expertise of its personnel and EU’s ability to collaborate and cooperate broadly with different actors including other EU personnel (the integrated approach). The main challenge is reconciling planning with complexity. Getting the pieces of a crisis management puzzle together from structures, budgets, agreements, personnel so that the mission or operation can be launched is already complicated and time-consuming; but the crisis management operations also operate in complex situations where change can be rapid, and inbuilt flexibility is required. In these changing
circumstances, on-going planning processes are especially vital to differentiate the strategic from the expedient.

European Union’s crisis management is a unique and valuable tool, which has the potential to transform conflicts and positively impact the lives of countless civilians. Through improving the security situation in Europe’s neighborhood, crisis management also contributes to improving Europe’s own security. However, on-going development of crisis management is also needed to tackle the challenges of the future better.

6. LEARNING APPLICATION TO SUPPORT EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT TRAINING

Markko Kallonen, Petteri Taitto, Kirsi Hyttinen and Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS

Foreword

IECEU Learning Application is one final online production of IECEU to be benefitted by training and education communities. EU CSDP related Learning Application is available for public, free of charge, on: www.ieceulearning.eu. NMLA can act as a stand-alone course to ensure that personnel possesses knowledge about EU crisis management, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in general as well as more deepen knowledge and experiences related to IECEU Case Studies (Kosovo, BiH, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Afghanistan, occupied Palestinian Territories). The overall learning aim of the application is that after completing the lessons, the user has obtained a basic understanding of the EU processes and institutions that are involved in planning and implementing EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy missions. Additionally, the user will gain understanding of the essential concepts and topics related to crisis prevention and crisis management including: comprehensive security, security sector reform (SSR), mentoring, monitoring and advising (MMA) and local ownership.

One of the goals of the IECEU project was to provide new solutions, approaches and recommendations for the EU to guarantee long-term stability through conflict prevention and peacebuilding. New Media based Learning Application (NMLA) was...
developed to enhance learning in EU crisis management and conflict prevention and to provide a catalogue of best practices and lessons learned in EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The NMLA is an eLearning tool and a part of the IECEU training toolbox, developed during the course of the project, as a part of the IECEU dissemination activities. The NMLA’s target groups includes staff seconded and contracted to the CSDP missions, national staff, researchers, educational institutions, students, civil servants and employees of NGOs. Training and education institutions, operational actors such as CSDP missions, EU delegations as well as policy makers can benefit from the learning application by using it to leverage knowledge gaps prior to the residential training event.

Design of IECEU Learning Application environment

To construct the NMLA, reports from 12 different CSDP operations and more than 250 interviews were analysed. The best practices and lessons learned through these interviews were then developed into an online application, namely the NMLA. During the analysing process, the qualitative analyses pointed out that experts experienced positively the rich media contents, especially visualisations and video animations. The positive implications were addressed on successful descriptions of the challenging and culturally sensitive topics of peacebuilding. In the group discussions it was observed that the content of peacebuilding training material must be updated and changes must be completed to the application in line with the global situation. It was addressed that research could contribute to online training with providing new knowledge and updated content. NMLA enabled learning taking place by adapting knowledge via different methods such as reading, watching, and hearing. There was also a possibility to use learners’ earlier experiences and knowledge and combine them with NMLA content.

As the information in the field of civilian crisis management develops in a fast pace, an interface was designed and implemented for entering new and updating existing information. The IECEU research findings highlighted the need for enhanced training among CSDP mission participants. This need created a strong incentive to develop and utilize eLearning in a more systematic manner. In order to support EU’s comprehensive approach, it is logical and beneficial to restructure eLearning activities/platforms in a more holistic manner.

Furthermore, the use of various eLearning solutions has increased considerably in EU countries as part of informal and formal education. Also, the EU has demonstrated increasing interest towards eLearning and that has resulted in investments for developing various eLearning contents to support conflict prevention/crisis management related training (especially under ESDC, ENTRi and EUPST activities). The NMLA is based on current EU/CSDP training in particular with regard to existing eLearning. Nowadays, the professionals joining the CSDP missions and operations are more accustomed to use eLearning tools in their training and thus they can be more respondent to it. Training that provides understanding of this interconnectedness with the various eLearning platforms serves to enhance the competences and analytical skills of the collaborators in the CSDP missions and operations. Ultimately, this will enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts in conflict prevention. NMLA was developed in five phases: 1) analysis of required specifications 2) developing and coding the platform 3) initial testing of the product 4) piloting of the platform and 5) revising the final structure and learning objectives. The special attention in the development of online training and education in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention was addressed towards human centered approach and end user feedback throughout the design process. The final evaluation of the NMLA will ensure the analysis on how this online training can benefit the crisis management experts and dissemination of IECEU –project findings as a tool.

NMLA’s structure and learning outcomes

The structure of the NMLA consists of ten lessons. The platform allows users to navigate freely, so that they are able to focus on their individual needs and interests. The NMLA is facilitated in Opigno Drupal open-source software which provides a clear and light basis for comprehensive content which is easy to maintain and update. The application can be shared to different communities and thus it suits better the future training needs in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Special attention was focused on the user-friendly format of the information, so that the users of the learning application will be able to utilize the information more easily. The rich visualisation and gamified content give the possibility for enhanced learning opportunities for the learners.

The learning application is an evolving tool which was developed during the IECEU project and can be further developed to meet the constantly changing needs of security and defense in the EU.
conflict prevention and crisis management. Laurea UAS together with CEP has and will arrange the education for trainers, in order to ensure the future use of the NMLA in higher education programmes, training, seminars and workshops. The maintenance and sustainability of the NMLA will be considered as Laurea UAS edits, updates, supervises and continues the use of the platform, even after the project, to support the universities and other training organisations in conflict prevention issues.

For further reading:

References:
Hyttinen, Kirsi, 2017, Human-Centered design model in the development of learning environments for peacebuilding training, case IECEU, New Media Based Learning Application (NMLA). Unpublished.

7. INTEROPERABILITY – WHAT EFFECTS TO EFFECTIVENESS OF EU EXTERNAL ACTIONS?

Elisa Norvanto, Laurea UAS

Foreword

The objectives of this task are driven by the need to assess the potential for pooling and sharing the EU capabilities, in terms of future threats and challenges. The research of interoperability and pooling & sharing in IECEU was conducted by several IECEU partner organisations, such as AIES, Enquirya, FINCENT, CMC Finland beyond the others. This paper is based on research activities and findings of IECEU. The assessment of the potential for pooling and sharing will also evaluate the critical points of the current capabilities, overlap between civilian and military efforts and the possible interoperability of resources. The focus of this paper is to outline how interoperability between EU civilian and military capabilities could be enhanced.

Interoperability

The integrated approach to conflicts and crises aims to consolidate the coherence and impact of the EU response to instability and to operationalize the comprehensive approach. Involving many actors in crisis-management efforts requires external and internal coordination of crisis management units, instruments and the coherence of common objectives. It entails a long-term and holistic approach to cross-cutting policy issues of international crisis management, with emphasis on output-oriented goals. In line with the principles contained in the various comprehensive approach framework and policy documents, an integrated approach to conflicts aims to create synergies at the four levels; multi-dimensional, multi-phased, multi-level, multilateral, in order to improve information sharing, contribute to a shared understanding and strategic vision, reduce compartmentalization, facilitate inter-agency delivery – all this for a greater impact. To achieve these objectives, it requires both an enhancement of the civil-military interface and a higher degree of interoperability within the EU and between its partners.

The new security political threats are more complex, dynamic, interrelated and each conflict/region calls for a combined and tailor-made response as also described by the integrated approach of the EU. Such an approach requires even more focus and attention for interoperability, more efficient civil-military cooperation and harmonization and standards. There is now the potential of renewed political will to increase interoperability as evidenced in the vision of ‘integrated CSDP crisis management operations’ in the 2016 Global Strategy. Stronger emphasis on the internal-external security nexus, and an increased focus on EUs neighborhood as well as growing security concerns.

Interest in, and development of, interoperability has been a central focus of the European Union from its inception, as from an interoperability point of view, the institutional framework of the CSDP crisis management operations is challenging, as all 28 member states, the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Parliament (as budgetary authority) have their role to play. The impact of this complex decision making matrix varies between civilian missions and military operations. For the EU external actions, the aim of interoperability is to enhance effectiveness of its capabilities to achieve greater impact through more efficient use of available resources and policies. Consequently, interoperability of EU crisis management capabilities relies on systems being able to both provide and accept services, units, tools and personnel, is the foundation of cooperation and pooling and sharing within crisis management. Poor interoperability or lack of interoperability leads to inefficiency, wasted resources and at the very worst, inability to act. There are several on-going processes and initiative within EU to increase interoperability, and as stated in the Commission Press release in June 2017 “already more has been achieved in the area of defense in the last two years than it has in the last sixty.” Strengthening interoperability is vital also within the civil-military environment, with the increasing focus on integrated crisis management operations and an even more complicated security environment in the European neighborhood. Consequently, the measures to foster the collaboration

44) If the UK is included.
and coordination, integration, and pooling of resources across the institutions and organizations, becomes key for the EU to truly move the comprehensive approach forward.\(^{46}\)

Results from the comparative study

Interoperability and enhanced collaboration and coherence within the different policies and instruments, are both central for the development future of CSDP and European external actions. The comparative study of eight CSDP missions and operations conducted during 2015 – 2017\(^{47}\) demonstrated that, although the EU has developed policies and mechanisms to enhance the coherence of its different foreign policy instruments, there is still a need for EU to further develop measures to better coordinate its various entities and policies in the field of security and development. In relation to the degree of interoperability between the different civilian instruments, the study suggested that there is a large variety among the missions, which leads to a varied need of interoperability and challenges. For the military-military interoperability, it does not come as a surprise that the role of NATO is playing the key role, together with the lack of consensus regarding the development of EU defence integration. From the effectiveness point of view, the findings related to civil-military cooperation/collaboration with the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy.

In relation to the degree of interoperability between the different civilian instruments, the study suggested that there is a large variety among the missions, which leads to a varied need of interoperability and challenges. For the military-military interoperability, it does not come as a surprise that the role of NATO is playing the key role, together with the lack of consensus regarding the development of EU defence integration. From the effectiveness point of view, the findings related to civil-military cooperation/collaboration need to be further elaborated in this paper.

Civil-military interoperability - challenges and opportunities

The rationale for focusing the study on civil-military aspects of CSDP lies in partly the changing security landscape in which CSDP missions and operations are (to be) deployed, requiring an increasing the need for more integrated civil-military crisis management operations. Terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber security, energy security and organized crime are just some of the complex modern threats that require for multidimensional approach. Military operations could benefit from a stronger civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.), building the dialogue with civil society and the access to funding instruments for capacity building projects and development, to list just some of the reasons. The cooperative civil-military response to new security challenges is also in line with the EU’s comprehensive approach, and integrated approach to conflict and crises which


\(^{47}\) Based on the analysis of 8 case studies, and 285 interviews.

Interoperability in this study is analysed through the following dimensions: cooperation/collaboration/coordination within the operation/mission, between the EU actors on the ground, and between the CSDP mission/operation and third party, and civic/mil/civ-mil/mil synergies.

Further dissolve the traditional borders between civilian and military crisis management approaches, and partners.

So far, the CSDP has been the EU’s tool for external crisis management, encompassing military and civilian aspects. The new security challenges, in particular to Europe’s East and South, raise the question whether crisis management only should continue to be the CSDP’s aim, and in what way the tool could be further developed and utilized. It goes without saying, that the added value of EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management approach to external conflicts and crises in comparison to its international partners, such as United Nations and NATO, is embedded in its ability to employ the resources of its Members States by combining a variety of diplomatic, economic, development, defense and humanitarian instruments to address the external threats. However, due to a number of political, structural, financial, and organizational challenges, as well as, short rotation cycles, national caveats, technological, human and procedural related challenges in information and intelligence sharing, are all among the identified factors influencing the further development of the civil-military interoperability. Similarly, although the EU cooperates with many actors, third country and international participation and cooperation in CSDP is growing emphasis.

Although the EU is uniquely positioned as a comprehensive security provider, it faces the problem of institutional stove-piping and the lack of streamlined decision-making. Nevertheless, the Brexit as well as formulation of EU’s Global Strategy seem to have created momentum for strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy. The discussion has comprised on how the 27 remaining governments would share assets and deepen cooperation in EU missions. However, the plan is not to establish a European army nor challenge NATO, yet rather to fulfill the ‘gaps’ in relation to external actions. The ministers of the countries seek to strengthen the EU’s ability to respond autonomously to external threats without a help from United States, underlying the potential need for the EU to launch a mission in regions where NATO does not consider taking action. The Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw in 2016, identified 42 areas where EU and NATO will enhance their collaboration.

Among others, the closer cooperation with NATO will have implications to the future development of CSDP. The larger the number of actors, the more clearly challenges of interoperability become visible, and the more benefit EU has on increasing interoperability. Moreover, the more divergent EU practices are, the more challenging will cooperation be with external partners and the less likely it is to produce desirable outcomes. In addition, the proliferation of the security challenges, and the proliferation of the number of different actors, the understanding of interoperability need to adapt to this change as well. The widening web of actors involved in the crisis management adds amount of challenge to the coordination of the efforts. Furthermore, evolving domains such as cyber defence and maritime domain, needs also to be taken into consideration in the interoperability related discussions.
Challenges

The analysis of case studies has shown, that the key strategic-level challenges are often related to the information access restrictions, changing political objectives, Command and Control (C2), decision-making capabilities, as well as the force structure requirements. The disparities in technological capabilities, sovereignty concerns, differing national interests, cuts in defence spending are political in nature and can only be resolved by politicians at the strategic level. There are limits to what extend the nations are willing to trust another. These limits constrain openness and system interdependencies (i.e. intelligence, communications) which in turn affects interoperability. Nevertheless, these challenges tend to reverberate throughout the operational and field levels. Operational and field level interoperability challenges are often related to planning, C2, and management namely in terms of information exchange and security issues. In addition, challenging for military operations, some nations are likely to continue to maintain direct national control of their national assets rather than contribute them to a larger, shared pool under direct control of the Force Commander. Furthermore, in the field challenges relate often to performance capabilities referring to the capability of the humans and technology to operate as intended. They may include challenges related to logistics, information sharing; command, control and communication (C3); Doctrinal and cultural differences, language barriers and resource gaps. Furthermore, sharing of the information in the field is seen to be challenging as a result of over classification of information. Also change or hand-over of information between the troop rotations and shift changes hampers the interoperability. Above all, when political motives are misaligned, no amount of interoperability, technological or otherwise, can mitigate the problem.

In addition to the above list of challenges hampering the interoperability, three overarching challenges for interoperability can be listed: i) divergent, non-standardized and sometimes contradictory national practices, which remain evident in CSDP operations and missions. ii) lack of a mind-set for increasing interoperability in practice, especially in civilian missions, but also between civilian and military actors, even where increasing interoperability has no foreseen costs; iii) the current intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, some of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU (including the Lisbon treaty), which affects the development of interoperability.49

Recommendations

The current intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, some of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU, which hinders the development of interoperability. However, a new dimension to interoperability is both the potential of a greater number of integrated missions necessitating a higher level of civil-military interoperability as well as the increased need to include civilian components into military operations (generally to add expertise), and military components into civilian missions (generally to increase the security of the mission). Where military or civilian components are added, the mission/operation becomes somewhat integrated while remaining purely military or purely civilian in terms of organisation. Larger civilian missions have many of the same requirements as military operations. Increased civilian-military cooperation especially in terms of supportive functions like procurement, logistics and information sharing would not impinge on the divide that needs to exist between the two functions.

Being able to work together in coherence is however not only an institutional, but also a cultural and political question. Coherence between the civilian and military actors has been recognized to be an important tool to increase the efficiency of international conflict prevention and crisis management efforts. Therefore, understanding the key elements enabling and on the other hand, preventing interoperability of the EU’s civilian and military crisis management instruments is crucial. It goes without saying that the major obstacles for stronger interoperability within the Union’s external actions is strongly related to Member States’ political will and commitment towards the development of common security and defence. Nevertheless, the cross-case study analysis suggested that there is a number of areas, which could help enhancing further civil-military interoperability in CSDP.

The potentials for enhance civil–military interoperability are listed also here:

1. Reinforce the jointly initiated crisis management concept with a more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalization,
2. Further development/ support centralized/ harmonized pre-mission and in-mission training, linked to job descriptions.
3. Discourage national (re)interpretation of the ‘Statement of recruitment’ used in CSDP military operations. Aim to harmonize “working” versions of key capacity building concepts (e.g. ‘Integrated Border Management’)
5. Aim to harmonize “working” versions of key concepts for development of shared understanding.
6. Create mechanisms to create and enforce institutional memory • Through training • Through standardized or near-standardized tools and ways of working • Through creating mechanisms for frequent, brief, and focused updates and hand-over notes
7. Develop common standards for civilian and military shared services.
8. Develop a common warehouse for military operations and consider to building synergies with the existing civilian warehouse.
9. Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework, addressing in a cost effective way the logistical challenges of CSDP crisis management operations.
10. Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture

49) For more information, view D7.2 New Policy Approaches and Solutions. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
11. Develop a CSDP specific military command and control (C2) that caters both for synergies with the civilian C2 systems in use and is compatible with NATO structures.
12. Develop a CSDP specific information sharing doctrine and that details what information, is shared with whom, under with conditions and when.
13. Strengthen the EDA’s role in developing cyber defence for CSDP crisis management operations and invest in building synergies with NATO.
14. Consider developing a CSDP concept for, so-called CNO’s, enhancing the common operational picture and interoperability in the field.
15. Consider developing a CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tools on top of existing information sharing tools.
16. Include third country participation in the early planning stage.
17. Strengthen third country participation in CSDP crisis management operations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/interoperability.
18. Continue working on a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations.
19. Continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluators.

Importance of joint situational awareness and information sharing

The broad range and the complexity of CSDP missions make the ability to manage information and resources efficiently critical to decision-making, planning, and engaging capabilities within such missions, and essential to increase their efficiency, visibility and impact. The many processes, procedures, information management systems, and equipment currently in use for such missions need to be identified, characterized, and modelled to constitute a coherent and interoperable situational awareness and information exchange capability and operation control center. The study showed that there are a number of interoperability-related issues, which on one hand have a direct impact on the day-to-day running of the CSDP operation, and on the other hand, would enhance the development of stronger CSDP organizational culture. Hence, in order to address some of the issues effecting the cooperation and coordination between the different EU institutions and between the EU and third parties, the information and intelligence gathering, managing and sharing, third country participation and organizational learning, are among the key aspects that are to be addressed by the EU within the coming years. These aspects are elaborated further.

1) Need for better mechanisms to collect and share information within the mission, between the field and Brussels.

Information functions as an enabler of interoperability. The key issue hampering effective coordination & collaboration among field missions operating in the same geographical regions has been a lack of shared situational awareness, underutilized reporting, access to information and analysis on these. Due to number of technical, procedural and human related reasons information sharing within the CSDP operation is seen insufficient in the field and between the Brussels and Field. The lack of secured networks, and fragmented information sharing practices significantly hamper the information sharing, information management and overall communication within the operation, between the different actors in the field, and between the field office and OHQ. In the absence of common information sharing culture, adequate and compatible tools and systems, lots of valuable information, contacts and intelligence is lost or poorly transferred. In regards to the interoperability significant gaps remain in the realms of information-sharing and communications, styles of command, cultural understanding, standard equipment, and complex intelligence sharing policies.

Hence, as the mandates and operational environments of CSDP missions have evolved, their capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyze information must develop too. The EEAS should consider better ways to compile, analyze and discuss reports and other relevant information through an enhanced information sharing framework within the CSDP structures and between their support elements at both strategic and operational-field level. In order to ensure the timely and efficient flow of information within the EU crisis management structures, the information sharing framework should take into account the procedures and practices, tools, technological solutions, staffing, capability development means. This should be done in active cooperation with field missions to foster interoperability among EU actors and provide a basis for cooperation with external partners.

2) Need for better intelligence gathering and sharing tools

The current capabilities to collect, analyze, store and share CSDP-related intelligence is inadequate. The shortfalls range from proper means in terms of services and equipment, skills, staff, procedures, common intelligence policy and intelligence sharing culture. There is no policy or guidance on early warning, situation assessments and legal aspects of the Computer Network Operations. All these domains are strongly interlinked to intelligence capabilities and further requirement work is needed to develop a capability that is interoperable, i.e. that enables the development of a common operational picture. Furthermore, there is an absence of a common CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tool. Currently, the different organizations have their own systems which are often not compatible with the systems used by other EU missions or institutions.

Therefore, in order to utilize the human aspect properly, more training is necessary. Nowadays, there is no common understanding between the EU member states as to what information can be shared with whom and a lack of trust mostly due to short rotations is clearly visible. EU missions and operations are not able to force a participating nation to share information and here the problems usually begin. Information sharing often happens ad hoc and cannot be documented due to the nature of the content, which makes it a very sensitive issue and therefore it was suggested that a
3) Need for better ways to strengthen third country participation to the planning and conduct of the mission

The current crisis management procedures do not enable solid third state participation to the EU CSDP. In theory, third states have same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as the EU member states. However, any contribution of third states is without prejudice to the decision making autonomy of the Union. In addition, one key aspect which affects on the use of third-nations’ capabilities is that they are not officially involved in the drafting of the concept of operations or the operation plan nor do they participate in force generation conferences. They are invited to contribute – in most cases to fill gaps – but are required to accept the EU’s timeline and procedures. Even once the operation is launched, the various mechanisms in place limits the involvement of partners, effectively reducing them to second-class stakeholders. Furthermore, lack of institutionalization of third state contributions in EU crisis management may hamper the information sharing within the mission and operation. National caveats may limit the possibility to release documents within the CSDP, as some of the information can be circulated only among the EU member states.

In order to strengthen third country participation in CSDP crisis management operations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/ interoperability. Tackling these interoperability challenges at operational level and better incorporating third states in CSDP crisis management operations is important as it has economic benefits, force generation benefits and gives political legitimacy.

4) Need for better mechanisms to support organizational learning

The utilization of lessons identified from the past or on-going missions/operations in the planning and conduct of the CSDP operations/missions are not monitored. Despite the standardized process of collecting and distributing the lessons, the current challenge to the EEA is to ensure that the lessons identified are learned at respective levels. The implementation of the lessons at the planning of a new CSDP operations and missions has been inadequate, as often there is no time to conduct lessons cycles or consult lessons learned documents. Therefore, the mechanism to ensure that Lessons are incorporated into CSDP Planning and Conduct of Activities should be strengthened.

Thus, EEA should continue development of a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation process. This can be strengthened by continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluations. The cooperation between the EEAS and Commission should also be fostered.

Way forward

Interoperability challenges affect the efficiency and effectiveness of current crisis management operations. These interoperability challenges are likely to become even greater in the near future due to new security environment, closer civil-military cooperation, greater participation of 3rd states and future integrated/hybrid/joint missions. Moreover, in terms of efficiency, EU military operations can benefit from a stronger civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.) and building the dialogue with civil society. Civilian missions can also benefit from closer integration with military elements through, for example, provisions of security, logistics, strategic planning. Integration can thus support both civilian and military actors in achieving their objectives as well as strengthen pooling and sharing.

The current developments including the establishment of Military Planning and Command Capability, PRISMA, EU Defence Research Fund, are warmly welcome as they address many of the above-mentioned issues hampering further civil-military synergies. Furthermore, EUPFOR ALTHEA as well as the EU Satellite Centre can be regarded as good examples of interoperability and it should be acknowledged that a lot has already been done in this field. Another remarkable advancement regarding the greater interoperability and pooling and sharing, is related to ongoing discussion on the future of ATHENA mechanism. Funding of equipment, and EU military missions/operations have been identified to be the key issue hampering the further synergies between the civilian and military sides. Hence renewed funding instrument may bring solution to some of the funding related challenges. Furthermore, the following three elements; (1) The EU Global Strategy’s Implementation Plan on security and defence; (2) The European Defence Action Plan, and (3) Cooperation with NATO, are expected to help the European Union to deliver more effectively on the strategic priorities identified in the EU Global Strategy, namely to protect Europe and its citizens, respond to crises and build our partners’ capacities. Work on all three strands has progressed at a fast pace in recent months, and they have implications also to the quest of interoperability. Other positive developments are also taking place such as, mission support platform and the common warehouse initiative. By centralizing assets that are used in missions, there are greater economies
of scale, and speed for both deployment and liquidation of missions can be significantly enhanced. The centralization creates a common rulebook, this time about the equipment and services needed for a crisis management operation. It establishes a de facto standard that ideally is again linked to the training system and national states. On the military side, a similar initiative is the work on the capabilities performed by the EDA. By developing European core operational concepts, that are both highly relevant in any crisis management operations and enable capabilities of 27 member states to work together, interoperability is enhanced and the potential for pooling and sharing of capabilities is realized.

There is now the potential of renewed political will to increase interoperability as evidenced in the vision of ‘integrated CSDP crisis management operations’ in the 2016 Global Strategy, an increased focus on EUs neighborhood, as well as growing security concerns. Interoperability is a key enabler of Pooling and Sharing, both central mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of CSDP crisis management operations, as well as improving potential for cooperation between national actors. Although interoperability is often seen as mainly seen a cost saving mechanism, it builds common organizational culture and solidarity. Interoperability leads to more effective use of current capabilities and increases availability of resources for the States to deploy for EU, NATO, multinational or national purposes. In short: increasing interoperability is one of the key mechanisms that EU can use to improve its effectiveness.

For further reading:

D6.1 Standardisation review. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D6.2 Identification of the overlap between, 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D6.3 The interoperability of resources, 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D6.5 The potential for pooling and sharing the EU capabilities. 2017. IECEU, 653371.

References:


A transition towards more preventive activities?

The Lisbon Treaty highlights conflict prevention as key objective for EU’s foreign policy and external relations. The CSDP missions and operations were one part of the EU’s preventive engagement globally. The civilian missions and military operations together with diplomatic activities are the most visible conflict prevention activities. From the long-term perspective, the structural instruments such as regional cooperation, financial assistance through access to EU markets as well as security sector reform programmes aim to tackle the root causes of potential conflicts. On the other hand, the short-term preventive activities are operational policy dialogues, mediation and peace talks, fact-finding and monitoring missions. Moreover, the economical and political sanctions can be seen as short-term conflict prevention instruments or policies.

Council Conclusions on security and development highlighted the nexus between development and security and pursued conflict prevention as a priority goal. Also, the surveys conducted in the early stage of IECEU-project revealed a need for better conference and understanding between EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding thinking. The same studies showed the need for clearer linkages between EU’s operational missions and operations and political goals. Even the high ambitious conflict prevention, the CSDP instruments were seen in a limited role as part of overall conflict prevention activities. The complexity of EU engagement and current conflict and crisis areas requires continuous assessment on the effectiveness of different conflict prevention and crisis management activities (see for example European Parliament, 2012). The challenges in this complexity are identified through several studies and research projects. The key focuses with recommendations are around knowledge management between policies and operational activities, interoperability and learning from the lessons of CSDP missions and operations.

IECEU analyses from crisis management capabilities and lessons

By focusing on the six capabilities as defined in the methodology of the IECEU project, IECEU case studies led towards a proposal of 14 recommendations that were presented along the lines of the identified six core capabilities used to research the crisis management operations: Planning, Interoperability, Competences, Comprehensiveness, Technology and Operational capacity. In total, 14 IECEU recommendations in order to improve EU’s crisis management and conflict prevention were categorised according to key focuses they had and in line with key stakeholders relevant from recommendation (e.g. political/strategic, Member State). For each capability, the main points of the findings and recommendations to overcome the identified problems are presented. The recommendations introduced in this chapter are presented under capabilities/themes of IECEU research. The more detailed descriptions and further analysis can be found from the final deliverables of IECEU WP7 (D7.1, D7.2 and D7.3).

1) Planning

“Civilian and military elements within the EU should, on future missions deployed in a crisis situation, combine the initial planning phase and remain in close partnership thereafter. The developments on this are already implemented in the structures of EEAS. Advanced communications between both the head of the military and the head of the civilian command and conduct capability at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions were analysed to be further developed. In order to support this kind of communication, consideration should be given to a programme of staff exchange and expanded purposeful training between the military and civilian institutions. The desired end-state, purpose or overarching strategic objective of the mission should reflect an appropriate action relevant to the needs of the nation it is operating in, at that juncture. Invariably, this may be to stabilise the territory and make it safe for its people. Local actors should be involved in the planning phase, particularly at the start. The same applies to partner agencies. In the same vein, the mission should have more influence on the mission...”

References

Implementation plan. A core planning team with accurate equipment should be immediately established on the ground in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly.” Some developments on this are already implemented in the structures of EEAS.

2) Interoperability

“Combined civilian and military platforms should be created to discuss interoperability in different fields, fostering the dialogue needed to build the mind-set and culture. Tools to collect, analyse, store and share CSDP-related intelligence should be further developed and enhanced and interoperable, i.e. supporting a common operational picture for the crisis management operation (civilian and military). Continue the development of a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation process.”

3) Competences

“At management level in crisis management operations, a separate test of soft skills could be beneficial, implemented in a standardized way.”

4) Comprehensiveness

“Review ways in which to strengthen both competences of mission and operations staff as well as creating or augmenting existing platforms in order to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other EU actors in the field.”

5) Technology

“Strengthen the technological component of missions in terms of having technologies that deliver in the field, with a key role for the mission support platform and sufficient funding to buy appropriate technological tools. Include in Pre Deployment training on available technology and equipment in the field. In CSDP crisis management operations, the starting point for selecting technologies for local capacity building should be sustainability.”

6) Operational capacity

“Deployment cycles ought to be managed in such a way that the proper execution of the mission is not endangered with the replacement of staff. Improvements in conflict analysis in advance of deployment should be made by involving the broad spectrum of civil society in order to have an accurate and timely local operational picture. All EU delegations and CSDP crisis management operations should have systems in place enabling the exchange of classified information.”

The testing of the lessons identified and recommendations were already implemented partly during the policy dialogues and advisory board meetings organised in the Spring 2017. These discussions combined 86 external CSDP experts in total. The further research and testing (in October and November of 2017) will identify the key focuses from operational level towards political decision-making and more abstract discussions. Therefore, within the logic of WP7, the 14 recommendations will be further analysed in IECEU – project deliverable D7.3, where an assessment will be made, which of those recommendations have already been taken into consideration and are currently in the process of being implemented. The IECEU team thus conducted a series of polls and interviews, which highlighted the following main recommendations:

- Firstly, the recommendations focusing on ensuring that the local dimension of crisis management operations is sufficiently taken into account in the planning and execution phase;
- Secondly, the recommendations focusing on the technological component in pre-deployment training and crisis management operations). Both sets of recommendations are very different in nature.

The first one is strategic, linking to the integrated approach, the cooperation of EU-delegations and EEAS and the role of the European Commission in the CSDP process. The second one is tactical/operational, focusing on the technological tools supporting the CMO staff and local actors. After discussing which one to prioritize for testing, it was decided that considering the nature of the IECEU project and its focus on effectiveness, the research will concentrate on how to make best use of the existing EU structures in order to properly implement the integrated approach or comprehensive approach.

However, taking into account the changing security environment and the variety of threats and challenges that the EU and its member states are confronted with and analyzing the current promising dynamics in security and defence policy within EU, the general question of how future crisis management will look like needs to be addressed. It is indisputable that a more integrated and multi-dimensional approach to conflict and crisis is needed. Above all, the future of CSDP missions and conflict prevention will depend on whether they are effective or not. This requires not only a further strengthening of the strategic and operational capacities of the Union by taking into consideration the lessons learnt of past CMOs, but also allowing for an external assessment of the Union’s action. Only be establishing a strong knowledge base, the aim of the EU Global Strategy to provide for targeted approaches to resilience, conflict prevention and resolution can be properly achieved.
For further reading:

D7.1 The improvement of the effectiveness of EU capabilities. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D7.3 Preventive activities for pre-existing structures. 2017. IECEU, 653371.

References:


IECEU –project, 2015. D1.2 Analysis of the current preventive activities (tai for further reading)

9. RESEARCH MEETS POLICY – TOWARDS A CULTURE OF EXTERNAL ASSESSMENT

Petteri Taitto, Laurea UAS

The EU CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) is a Member States owned activity and process, and therefore it poses certain challenges and political sensitivities to the missions and operations planning, conduct and evaluation. As long as Member States, with their own national agendas, are defining requirements, planning missions and evaluating themselves in the field of CSDP, the process will be based on politically ‘polished’ reporting of activities, rather than real lessons.

The EEAS (European External Action Service) formal Lessons process includes different actors from the EEAS and from relevant Commission directorates, like DEVCO (Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid), ECHO (Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid) and NEAR (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations). Over the last five years the process has successfully identified lessons and followed the implementation of the recommendations in the EU external action. However, this does not exclude the fact that the evaluator and sources of information are coming from the structures of the EEAS.

The IECEU – project has published numerous scientific reviews, that are reflected against the 260 interviews done in the CSDP missions and operations. This research has led to recommendations for policy makers, operational actors and training institutions in different areas like: planning and operational capacities, competences, comprehensiveness, interoperability and technology. All of these areas have been presented respectively in the policy dialogues in the course of the project, and results of these dialogues have been further integrated to the recommendations. Therefore, the IECEU as such can be seen as external assessment of the CSDP missions over the last three years.

The IECEU project has shown that there is a certainly a difference between evaluating yourself or by an independent and external actor, who possesses scientific expertise with evaluation. The IECEU project has revealed that there seems to lack a proper plan, how to implement quality assurance cycle following up on policies and defining whether they are implemented. Therefore a periodic independent external assessment is considered as indispensable for having an objective evaluation. This is not to substitute, rather complement, the existing EEAS Lessons process by providing objective support when examining the policies and practices in the missions and operations. The external research can find real shortfalls, but also good practices that can be further strengthened in the future policies and guidelines.
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIES</th>
<th>AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND SECURITY POLICY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMA</td>
<td>THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENT AND ACCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIH</td>
<td>BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>COMMAND AND CONTROL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>CRISIS MANAGEMENT CONCEPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER FINLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>CIVILIAN PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP/ESDP</td>
<td>THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (PRIOR TO THE LISBON TREATY) THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION – EUROPEAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG NEAR</td>
<td>DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR NEIGHBOURHOOD AND ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>DIRECTORATE OF POLICE INTELLIGENCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTRI</td>
<td>EUROPE’S NEW TRAINING INITIATIVE FOR CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDC</td>
<td>EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAVSEC</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION AVIATION SECURITY MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>THE EUROPEAN UNION BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU COPPS</td>
<td>EU COORDINATING OFFICE FOR PALESTINIAN POLICE SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION RULE OF LAW MISSION IN KOSOVO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUropol</td>
<td>THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOST</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION POLICE SERVICES TRAINING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>EUROPEAN UNION SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GABC</td>
<td>PALESTINIAN GENERAL ADMINISTRATION FOR BORDERS AND CROSSINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPPT</td>
<td>GERMAN POLICE PROJECT TEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>HEADQUARTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>HUMAN RESOURCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC EU</td>
<td>Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILP</td>
<td>Intelligence-Led Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCB</td>
<td>International Police Co-ordination Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>Justice Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Mission Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMLA</td>
<td>New Media Based Learning Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Palestinian National Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUIM</td>
<td>National University of Ireland, Maynooth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTS</td>
<td>The Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA (PNA)</td>
<td>The Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCOP</td>
<td>Provincial Chief of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>The Palestinian Civil Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>The Palestinian Legislative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>Rafah Crossing Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDCC</td>
<td>Roskilde University and Royal Danish Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMA</td>
<td>Status of Mission Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSMI</td>
<td>Strategic Support for Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UACES</td>
<td>Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWRA</td>
<td>The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOSCAP</td>
<td>Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Work Package</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AUTHORS

Arnold Kammel (Dr.) is director of the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) in Vienna. His research covers the topic European integration (focusing on EU foreign, security and defence policy) as well as EU Governance and transatlantic relations. He also serves as Vice-President of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) in Brussels and teaches regularly European and security topics at Austrian and foreign universities as well as the Theresian Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt.

Gitte Højstrup Christensen (MSC) works as a Project Officer in IECEU for the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC), Institute for Strategy. She has an academic background in global studies, international security and security politics. Her research at RDDC focuses on strategy, interventions and special operations.

Kieran Doyle (Dr.) is the Assistant Director of the Edward M Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention in Maynooth University, Ireland. Dr. Doyle is Irish representative on the Academic Board of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) based in the European External Action Service, Brussels, and also represents Ireland on the Academic Think Tank of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). His primary research and teaching interests lie in peacemaking and practice based learning, and since 2015, leads the Kennedy Institute team in two H2020 research projects examining the effectiveness of EU conflict intervention capabilities. He is also a founding member of the editorial board and coordinator of the open access Journal of Mediation and Applied Conflict Analysis (JMACA).

Pasi Hario (MA) is working as a research specialist in IECEU for Laurea University of Applied Sciences. His academic background is in conflict studies, history and future studies. He is a politics and communications professional with a broad experience in national level governance, working with NGO’s, academic world and operational crisis management duties.

Kirsi Hyttinen (MA (education), PhD Cand (cognitive sciences)) holds a position as Senior Manager for Research at Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Laurea UAS) and she acts as Consortium Coordinator for IECEU –project. She has been responsible of progress of the IECEU project as well as coordinator among beneficiaries during the project implementation. She has had responsibilities in project management, coordination and large networks through international project. During her commitments in Laurea, she has resulted grant funding for Laurea over €1,5 million. She has years of experiences of the design and implementation of different adult education and higher education training programs in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention. Beyond from previous her research interests focuses on the political aspects of security and defense, leadership and technologies in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Markko Kallonen holds a PhD in Diversity Management and Governance, European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation and Master’s Degree in History. He has working experience from civilian crisis management operations from the European Union Monitoring Mission to Georgia and from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Mr. Kallonen has delivered training in various crisis management related courses in Finland and worked as a researcher at the EURAC Research institute located in Bolzano, Italy, focusing on themes dealing with national minorities and autonomy arrangements.

Maria Mekri (MPhil, MBA) is the Executive Director of SaferGlobe, Finland’s leading independent think tank on peace and security as well as the Conceptual Framework Manager of the H2020 funded IECEU-project [Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention]. She is an expert in a wide range of topics in peace and security with years of management, academic and teaching experience. Her specific interest is to drive the development of new tools and new understanding.

Melika Muherina has completed her bachelor’s degree in International relations and is currently pursuing her Master’s degree in Defence Studies. She has developed a special interest in CSDF mission, while Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina will be her focus in her master thesis. She is a member of Center for European perspective since October 2015 where she is gaining relevant work experience and putting her knowledge into practice.

Elisa Norvanto (MSSc, PhD Cand.) currently holds a position as R&D Communication and Project Expert at Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Laurea UAS), responsible for the design, development and implementation of Laurea’s R&D communication and exploitation strategy, as well as research related to cross-border collaboration, security & defence, and multiagency coordination. She has been involved in IECEU project since its inception, working as a Senior Researcher in Finnish Defence Forces International, responsible for the research and development activities related to CSDF, protection of civilians, and civil-military interaction. Her background is in Political Science and Economics, and she has been working in the field of international relations since 2011. She is currently doing her Doctoral Dissertation on Leadership in Peace operations.

Nina Pejić holds a B.A degree in International Relations at the University of Ljubljana and is continuing her educational path with pursuing master’s degree in International Relations at the same university. Her research interest lies in the reconceptualization of traditional approaches to reconstruction efforts in the conflict-torn societies, which is also the research topic of her master thesis. She is currently working at Defence Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana.
Ivana Boštjančič Pulko completed International Relations studies at the University of Ljubljana. She has worked for the Centre for European Perspective since 2008, implementing projects in the field of security sector reform in the Western Balkans, mainly in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro, which were delivered as official development assistance by the Republic of Slovenia or in other frameworks. All these years she has led several capacity building and evaluation activities in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention, with special focus on CSDP missions and Kosovo, also as part of the ENTRi project.

Jyrki Ruohomäki (Dr.) and works as a Head of Development at CMC Finland. Before joining CMC Finland in 2015, Ruohomäki has worked as a university researcher and lecturer in Finland and abroad, including University of Jyväskylä, Queen’s University Belfast, Columbia University in New York City and the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies in Uppsala. He has earlier conducted peace and conflict research as Post-Doc Researcher in University of Tampere (School of Social Sciences and Humanities). Ruohomäki’s research has covered a large scope on the field of peace and conflict studies, from the Northern Ireland conflict to the effectiveness of CSDP in Libya.

Petteri Taitto (MA [education], General Staff Officer) is Principal Scientist at the Laurea University of Applied Sciences, Finland. His previous positions include Training Manager at the ESDC/EEAS (2014-2016), with the responsibility to coordinate CSDP mission related training, Project Leader and Head of Training positions at the Crisis Management Centre Finland (2007-2013), Principal Instructor at the Emergency Services College (2004-2006), teacher at the National Defence College (1995-1997) and in various positions in the Finnish Defence Forces (1990-2003). In 2013, he held a presidency of International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). He holds a Master of Education from Jyväskylä University and a General Staff Officer degree from the National Defence University. He is a EU Civil Protection coordination expert and a member of EU Civilian Response Team (CRT). His crisis management mission experiences are from UN missions in the Balkans.

Mascia Toussaint is the executive director of Enquirya, a Dutch software company focused on data driven decision making for public organisations. In the H2020 funded IECEU-project she has actively involved in the research on pooling and sharing and interoperability within CSDP crisis management operations. She holds a master in international relations as well as LLM in European and Dutch civil law from Leiden University. She worked for the Dutch Ministries of Justice and Interior on several JHA topics, including multiannual programmes and for the European Commission as a seconded national expert.

Peter Österlund has studied Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki and is currently pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in Security Management at Laurea University of Applied Sciences. He owns a military background and is currently working as an advisor at the Finnish Immigration Service. He is also working for Laurea University of Applied Sciences as a Project Worker, focusing on the IECEU and GAP – projects funded by Horizon 2020 Programme.
As the European Union tries to increase its influence and relevance in EU external actions, it first has to reach a common understanding on how to, in the most efficient way possible, embark on this journey. A journey, which has the possibility to make a real difference and impact generations to come, if the EU has done its homework properly. This publication, based on the Improving the Effectiveness of the Capabilities in EU conflict prevention (IECEU) – project (funded by the European Commission H2020 Research Programme) provides lessons identified from eight different case studies and recommendations for the EU on how to improve the effectiveness and capabilities in future crisis management operations and conflict prevention, whether they be civilian, military or a combination of both.