Analysing Counter-Radicalisation Policies of the United Kingdom’s ‘Safe Campus Communities Programme’ for Finnish Schools.

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Analysing Counter-Radicalisation Policies of the United Kingdom’s ‘Safe Campus Communities Programme’ for Finnish Schools.

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The study of radicalisation and its countermeasures is relatively new, thus, there are issues and controversies surrounding how best to prevent radicalisation, particularly the threat of violent radicalisation that might emerge from Higher Education Institutions’ (HEIs) environments. In preventing such violent radicalisation in UK universities, the Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) was introduced albeit with skepticisms and criticisms from HEI managers and student groups.

This thesis write-up studies the UK’s SCCP from the perspective of the law, the government, the history of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation in the UK and EU in general, students and HEI managers. It aims to study and analyse the Programme, its setbacks and its successes in preventing violent radicalisation in the UK and in UK HEIs. Aside from this, the write-up intends to explore the possibility of introducing a similar counter-radicalisation programme in Finnish HEIs by analysing how the SCCP’s website functions. Also, a survey of 46 respondents from Finnish Universities of Applied Sciences was conducted to understand how Finnish HEI students perceive such a counter-radicalisation programme for Finnish universities and colleges.

The results from the analysis, survey and findings in this thesis write-up show where there are defects in carrying out the UK’s SCCP, the limitations of the Programme’s website and recommendations on how they can be corrected. It also opens the window to further future surveys and debates on the adoption or modification of such a programme for Finland.

Finally, this thesis write-up exposes the misconceptions about violent radicals and extremists’ state of mind and the perceived conditions that lead individuals to violent radicalisation and extremism.

**Keywords:** Radicalisation, Violent Radicalisation, Extremism, Prevent Strategy, Safe Campus Communities Programme, Higher Education Institutions.
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Introduction

It is noteworthy to point out that over a million results pop up under 0.54 seconds when you search for ‘terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom’ on the search engine, Google, while a search for ‘counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies in the United Kingdom’ displays 305,000 results in 0.68 seconds. This is one way to glance at discussions and developments related to terrorism, and those related to preventing the factors that lead to it in the United Kingdom (UK). In the last few decades, the UK, and particularly, London, has been the epicentre for terrorist attacks. From the bombing campaigns of separatist groups like the Irish republican Army (IRA) that started in the 1970s up until 2011 (Global Terrorism Database), to Jihadi terrorism that currently remains a threat in the United Kingdom and around the world (MacLeod 2005), it is unsurprising that discussions have continued among policy makers, the academic and the public on what could be the factors behind such vicious attacks and the possible ways they can be effectively prevented.

According to the European Police Office (EUROPOL) report on European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EUROPOL 2014, 46-47; 2015, 40-41; 2016, 44-45), a total of 152 attacks (including successful, prevented and unsuccessful attacks) were carried out inside the European Union (EU), along with 535 arrests in the year 2013. In 2014, attacks rose to 201 while arrests were at 774. In 2015 however, attacks within the EU rose again to 211, with 151 recorded deaths, and 1077 terrorist-related arrests. Out of these 211 attacks, almost half of the figure, precisely, 103, were reported from the UK.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTACKS IN EU (successful, prevented &amp; unsuccessful)</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>152 (35 from UK)</td>
<td>201 (109 from UK)</td>
<td>211 (103 from UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>535 (77 from UK)</td>
<td>774 (132 from UK)</td>
<td>1077 (134 from UK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: European Union terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2014, 2015 & 2016)

From the report, the groups behind the 103 reported attacks from the UK in 2013, 2014 and 2015 were not specified, thus, it is difficult to correctly analyse the groups responsible for the attacks and the trend of the attacks.
In another report by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the UK recorded attacks were 137 in 2013, 103 in 2014 and 115 in 2015. The result shows a downward trend of attacks in 2014 while attacks increased significantly in 2015. The EUROPOL and GTD report figures differ, perhaps due to their different approaches, information sources, reporting criteria and organisational considerations.

Reports of devastating and deadly attacks are not limited to the United Kingdom, other European Union (EU) member States have had their bitter shares of terrorist attacks in recent time. Some of these attacks come with an unusually large number of fatalities (Foster 2017).

Despite these sporadic and sometimes fatal attacks on EU soil, the governments and researchers in the EU have, lately, shifted attention from how to identify or profile terrorists to how violent radicalisation that leads to terrorism can be prevented, particularly, the attacks from ‘home-grown’ network of terrorists’ within the Union.

There have been suggestions and policies by Expert Groups set-up by different international and regional organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the EU on how to prevent, halt or reduce the radicalisation process that leads to terrorism on potential victims (United Nations 2006; European Commission 2016). Also, some researchers, scholars and experts in the field of radicalisation and terrorism have come up with different measures they think can help the society in preventing the radicalisation process.

From the different measures and programmes suggested by scholars and organisations in the field of radicalisation, the focus of this write-up will be centred on preventing radicalisation in the education sector in the UK and in Finland. The main question is, how can the education sector be used to prevent the violent radicalisation process that leads to violent extremism or terrorism? More specifically, focus will be on the effectiveness of the Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) of the UK Universities.

What does Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) mean?

The SCCP is one aspect of UK’s Prevent strategy. The Prevent strategy is one of the 4 tentacles of the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST launched in 2003. The other 3 tentacles of CONTEST are, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. CONTEST’s aim is to reduce the risk of terrorism to the UK and its interests abroad. The SCCP, as part of the Prevent strategy, is a legally binding strategy on all Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in England, Wales and Scotland on how to prevent their students from becoming violently radicalised.
The Guidance of Duty of the Prevent Strategy to higher and further education institutions was revised and re-presented in July of 2015 under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which was enacted by the UK Parliament. It was then approved by the Parliament in September of the same year to give the Act a constitutional strength (UK Government 2016).

The goal of the SCCP is to help promote debate and free speech, campus community safety (Safe Campus Communities n.d.), and also to protect vulnerable students from becoming radicalised (Home Office n.d.).

HEIs in England, Wales and Scotland (a different version was approved for Wales) have a legal duty to promote and secure the academic freedom and freedom of speech of students while also ensuring that universities’ environments and campuses are not turned into breeding grounds for violent radicals and extremists. These, according to the Act will be achieved by following the UK Prevent programme (Safe Campus Communities n.d.).

This thesis write-up will focus attention on the roles the Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) play in the overall anti-terrorism policy of the UK. How was the SCCP received by the HEI communities in the UK? And, is there the need for a programme like the SCCP in HEIs in Finland?

The thesis survey questions seek students’ opinion on the adoption of the UK counter-radicalisation programme for HEIs in Finland. Do students feel there is the need for a programme such as the SCCP in Finnish schools? Have students in Finland’s HEIs observed signs of extremism in fellow students? Do students of HEIs in Finland feel safe at all times during their studies? The answers to these questions will reflect the perception students’ have when it comes to their safety and security in Finnish HEIs and if they are in support of counter-radicalisation programmes in their respective HEIs in Finland.
2 Conceptual Definitions

There are thin lines that separate some of the terminology used in identifying, classifying, persuading or encouraging radicals to drop their violent ideologies or views, or those that concern preventing and reducing their potential to resort to terrorism. Sometimes, some of these terms are interchangeably but incorrectly used, perhaps due to the opinions that policymakers and the media have reflected on them. The definitions in this write-up are aimed at introducing the reader’s mind to the perspective of view of researchers in the field of radicalisation. The definitions will also open the readers’ mind to the distinctive differences among the terms.

The definitions of terminologies used in the write-up are adopted from different academic, government and organisation’s point of views, however, emphasis will be given to the definitions from authorities from the United Kingdom due to their significance to this write-up. Where there were no direct definitions, reputable scholars of social sciences and organisations definitions were adopted.

**Ideology**

According to the United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy programme (2011, 107), ideology refers to some set of beliefs that an individual adopts in his/her everyday life. The Australian Government (n.d.) refers to ideology as a ‘significant shift’ in the manner an individual sees the world while Schmid, Jongman, and Price (2011, 643-644) defined ideology as systems of ideas that inform people about the workability of the social world, their supposed position in it and their responsibilities in such a society.

**Radicalisation**

Schmid (2013, 5) claimed that there is no definition of radicalisation that is generally acceptable either among scholars or governments. But, according to Dictionary.com, radicalisation is the noun form of the word ‘radical’ which comes from the Latin word ‘radix’, an adjective synonymous with the word ‘fundamental’, ‘basic’ or according to Schmid (2013, 10) ‘root’. The word radical represents an undiluted and uncompromising political, social, environmental or religious ideology that most times differ from the general perspective of the majority of the society.

The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (2009, 11) refers to radicalisation as the ‘process’ in which individuals decide to support violent extremism or join terrorist groups.
The European Commission (EC), under Migration and Home Affairs studies (2016) defined radicalisation as a ‘complex phenomenon’ of individuals adopting a radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts.

To understand the best approaches toward counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies, it is imperative to understand the elements that constitute radicalisation. What is common to these definitions is the fact that there is an extremist ‘ideology’ or ‘belief’ behind a radicalised individual that makes him/her susceptible to violence. It should also be noted that radicalisation, according to the definitions, is a ‘process’, that is, there are no definitive paths, factors or stages that lead individuals to it.

**Violent radicalisation**

The definition of violent radicalisation was not found on UK Government’s portals online. However, Hemert, Berg, Vliet, Roelofs, Veld, Marret, Gallucci and Feddes (2014, 5) argued that the term violent radicalisation was developed to distinguish between radicals who are non-violent and those who use violence or terror to project their cause.

Reinares, Alonso, Bjorgo, Coolsaet, Della Porta, Khosrokhavar, Lohlker, Ranstorp, Schmid, Silke, Taarnby and De Vries (2008, 5) claimed that some experts believe violent radicalisation involves concrete violent behaviours while others believe that barely accepting certain ideologies that justify violence is a sign of violent radicalisation itself. Summarily, violent radicalisation can be understood as the socialisation to extremism that can manifest itself into terrorism (Reinares et al 2008, 7).

**Extremism**

The United Kingdom Government (2015, 9) defines extremism as the vocal or active opposition to British fundamental values, which includes democracy, individual liberty, rule of law and mutual tolerance and respect of divergent faiths and beliefs. In addition, calls for the death of members of British armed forces is categorised as extremism.

Schmid (2013, 10), in an attempt to differentiate between radicals and extremists, argued that radicals tolerate divergent opinions, they are rational in thoughts and can be redeemed from their radical approach into the traditional societal inclination. On the other hand, Schmid pointed out that extremists’ mindsets are intolerable of divergent views, they are never democrats and are always willing to use violence if provided with the opportunity. The scholar claimed that radicals can either be democrats, use violence or
decide not to, while on the contrary, extremists are at all times ready to use force or violence in their agitation.

**Violent Extremism**

The United Kingdom’s Crown Prosecution Office (2011) define violent extremism as the showing of ‘unacceptable behaviour’ which supports the use of any means or medium to express views which may ‘foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence’ in advancing particular beliefs; seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK.

**Terrorism**

In the UK Terrorism Act of 2000, terrorism is defined as the use or threat of action involving serious violence against an individual, damage to property, endangering another individual’s life, creating a serious risk to the health or safety of a section of a section or the whole public, interfering or disrupting electronic systems, making threatening statements to intimidate or influence government or the public including to advance political, religious or ideological cause, and/or the use or threat of use of firearms or explosives for either or not it is aimed towards influencing the government or intimidating the public.

Crenshaw (1981, 380) claimed that the word terrorism was devised to indicate the systematic instigation of fear and anxiety that influences the activities of a civilian population.

Borum (2004, 6) define terrorism as ‘acts of violence’ that are deliberately carried out on defenceless civilians with the aim of promoting some ‘ideological, religious or political objective’.

**Terrorist**

A terrorist is a radicalised individual who then commits an act of terror which affirms the radicalisation (Bigo et al 2014 11).

**Anti-radicalisation Programmes**

Anti-radicalisation programmes are used to explain the procedures applied to discourage and prevent radicalisation from occurring in the first place (Clutterbuck 2015).
Counter-radicalisation

The United Kingdom Government, under Prevent Strategy (2011, 107) regards counter-radicalisation as the activities focused on a group of individuals intended to prevent them from engaging in terrorist-related activities.

The United Nations (UN 2006, 5) through its Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism defines counter-radicalisation as a collection of ‘social, political, legal, educational, and economic programs specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists’.

Counter-radicalisation according to Horgan (2009, 153) is the efforts directed at preventing violent radicalisation or interrupting the continued involvement of radicals in terrorism.

Vidino and Brandon (2012, 9) defines counter-radicalisation as a strategy with a set of policies and initiatives (either to de-radicalise, disengage, or prevent radicalisation), most times enshrined in a centrally-issued document with set goals describing methods and the responsibilities of participants in order to execute a government’s plan or effort to counter radicalisation.

De-radicalisation

For the United Kingdom’s Government (2011, 107), de-radicalisation programmes are measures that are intended to effect behavioural and cognitive change in individuals who support terrorist activities and those who have physically engaged in terrorism to have a new attitude on terrorism and/or disengage from it.

Horgan (2009, 153) defines de-radicalisation as a ‘social and psychological process’ where a person’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalisation is significantly reduced to the levels that they are no longer at risk of involving or engaging themselves in violent activities, for example, terrorist acts.

De-radicalisation according to the UN (2006, 5) involves programmes which are commonly directed against people who have become radicalised with the intention of reintegrating them into the society or at least prevent them from violent acts.

According to Hemert et al (2014, 6), de-radicalisation essentially refers to a ‘cognitive rejection of certain values, attitudes and views’. The authors argued that de-radicalisation can happen both before and after any engagement in violence.
In all the definitions, it is clear that the aim of de-radicalising is to dissuade radicals from their views of promoting violence to achieve their aims and making them realise they are part of the society they intend to destroy.

**Disengagement**

The United Kingdom Government (2011, 107) refers to disengagement as the process where a person stops getting involved in terrorism while Hoeft (2015, 12) defines disengagement as the altering of violent behavioural traits of radicals that are necessary for their de-radicalisation.

Horgan (2009, 152) expatiates further, that, disengagement involves a change in responsibilities or functions that are most times related to a decrease in violent activities. This may not involve leaving the group but it is usually linked to a temporary or permanent change in responsibilities that are considerably notable.

It is imperative to understand the elements that constitute radicalisation in order to be able to understand the best approaches toward counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies. What is common to these definitions is the fact that there is an extremist ‘ideology’ or ‘belief’ behind a radicalised individual that makes him/her susceptible to violence. It should also be noted that radicalisation, according to the definitions, is a ‘process’, that is, there are no definitive paths, factors or stages that lead to it.

From the authorities in the UK, radicalisation and its extreme effects are ideas or actions that strongly oppose the ‘fundamental values’ of the country, for example, its democracy, rule of law and public peace. The UK also regard violent radicalisation as ‘unacceptable behaviours’. Referring to radicalisation as ‘unacceptable behaviours’ and behaviours against the ‘fundamental values of the UK’ seems ambiguous and, the two clauses have the tendencies of being manipulated to serve interests other than what it intends to serve.

In other words, the definition does not specifically capture the unacceptable behaviours that qualify to be termed violent radicalisation.

It was also observed that definitions have strong connections to who defines them. Government definitions focused on the maintenance of the rule of law, democracy, public peace and orderliness. On the other hand, scholars and organisations’ focus lies more on individual’s state of mind and the role their social environment plays in the long process of radicalisation that leads to terrorism. What this suggest is that scholars approach the issue of radicalisation from a holistic point of view, perhaps due to their apolitical stands while
governments are more concerned about maintaining the rule of law that their governance system is built upon and also protecting their democratic principles.

3 Literature Review

The study of counter-radicalisation is an emerging field of research, thus, there are different ideas and arguments on the best approaches toward preventing violent radicalisation by different scholars, governments and international organisations without general acceptance or application. Many of such ideas have generated debates and controversies, the same way their level of effectiveness have generated arguments. Scholars like Hoeft (2015, 6) and governments like the United Kingdom Government have proposed what can be regarded as ‘soft approach’ to counter-radicalisation. The United Nations (UN) in 2006 also proposed what can be referred to as a soft approach towards preventing radicalisation. In Europe, countries like France, Italy and Spain have adopted the ‘hard approach’ to counter radicalisation (Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet & Ragazzi 2014, 18).

Hoeft (2015, 6) explains that soft approach towards countering violent radicalisation are targeted towards winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of individuals who are vulnerable to violent radicalisation. He argued that such programmes can be achieved by using non-coercive means of engagement. Bigo et al (2014, 18) further state that soft approach involves preventing violent radicalisation by using a wide range of participants that include communities, non-governmental organisations, the prison service and the local police. This partnership according to Bigo et al (2014, 18) serves as an accompaniment to the efforts of the judiciary and executive powers of government.

In contrast, the hard approach has little or no recourse to community engagement. It relies on prosecution through the use of aggressive judicial processes, the use of administrative and that of the executive powers to prevent and foil attacks Bigo et al (2014, 18).

There are researchers who have attempted to categorise counter-radicalisation in a broader and more comprehensive way. Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (2015, 158) categorised counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism into two parts - reactive and preventive methods. The authors opined that reactive counter-radicalisation uses the justice system to prosecute people who are suspects of criminal activities according to relevant laws. Contrastingly, the preventive counter-radicalisation programme anticipates and prevents criminal acts that are related to terrorism before they occur.
In Europe, violent radicalisation issues and its prevention mechanisms became a popular discussion, particularly, among politicians and the academic after the Madrid bombing of 2004 and the subsequent London bombing of 2005. It was after the two incidents that the word ‘violent radicalisation’ was coined in Europe (Bakker 2006, 4; Schmid 2013, 1). Another explanation by Hemert et al (2014, 5) is that the term violent radicalisation was developed to distinguish between radicals who are non-violent and those who use violence or terror to project their cause. Kundnani (2012, 6) believed that the idea of ‘home-grown’ terrorists became popular after the two incidents of terrorism. Home-grown terrorists refer to terrorists who are born/raised in Europe.

Before the Madrid 2004 and the London 2005 bombings, Europe has encountered a wave of nationalist, right- and left-wing terrorism in decades past. The UK, for example, was confronted with a nationalist movement known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from the 1970s up until the 2000s, Spain battled with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) or Basque Fatherland and Liberty from the late 1950s to 2011, West Germany was faced with the Red Army Faction (RAF) while some countries in parts of Africa, Asia, The Americas and Europe were faced with different neo-Nazi groups (Bakker 2006, 3-4).

In recent years, however, the number of attacks in Europe has surged while their level of sophistication and devastation have equally increased. According to EUROPOL (2016, 10), in 2015, attacks within the EU rose to 211, with 151 recorded deaths as compared to 201 attacks in 2014. France suffered the highest casualty figures, particularly from Jihadi attacks, while the UK recorded the highest number of attacks. Other countries that suffered massive casualties include Germany and Belgium. EUROPOL is yet to release its 2016 official figures, but considering terrorist attacks in Europe in the past year, the casualty figure from terrorist attacks is likely to be on the increase.

Historically, the study of counter-radicalisation programmes in the European Union (EU) started with government officials in The Netherlands after the 2005 London bombing. These officials believed such programmes can help forestall terrorist acts inside the EU. They were of the opinion that the understanding of individual’s or group’s ‘indicators’ that may lead to terrorism can be used to develop warning signs to detect religious violence. However, instead of venturing into the research of understanding the factors that lead European citizens to terrorism, the Dutch scholars and researchers in this emerging field focused on techniques that can be used in identifying potential terrorists or supporters of extremist ideologies that may lead to terrorism in The Netherlands (Kundnani 2012, 6).
Apart from The Netherlands early researchers, different scholars from around the world have also contributed to discussions about radicals and radicalism. Some of these researchers focus on the factors that lead to violent radicalisation. Among these factors, ideology stands out. Schmid (2013, 9), Neumann (2010, 12), Kundnani (2012, 4), Cincu (2016, 18) all agreed that ideology plays a significant role in the factors that lead to violent radicalisation. Sabir (2016) however concluded that there appears to be a consensus among the academics and counterterrorism experts that the presence of unjust and unfair political and socio-economic practicalities gives ‘sanctity and legitimacy’ to violent ideology.

Some scholars agree that grievances in form of inequities, marginalisation, humiliation (particularly those concerning religious, political, cultural or ethnic groups), under-employment, poor education, foreign policies and conflicts, disenfranchisement and unemployment/under-employment are some of the issues that contribute to the factors that lead to violent radicalisation (Reinares et al 2008, 9). In their conclusion, Reinares et al (2008, 12) identify ‘ideological activists’ as an important recruitment tool in the radicalisation process that leads to terrorism. Ideological activists, according to the scholars are individuals who possess appealing characteristics, are learned, and integrates well with the society they live in. Most of these activists have an unflinching sense of justice, are seen as role models within their locality and are inspired by their strong idealistic beliefs.

Apart from grievance, researchers and experts in the field of security studies at a conference in London convened by the TRENDS Research and Advisory and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) in 2016 claimed that identity crises, mental health issues and criminal activities contribute to factors that lead to violent radicalisation. Rik Coolsaet stated at the conference that some individuals are motivated by terrorist organisations who they see as super-gangs and tend to join these groups even without understanding their ideology (Moos 2016). This notion was supported by Basra, Neumann and Brunner (2016, 23), the authors found out that criminals are justifying their criminal activities by joining jihadist groups while also using their violent radicalisation to ‘clear’ their past sins’.

Interestingly, other researchers believe that social issues such as family background, personal experience, friendship, involvement in high-risk activism and political affiliations can lead to violent radicalisation (Reinares et al 2008, 9; Bigo et al 2014, 13). In Australia, the government through its Living Safe Together programme believes ideology is the number one cause of radicalisation. The Australian government, however, noted that ideologies are not a cause for concern unless there are calls for the use of violence or unlawful acts to promote such beliefs.
In another perspective, Schmid (2013, 2) faults some of the assumptions by scholars that political, social, religious or cultural discontents stimulate the process of violent radicalisation. He argued that such assumptions are ambiguous and lack formal investigation while also suggesting that the actors (terrorists) themselves should be interrogated in order to understand their perspective on the issues surrounding the factors that lead to violent radicalisation. The author grouped the root causes of violent radicalisation into Micro, Meso- and Macro levels to categorise and simplify the different levels that contribute to violent radicalisation.

**Micro-level:** The micro level factors deal with the individual's cause of influence. For example, failed integration, feelings of isolation, discrimination, direct or indirect humiliation, rejection and stigmatisation, most times, combined with feelings of vengeance and moral outrage can lead to violent radicalisation (Schmid 2013, 4).

**Meso-level:** Meso-level deals with the bigger society that supports or get involved in individuals’ quest for vengeance. It serves as the ‘missing link’ with the extremists’ larger society or like-minded aggrieved groups who shares the same grievances. The group, according to Schmid (2013, 4) can serve as a recruitment base for radicalisation that may lead to violent radicalisation.

**Macro-level:** The macro-level as expressed by Schmid (2013, 4) is influenced by the role of government and the society at large, either home or abroad. It can also be influenced by perceived unjustifiable public opinion, party politics, tense ethnic minority versus majority relationships, and the effect of lacking socio-economic opportunities which may together lead to the coming together of these individuals and the radicalisation of dissatisfied members which might result in violent extremism.

The difference in opinions of scholars and researchers in the field of radicalisation have clearly shifted from claims that terrorists and violent extremists are mentally unstable, senseless or depressed. As explained by Reinares et al (2008, 9), Crenshaw (1981, 380), Horgan (2009, xii) and Sageman (2004, 97), violent radicals are neither depressed, irrational, emotionally unbalanced, nor senselessly involved in extremism. To put their description in proper perspective, there is nothing like a terrorist personality (Crenshaw 2006, 7; 2000, 409; Alonso et al 2008, 11; Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet & Ragazzi 2014, 11). However, Horgan (2009, 3) argued that the issue of violent extremists or terrorists’ state of mind is contentious, thus, claims that they are psychologically normal is inaccurate. In addition, the author claimed that what constitutes abnormality to researchers differ.
In general, it is safe to conclude that grievances against the society, either justifiably or unjustifiably, contribute to what lead individuals to violent radicalisation or extremism. Such grievances can emanate from political, religious, cultural or socio-economic tendencies which may, in turn, fuel and validate inherent violent ideology. However, from the different suggestions and research results studied, there appears to be no definite or specific pathway that leads to violent radicalisation. It is observed that what some individuals perceive to be grievances against their community or country may be wished away by others, and what leads some individuals to violent radicalisation do not necessarily lead others to it. This fact neutralises the idea of designing a terrorist personality and claims that an entire religion or societal group should be targeted for extremist signs. In fact, there are arguments by some researchers that insanity contributes to violent radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Does that mean that all mentally unstable people are radicals? The answer is a definite no.

All in all, these findings tend to show that one form of counter-radicalisation programme cannot be suitable for all forms of violent radicalisation. And the best approach to counter some of these factors is to first understand what led to them. Thus, a counter-radicalisation programme for one community or society may not necessarily be effective for another.

In the UK, there is a history of using legislative and judicial powers to prohibit, prevent and deter individuals from spreading hate, violence or terrorism in order to agitate for a cause. The next sub-heading explains some of the historical efforts taken in the UK to counter the effects of radicalisation and violent radicalisation.

3.1 Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation Programmes in the UK.

Since the 1970s, the United Kingdom had enacted different laws aimed at prohibiting members of the public from joining or supporting the ideology of radical, extremist and separatist movements by criminalising such practices. Some of the groups that operated in the 1970s include the Sinn Fein Movement, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) (Bowcott 2014).

The UK government responded by enacting major laws that are targeted toward combating violent radicalisation and extremism. Common among these laws are, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974, the Broadcasting Ban of 1988 (which was dismissed in 1994) (Bowcott 2014), the Terrorism Act of 2006 (enacted to update the Terrorism Act of 2000 after the London 2005 bombings), the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act of 2011, and more recently, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 that encompasses the Prevent strategy (UK Government 2009, 14; Blackbourn 2016).
Some of these Acts are directed toward counterterrorism, and in recent time, others are directed toward counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism.

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act through the Prevent Strategy focused specifically on some areas of life, one of which is the education sector. This is because there appears to be a lot of issues associated with radicalisation in Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in the UK. These issues were reflected in the Prevent Strategy document published by the government in 2011 (72). For example, the government found out that over 30% of individuals convicted of terrorism-related offences between 1999 and 2009 had attended a university or higher education institution of study. In another discovery, the government found out that 15% of convicted individuals graduated from either a further education institution or a vocational school while another 10% were either students’ when they were charged or convicted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS (students)</th>
<th>% BETWEEN 1999-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attended university convictions</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduates from vocational/further</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying at time of arrest or conviction</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Statistics of students involved in terrorism in UK HEIs.

The government believes that there are students who are already radicalised before gaining admissions into HEIs while others become radicalised during their studies in UK HEIs. One of such cases of radicalisation during studies is the Iraqi-Swede, Taimour Abdulwahab Al-Abdaly who studied at the University of Bedfordshire and died in a failed attack in Sweden in 2010 (Prevent Strategy 2011, 72). The government is also of the opinion that there is a growing diversity, sophistication and unpredictability of terrorism in the UK which does not isolate HEIs from recruiters and influencers of these acts (United Kingdom Government 2012, 1).

Choudhury and Fenwick in their 2011 research (67) claimed that the July 7, 2005, attacks on the transport network in London gave birth to debates about the instantaneous and intermediate actions that the government needed to address to stem the wave of islamophobia in schools, and at the same time prevent students from becoming radicalised within their school environments.

In addition to these developments, there is a growing number of school pupils joining ISIS which is worrying to the government. In 2013, Glasgow University student, Aqsa Mahmood travelled to Syria to join ISIS and had since become a recruiter of the group calling on Muslims who cannot make the journey to commit terrorist acts back home. Also, in 2015, three British
schoolgirls, Amira Abase, Shamima Begum and Kadiza Sultana left their homes in London and travelled to Syria to join ISIS (Webb 2016).

Some of these widely publicised cases of students joining ISIS may have contributed to creating the Safe Campus Communities Programme to prevent and halt the radicalisation process in schools, particularly HEIs.

Considering also, EUROPOL’s 2016 (10) report which reveals that the UK recorded the highest number of attacks in Europe in 2015, coupled with a report by the UK Foreign Secretary that over 1500 Brits have attempted to enter Syria in the last four years with the aim of joining ISIS (Groves 2016), it should not be surprising that the UK government is taking serious and concrete measures that include programmes aimed at preventing violent radicalisation in HEIs in the UK.

Aside from these developments, questions have also been raised about the medium of communication among like-minded people or groups recruiting and propagating ideologies of extremist nature in schools. It has been recognised that face-to-face interaction remains the most effective means of recruitment. However, the role of the internet has also been emphasised to be critical in the recruitment process (Prevent Strategy 2011, 46-47).

In all of these, Universities UK, the umbrella body for all Universities in the UK denied that universities serve as grounds for violent radicalisation. The Federation of Student Islamic Societies also denied reports that HEIs serve as breeding grounds for violent radicalisation, stating that such reports are inconclusive, yet are sensationalised (House of Commons 2012, 14).

As part of the larger society that the universities are not isolated from, there is a tendency that some vulnerable students can be lured into violent radicalisation. Considering the youthfulness, exposure and freedom of expression and association that students enjoy, there are chances that some of the students may misuse these opportunities to the detriment of the larger society (Prevent Strategy 2011, 72).

It is widely believed that the thriving and successful indoctrination of people into violent radicalisation and extremism are not cases in isolation, there are different views of injustices that are related to social, religious and political issues that fuel such developments according to the Home Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons (2012, 89). However, indoctrination of individuals has continued to occur despite the UK’s multicultural system that tries to promote integration and tolerance among immigrant communities (Cincu 2016, 17).
To understand why the UK has taken stringent measures to prevent radicalisation, it is important to understand what the government perceives to be the root causes of radicalisation.

In a report by the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Home Affairs Committee in 2012 (9-10), ideology, theology, mental health issues, grievances and social exclusion are argued as the pathway that leads to radicalisation in the UK. However, the report noted that the issue of social exclusion is less convincing while grievances play a leading role. The report cited that Maajid Nawaz, a former member of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (a pan-Islamic political organisation), expressed that his grievances against the State were as a result of his experiences of violent racism, falling victim of a stabbing, false arrest by the police and his view on the Bosnia crisis.

The UK government in 2012 (3) in response to the House of Commons report concluded that feelings of alienation from the society, sense of grievance (for example, due to racism and discrimination), islamophobia and lack of trust or confidence in constituted authorities are the drivers of radicalisation. Both reports emphasised that violent radicalisation is more pronounced among the youths and those of lower income and socio-economic groups in the UK. Conclusions that may have impacted the Prevent Strategy’s focus on HEIs.

These conclusions, however, do not completely answer the questions about students who have in subsequent years travelled to war-torn countries to join terrorist organisations. Some of those who have travelled to Syria and Iraq, for example, are compelled to do so under an illusion that those States are ruled or will be ruled under strict Islamic jurisprudence that is lacking in the UK and not necessarily that they have genuine grievances against the UK. This can be noticed on Webb’s report of 2016 which was posted on the Mirror UK website. The report focused on young women from the UK who travelled to Syria to join the Islamic State.

3.2 UK’s Prevent Strategy

The UK Prevent Strategy operates under CONTEST, an umbrella programme for counter-terrorism strategy in the UK with four tentacles: Pursue, Protect, Prepare and Prevent. These programmes function under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act which was first introduced in 2003 but given legislative power in September 2015.

The aims of the Prevent Strategy are, stopping the violent radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, reducing support for violent extremism and terrorism and discouraging individuals from becoming violently radicalised which may lead them to acts of terrorism. It also covers extreme right wing groups. (UK Government 2009, 14; 2012, 1; Blackkbourn 2016).
The ‘Safe Campus Communities Programme’ (SCCP) was set-up under the Prevent Strategy. The programme specifically focuses on all Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in England, Wales and Scotland. Its aim is to prevent vulnerable students of HEIs from becoming violently radicalised, particularly within their school environments. The goal of the SCCP is to help promote debate and free speech and, above all, maintain campus community safety (Safe Campus Communities n.d., Home Office n.d.).

As a law, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 provides all HEIs and staff in England, Wales and Scotland (different version was approved for Wales) the legal duty to promote and secure students’ freedom of speech and study, while also ensuring that the universities’ environments and campuses are not turned into breeding grounds for violent radicals and extremists. By following the Prevent Strategy Programme, the UK Government is optimistic that these responsibilities can be achieved (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d.).

The UK Government focuses its attention on students of HEIs because, it is believed that, demographically, the youths are more susceptible to violent radicalisation than any other group, and statistically, terrorist acts are committed more by individuals who are less than 30 years of age (Prevent Strategy 2011, 64), hence focus should be shifted to higher school of learning where the youths can be largely found.

In Part 5, section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, statutory responsibilities are placed on some specified government agencies. These responsibilities are referred to as ‘Guidance Duty’. The duties statutorily make it the responsibility of these authorities to ‘prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’. The government agencies being referred to are highlighted under Schedule 6 of the Act. They are local government officials, criminal justice executioners, education and childcare managers, health and social care boards, and the police (The National Archives n.d.).

The SCCP falls under the ‘education and childcare managers’ category of the Prevent Strategy. Its aim, as specified in the Act, is for education managers to prevent students from being ‘drawn into terrorism’ while discharging their duties. HEI’s managers (Vice-Chancellors, University Chairs, Chaplains, Legal Practitioners, Chief Security Officers and Student Support Services) are responsible for carrying out the Prevent Strategy duties in HEIs. However, many have involved students in consultations and engagements on how they can implement the Prevent Duties in their respective groups (The National Archives n.d.).
The SCCP equally has a dedicated website known as the Safe Campus Communities where relevant information related to the Prevent Strategy programme and Guidance Duty of education managers can be accessed by both HEI managers and their students. The website is comprehensively discussed under Findings and Analysis of this thesis write-up.

Apart from the available information on the SCCP website, there are other different programmes designed for universities in the UK on how to prevent violent radicalisation while equally ensuring that the freedom of speech of students is not impeded. This is because it is believed that universities have different peculiarities which may, in effect, make the programmes ineffective in preventing violent radicalisation in HEI environments. However, there are four major guidelines (legal responsibilities, information management, interfaith relations and external speakers’ management) that universities are expected to follow in the discharge of their Prevent Duties. These guidelines provide HEIs with information on how to address relevant yet controversial issues in university environments (Safe Campus Communities n.d.).

3.3 Impact of the Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP)

As presented in the introduction of this write-up, it is difficult to faultlessly analyse the positive impacts of counter-radicalisation programmes designed for a community or an entire nation. This also applies to the UK counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation programmes. The initiator of the SCCP (the government) has continued to argue that the programme has recorded considerable successes while critics are critical of the negative impacts arising from the introduction of the programme. However, like every other programme, the SCCP has its positive and negative impacts on UK universities.

Remarkably, the Prevent Strategy through the SCCP has made it possible for HEIs managers to have a legal backing on the prevention of violent radicalisation in HEIs environments, albeit with guidelines. The Programme has also encouraged HEI managers to set-up guidelines for downloading sensitive information for students’ research purposes, for example, the downloading of terrorist organisations propaganda materials from online sources for research purposes. The guidelines provide students with the procedures on how security-sensitive materials can be downloaded without encountering problems with the security agencies (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

Apart from the legal framework and guidelines on how sensitive material can be downloaded from online sources, the effective management of interfaith activities in universities and colleges of education has also been made possible by the introduction of the SCCP. Different religious groups are now aware of the rules guiding their activities. They are also aware of the
activities or lectures that are regarded as promoting incitements in HEI environments (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d.).

The SCCP has also helped in raising students’ level of awareness about the threat of violent radicalisation and extremism on HEIs premises. Many HEIs in the UK presently have guidelines in place for visiting speakers before they can be allowed to give lectures on campuses. Lectures that promote, for example, extremist views are not tolerated in many HEIs. Failure of speakers to strictly abide by these guidelines may result in cancellation of such lectures (House of Commons 2012, 21).

In addition, the general belief that university environments can pose a threat to vulnerable individuals from getting radicalised and that universities can serve as recruitment grounds for violent extremists was in part agreed to by Universities UK, the umbrella body for all universities in the UK. Thus, the body advised universities to be more active with activities related to the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism on universities and colleges of education campuses. Such a call serves as a boost for counter-radicalisation programmes in HEIs in the UK. (House of Commons 2012, 21). These admittances may likely encourage universities to be more proactive about the implementation of the measures in the Prevent Strategy for HEIs.

Furthermore many institutions in the UK have set-up different teams to ensure that key staff members can be able to identify vulnerable students and promptly offer professional supports while students are also guided on their duties and responsibilities to prevent violent radicalisation on campuses. This was made possible by the introduction of the SCCP (House of Commons 2012, 21).

Moreover, the SCCP has encouraged the National Union of Students (NUS) and the Business Innovation and Skills department (BIS) in the UK to develop training materials for their employees dealing with student union organisations as a result of the SCCP. Also, the NUS has been prompted by the SCCP to initiate a ‘No Platform’ guideline. This guideline prohibits staff members of the NUS from sharing a stage with ‘racists’, ‘extremists’ or those deem as ‘fascists’ (Prevent Strategy 2011, 74).

Apart from the ‘No Platform’ guideline, the NUS also partners with a number of student organisations in the UK to prevent extremism and violent radicalisation in those organisations. One of such organisations is the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) (the umbrella body for Islamic societies in the UK). The Programme has also encouraged local authorities like the police and youth and probation services to work together with universities and
colleges of education in the UK to prevent violent radicalisation (Prevent Strategy 2011, 74-75).

In all, the results of these measures on the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism on campuses remain contentious. However, it cannot be denied that the measures taken have increased awareness level on HEI’s campuses. The awareness level may likely force radicals to go underground or shift their attention from HEIs campuses to other areas outside the education sector for recruitment purposes. In addition to these, the fear of being detected is likely to hinder the activities of extremists in universities and colleges of education. On the whole, it cannot be generally concluded that the Prevent Strategy through the SCCP has made no significant achievement or progress in HEIs. However, it remains to be seen if the SCCP can totally eliminate, or rather prevent violent radicalisation and extremism from all HEI environments in the UK.

3.4 Safe Campus Communities Programme Setbacks

The Prevent Strategy report of 2011 (75-76) found out that some universities and colleges fail to engage in the Prevent Strategy. It was reported that universities partner more with local authorities than the colleges do. It also noted that the colleges take less seriously the Prevent Strategy programmes than the universities despite the fact that both are equally open environments where violent radicalisation can take place.

There were also observations of poor links between universities, colleges, the communities and local authorities in carrying out their Prevent duties (Prevent Strategy 2011, 76).

Beider and Briggs, in a 2010 (15) survey of HEIs, observed that a considerable number of HEIs staff lack the skills and confidence to deliver the agenda of the Prevent Strategy while many others are unwilling to carry out their duties due to fear of discriminating students or the fear of being attacked. They also found out in their survey that there is a lack of cooperation between the police and HEIs.

In another research carried out by Choudhury and Fenwick (2011, 68-69) some interviewees (mainly Muslim University students) believe that they are under ‘siege and surveillance’ by security agencies in the UK as a result of their active participations in Islamic, social or political activities.

Others raised questions about how their information may be shared among different security agencies which may lead to thorough scrutiny and even visa denials at airports. These have resulted in solidarity protests even among non-Muslims while other Muslim students have
simply abstained from Muslim organisations for fear of being witch-hunted or discriminated against.

Apart from discrimination issues, lack of funding is also seen as a significant hindrance to the Prevent Strategy because many HEI unions/organisations are unable to fund the training of their employees in carrying out their responsibilities in the Prevent Strategy programme (Prevent Strategy 2011, 76).

In another development, before the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act was passed in September of 2015, 525 professors from different universities and colleges of education were critical of the proposed law. They raised concerns about the effects of the law in the preservation of the freedom of speech enjoyed by HEIs and their students. Concerns were also raised about what they termed ‘unlawful and unenforceable’ responsibilities that the law tends to place on HEIs staff by identifying and preventing students’ who are susceptible to violent radicalisation from getting radicalised (The Guardian 2015).

The professors argued that only an open and democratic society that encourages debate of controversial issues and challenges discriminatory behaviours can successfully combat and prevent terror acts. They reminded the UK government that the new law will contradict the principle of academic freedom in universities and colleges guaranteed by the UK Education Act of 1986 (The Guardian 2015).

For HEI professors (over 500 of them) to have raised questions and concerns about the negative effects that a proposed law would have on HEIs shows that the law does not enjoy collective support from those who have important roles to play in effecting the law.

All in all, there has been several concerns that have been raised by both government officials and HEI managers. Some of these concerns may have been captured in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act updated and passed in 2015, however, there appears to be significant reluctance on the part of HEI managers to carry out their tasks as stipulated in the Act. These may be due to personal safety, fear of discrimination, blackmail, lack of proper skill and guidance, or lack of true understanding of their role in the Prevent Strategy. Also, cooperation among authorities, like the police, communities and HEIs appears not to be cordial as a result of jurisdictional issues and inter-agency suspicions. In addition, students who are members of Islamic organisations on campuses also have their suspicions and reservations about the SCCP.
Some of these students believe that the programme is unfairly targeted at Muslim students for the aim of gathering intelligence about their private life. It is, therefore, the duty of the government agencies in charge of the SCCP to restore confidence in the programmes stakeholders by carrying everyone along and proving to the different groups that the programme does not solely focus attention on them or their communities if they aim to achieve success and make a meaningful impact.

Another observation is that the SCCP website does not provide much information about the primary targets of the programme - the students. Although there are a considerable number of materials for HEIs employees to study and understand their roles in the Prevent Strategy programme which students may have access to, most of the materials, however, appear to be irrelevant to vulnerable students who need assistance in the prevention of the violent radicalisation process.

3.5 Criticisms of the Prevent Strategy Programme

There are Muslim communities in the UK who see the whole Prevent Strategy programme as a way for the government to snoop on their private life and create suspicion and enmity among British Muslims.

Kundnani (2009, 8) concluded after interviewing 32 workers working for the Prevent Strategy programme that the Strategy specifically targets Muslims who are British citizens in a complex structure of surveillance, propaganda, mapping and engagement because it sees the Muslim communities as a ‘suspect community’. He regarded the Prevent Strategy as the UK government’s ‘Islam policy’ that can be used to promote social divisions and encourage privacy violations of Muslims. He argued that the Prevent Strategy programme at best is counter-productive in reducing the risk of ‘political violence’.

Confirming Kundnani’s findings, the House of Commons (2012, 46) reported that some Muslim communities see Prevent Strategy as an essential ‘tool’ for spying and gathering intelligence about Muslim communities.

Another setback for the Prevent Strategy is that it lacks the confidence of some influential Muslim organisations (Muslim Association of Britain or Muslim Council of Britain or the Islamic Society of Britain) that the government dropped from the programme due to the government’s belief that they are ‘Islamist’ in nature. Many of these neglected organisations are however seen as legitimate by the majority of British Muslims while the organisations involved by the UK government are seen as ‘government mouthpieces’ (Bigo et al 2014, 29).
Some of these issues and suspicions that are raised by different groups particularly the Muslim communities as a result of the Prevent Strategy programme can be addressed by the government. The UK government must find a way to restore confidence and convince Muslim communities and organisations in the UK that the real intention of the programme is not to gather intelligence or spy on them, but to work and partner with them to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism within the UK. The government must also assure communities, particularly the minority groups among them that the programme does not specifically target their communities but generally focuses on the larger society.

4 Methodology

Methodology, according to Kumar (2008, 5), is used to methodically solve research problems. The author explained that research methods are part of research methodology. He further stated that research methodology takes into consideration not only research methods but also the reasons behind adopting such specific method of research against the others in order to be able to evaluate such research work.

Creswell (2014, 3) explained that research method is based on the description of the research problem(s), the personal experiences of the researcher in charge and the study target audience. The author pointed out that there are three approaches to research methods: qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods.

Qualitative research method explores human and social problems in order to understand their meaning. Such research requires procedures, asking pertinent questions and using relevant information/data collected from contributors in making informed analysis and interpretation of such data. Qualitative research can be unstructured or semi-structured in nature. (Creswell 2014, 4).

In contrast, quantitative research method tests theories by impartially scrutinising the correlations that exist among variables. Such variables in form of data can then be analysed and measured numerically using statistical techniques. Quantitative research, unlike qualitative research, has a set structure (Creswell 2014, 4).

According to Creswell (2014, 4), in summary, qualitative research relies on words, open-ended interviews/questions, case studies and making observations as a strategy, while quantitative research uses numerical data, close-ended questions and experimentations in collecting and analysing its data.
The Mixed research method combines both qualitative and quantitative research methods and may involve theoretical and philosophical assumptions to collect and integrate data, using designs that are well defined to produce a comprehensive and better understanding of research problems that either qualitative or quantitative research produces (Creswell 2014, 4).

Newman and Benz (1998, 9-10) concluded that qualitative method of research covers theories, case studies, document studies, interview studies, field studies, naturalistic enquiries and descriptive studies. They asserted that most times, qualitative research designs capture one case study or subject of research over a period of time and is often times associated with social sciences. On the other hand, quantitative research method according to Newman and Benz (1998, 10), deals with statistical or empirical studies and have been the dominating research method in social science.

In deciding the methodology to be used in this research, questions that were asked include: how do I study and analyse a website objectively and meaningfully? Is my topic a case study (reading, collecting and analysing certain information) or a scientific measurement of a theory using numbers? How do I make a reasonable expression of my results? Is it by representing my analysis in words or by presenting them in numbers? Who is/are my audience? And what experience do I have in data analysis?

In answering the above questions, I realised that, to be able to analyse and interpret my findings, and with my limited experience, qualitative research method has the features that best describes my work, according to Creswell (2014, 4) and Newman and Benz’s (1998, 9-10) description of qualitative research method. Also, the method can effectively provide the required answers to the questions asked.

In addition, I have an established topic (a case which is the SCCP) which needs to be studied, analysed and interpreted in words (qualitative), the only effective and objective way they can be presented. Apart from this, there are issues like the impacts, setbacks and criticisms of the Programme while also focusing on the functionalities, structure, accessibility and contents that the Programme’s website contains. These are human and social issues that require information about the Programme, analysing such information and interpreting their meanings in words using the available information (website and researchers works) as defined by (Creswell 2014, 4).
The semi-structured nature of the research is also a feature associated with qualitative research. There was no definitive or specific structure that was adopted from the beginning of the research, it was open and flexible which makes changes and modifications easy to achieve. This is characteristic of a qualitative research, according to Creswell (2014, 4).

Apart from the website’s study, a student survey was also conducted. The student survey explores students’ opinions on counter-radicalisation programmes for HEIs, and also their perception of safety in Finnish HEIs.

Many of the respondents (students) surveyed were surveyed within the premises of a University of Applied Sciences. They were mainly given the hard copies of the questionnaire in the library and in other open areas of the campus. Other respondents answered the survey questions through a web link posted on a student life related Facebook group page.

In total, 40 hard copies of the questionnaires were printed, while 35 were responded to. From the online version, 11 were answered bringing the total number of respondents to 46 which is comparatively, two classes of students in a typical HEI in Finland. The total number of questions in the questionnaire are 11.
5 Findings and Analysis

The results of the research were divided into two, the desk research analysis of the SCCP and the student survey.

5.1 Desk Research Description, Analysis and Assessment of the SCCP Website

The SCCP website and its contents were observed, analysed, described and assessed. The assessment of the website was done based on four parameters: accessibility, material contents, security, and its structure and usability.

From the SCCP’s website study and observation, a register/login area was noted which, as expressed on the website, is restricted only to ‘Higher Education sector’ users (I was able to register and access it irrespective). It also has a search area where search inquiries are redirected to the resources section of the website for similar materials. There is equally the same set of information for visitors and log-in users on the main menus of the website except for the Training and Forum sections (the Forum section is only available to log-in users while training materials can only be viewed after sign-in) (Safe Campus Communities, n.d.).

In addition, materials related to the Prevent Strategy programme are displayed randomly on the website for casual users but remain stable for log-in users on the ‘Organisations’ section.

Figure 1: Screenshot of the registration page on the Safe Campus Communities Programme website (05.02.2017).
The SCCP’s website is designed for use by both students and HEI’s managers’. It has 8 sections for visitors and 9 sections for log-in users. The sections altogether have 20 subsections. These sections include Resources, The Prevent Agenda, General Guidance, Role-Specific Guidance, Organisations, Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Monitoring, Training (with materials for log-in users), Forum (exclusively for log-in users) and, News (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

Figure 2: SCCP’s page after a user is logged-in to the site (Notice the training and forum sections. The training material modules can be seen in the screenshot). (05.02.2017).
Below is the menu sections and their subsections as available on the Safe Campus Communities Programme website.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTIONS</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>The Prevent Agenda</th>
<th>General Guidance</th>
<th>Role-specific Guidance</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>HEFCE Monitoring</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Forum</th>
<th>News</th>
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<td>SUBSECTIONS</td>
<td>Case Studies</td>
<td>Prevent in my region</td>
<td>Legal responsibilities</td>
<td>Vice-Chancellors</td>
<td>Government departments</td>
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<td>Understanding the Issues</td>
<td>What Prevent Means to HEIs</td>
<td>Management of information</td>
<td>Legal Practitioners</td>
<td>Other organisations</td>
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<td>Risks to individuals</td>
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Table 3: Safe Campus Communities Programme Website Menu and Submenu sections.

Each menu (and submenus) on the SCCP website has its functions. Below are the functions of the different menus on the SCCP website.

The *Resources Section*

The Resources section displays important materials that can be used by HEIs in the discharge of their Prevent duties. The section has two subsections; Case Studies and Understanding the Issues. The Case Studies subsection provide information about case studies on related topics while the Understanding the Issues subsection provides information about research papers and guidance information on how to carry out Prevent duties according to the law. Suggestions can also be submitted to a dedicated e-mail on the Case Studies subsection (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

The *Prevent Agenda Section*

The Prevent Agenda section explains the aim of CONTEST with regards to the overall counter-terrorism strategy; Pursue, Protect, Prepare and Prevent strategies which are all part of CONTEST. It has five subsections, namely, Prevent in my Region, What Prevent Means to HEIs, Channel, Risk Factors and Risks to Individuals (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).
The General Guidance Section

The General Guidance section provides details about some of the important information that education managers need to comply with in the Prevent Strategy Programme. These pieces of information are under 4 out of the 5 subsections of this section. They are Legal Responsibilities, Management of Information, Inter-Faith Relations and Management of Speakers.

External authorities like the police also have materials on how HEIs can comply with Prevent Duty. The fifth subsection contains information on Regional Coordinators (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

The Role-Specific Guidance Section

The Role-Specific Guidance section explains how specified HEI managers can carry out their Prevent duties and responsibilities effectively, and how they can partner with relevant Prevent authorities, for instance, the police, on how to achieve these tasks. Guidance materials are also available for use in this section.

The subsections in this section consist of the 6 HEI managers: Vice-Chancellors, Legal Practitioners, University Chairs, Chief Security Officers, Chaplains and the Student Support Services (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

The Organisations Section

On this section, organisations that are ready and willing to offer assistance to HEIs on the Prevent Strategy and student-related matters can be found. The two subsections in this section are, Government Departments and Other Organisations. Under Government Department, the Department for Education and the Home Office offers assistance to HEIs while under Other Organisations, Higher Education Funding Council for England, the National Police Chief’s Council, Association of University Chief Security officers, National Union of Students, Association of Managers of Student Services in Higher Education, and Committee of University Chairs offers assistance and support to HEIs (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) Monitoring Section

The HEFCE Monitoring section provides information about the duties of the HEFCE which is the monitoring Council for HEIs in England. It provides details on the institutions of learning that
HEFCE covers and the framework with which they work with. A map of Prevent Coordinators within England along with their names, phone numbers and e-mails are provided on a link which redirects to the HEFCE website. Materials like advice notes and links to Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (EFCW) and that of the monitoring body for Scotland - local and national Prevent and CONTEST groups can also be found in the section (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

The Training Section

The Training Section is exclusively available to log-in higher education staff members (but can also be accessed, although unauthorised to interested students and visitors to the site). When logged-in, access is given to the materials meant for higher education staff of Relevant Higher Education Bodies (RHEB) to study the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE) course. The materials help members to implement their Prevent strategy duty for the HEIs. The course materials available in this section consist of 7 modules: An introduction to Prevent Duty as it affects higher education, The Leadership Challenge, The Prevent Duty (legislation and legal duties), Implementing the Prevent Duty and upholding academic freedom and freedom of speech, Student and Staff wellbeing issue?, Risk Assessment and Action Planning, and the ICT challenge. These materials, as presented in the section, have been reviewed and approved by relevant bodies within government and the education sector. Apart from the materials in the section, surveys can also be taken to give feedbacks on the Prevent materials available in the section (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

The Forum Section

The Forum section has Order and Category options where log-in users can choose from newer or older questions, events or topics that suit their interest. Log-in users can also post questions, reply posts and pass information to users in the section (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

The News Section

The News section offers information on the developments in the HEIs with regards to the Prevent strategy (Safe Campus Communities Programme n.d).

Basically, most resources on the website focus on HEI managers’ guidelines on how to carry out their statutory duties regarding the Prevent Strategy. There are several case studies and resources on the website that students who are vulnerable to violent radicalisation and in need of urgent assistance may not find helpful. Impressively, there are available links that
redirect users to websites like the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and Radicalisation Research, however, there are no notable step-by-step actions that students can take to prevent/halt their radicalisation process or understand whether the signs they are seeing from a potential recruiter/radicaliser are indeed real signs. There may, however, be dedicated centres on campuses where students can go to seek help and guidance as there is provision for such on the Student Support Services subsection of the Role-Specific Guidance menu. This may not be beneficial to students who are afraid or shy of reaching out to these centres for help.

On the whole, the design of the SCCP’s website and the availability of open materials including the ease and unrestricted access to its login domain suggests that the website is designed not just for the HEI staff or students alone but also for members of the public who wish to understand one or two things about radicalisation can have access to such information. In addition to this, the contents of the website and the log-in domain are not secured (encrypted), perhaps because there seem not to be sensitive information on the website that may attract serious threats from attackers.

By and large, the cumbersomeness of the SCCP’s website remains obvious when compared with the website of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). The ICSR website has specifically 5 menus with no submenus. These are, About Us, Publications, Our Work, News and Contact Us. Each of the menus redirects undeviatingly to what they display. The publications on the ‘Publication’ menu are arranged from the latest to the oldest published topics, and there are signs that redirects visitors to the different ICSR social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) and also the website’s emails.

In contrast, there is no display of social media links on the SCCP’s website. Also, the website may be difficult to understand for first-time visitors who intend to read about the factors that lead to violent radicalisation or how to prevent violent extremism from the website. In terms of security, both the SCCP and ICSR websites are insecure.

Assessment of the SCCP’s website

The SCCP’s website assessment was done based on accessibility, material contents, security, and its structure and usability
Accessibility

It was observed that the SCCP website can be accessed both on laptops and mobile phones with all its features, however, on mobile phones, signs are used to indicate log-in areas and menu bars. On the search engine, Bing, the website’s credibility remain unconfirmed while it appears without question mark on Google. A sitemap is available for visitors to familiarise themselves with the website but there are missing links on some of the sections available. For example, the Contact link on the sitemap displays no e-mail address, phone number or contact address which makes it impossible to give feedbacks, inquire about a topic or get information about the SCCP office(s).

Furthermore, it is unclear if the SCCP website was originally designed for HEI managers, students and/or visitors. What is, however, obvious is that most of the contents of the website target HEI managers with little available valuable information for students and visitors who intend to read about violent radicalisation and the factors that lead to it.

SCCP Website Material Contents

On the ‘Discover Useful Resources’ link on the homepage, available materials are not up to date. For example, the latest link on the homepage dates back to 2015 while some resources date as far back as 2010. However, on ‘Organisations’ menu, links to different case studies available on the section are as up to date as December 2016. Some of the materials on the Organisations menu are from reputable organisations and institutes that their materials can be relied upon.

Examples of some of the publishers are, the Community Security Trust (CST), the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Prevent Strategy and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) publications. It was also observed that the materials on the Discover Useful Resources section display randomly. This means that when the page is refreshed, the previously displayed materials changes.

The font used on the website and its size are considerably legible for reading. The SCCP website uses size 11 of Omnes-pro font for its writings.

Security

It was observed that the SCCP website is not a secured (encrypted) website. Visitors to the site can obtain passwords and log-in information that allows them access to contents that are otherwise not accessible to visitors to the website.
Structure and Usability

Structurally, the SCCP website looks defective. The Menus are a bit clumsy and complicated for visitors to navigate. Menu sections and subsections information do not really correlate. For example, when users click on the ‘Organisations’ section, the website redirects to ‘Discover Useful Resources’ page which is in direct contrast with the term ‘organisations’. Also, to get information about organisations that support the SCCP, users need to leave the cursor on the Organisation menu before it displays the two submenus: ‘government departments’ and ‘other organisations’. This is a bit confusing.

In addition, five of the eight menu sections have different subsections that can otherwise be merged under few section names to ease the burden of spending so much time to search and find information that users are interested in. Furthermore, as observed, the availability of the ‘search link’ seem not to help users in easily and timely finding relevant information.

In comparison to other similar websites, for example, the website of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), it is clear that the SCCP website is at best unorganised and user-unfriendly. With 5 menu sections, the ICSR website can easily and timely serve the purpose it was created to fulfil. On the other hand, the SCCP with 8-9 sections (depending on either you are a visitor or a log-in user) and 20 subsections perform its functions in a complicated and inefficient manner. In summary, the website is difficult to navigate and search for relevant information.

Apart from the SCCP website’s complexity, the loading speed was also tested using Google Page Speed Insights. The result of the site’s speed test shows that the loading speed of the website is 53/100 when it is accessed from a desktop computer while the speed reduces to 43/100 when it is accessed through mobile phones. Interestingly, the loading speed of the SCCP website is faster than that of the ICSR website which loads at a speed of 39/100 on both mobile phones and desktop computers. However, variations in network provider’s download speed perhaps affect the loading speed of both the SCCP and ICSR websites when tested. The SCCP website was launched on both Google Chrome and Internet Explorer browsers without any impediment. It was noted that Universities UK operates the SCCP website while its management is carried out by Webstars.

On the whole, there are adjustments that need to be made to make the SCCP website more accessibly effective and informative.
5.2 The Student’s Survey

The students’ survey was conducted to understand students’ opinion on adopting a counter-radicalisation programme for HEIs in Finland similar to that of the UK. It also reflects students’ perception of general safety and security in HEIs in Finland and their opinion on the potential for Finnish HEIs to serve as recruitment centres for extremists and violent radicals.

In all, 11 respondents answered the online questionnaire while 35 respondents answered the hardcopy questionnaire bringing the total number of respondents to 46.
The below table shows the result from 46 respondents (students) of the questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS</th>
<th>ANSWERS</th>
<th>NO OF RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think teachers should be responsible for observing students in Finland for signs of violent extremism?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think Finnish HEIs can serve as recruitment places for extremists?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you approve an enactment of a national law in Finland that mandates all HEI managers to set-up programmes to prevent violent extremism in their institutions?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should HEIs in Finland have programmes in place to specifically prevent violent extremism?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you as a student approve programmes aimed at preventing violent extremism in your HEI of learning?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should HEIs have offices for students in need of assistance from violent extremism-related issues</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you at any time observed signs of extremism in a fellow student?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you at all times feel safe and confident that Finnish institutions cannot be targets for attacks?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Student Survey Result Table
As can be seen in the table above, respondents opinion are evenly divided on whether teachers should be responsible for monitoring their students for signs of violent extremism in Finland or not. This suggests the topic remain a controversial issue among students. Aside from the responsibility issue, a considerable number of respondents (14 out of 46) believe that HEIs in Finland can serve as recruitment grounds for radicals, a slightly higher numbers (15 out of 46) believe Finnish HEIs do not serve as recruitment grounds. However, the majority of the respondents (16 out of 46) are unsure whether Finnish HEIs can serve as recruitment grounds for radicals or not.

While most respondents (28 out of 46) are in support of a national law that makes it the duty of school administrators to have counter-radicalisation programmes in their schools, others (10 out of 46) do not support such idea while a lower number of respondents (8 out of 46) remain indecisive.

Another important survey result comes from whether respondents have seen signs of extremism in other students. Most respondents (37 out of 46) believe they have never seen signs that may suggest extremism in other students, however, a notable (6 out of 46) number of respondents believe they have seen such signs in fellow students. Interestingly, a significant number of respondents (14 out of 46) are of the opinion that the Finnish HEIs are not ‘attack-proof’ and can be targeted for attacks by violent radicals or extremists while half of the respondents (23) are of the opinion that Finnish HEIs are safe at all times.

Generally, the results from the survey questions reveal substantially (considering the number of respondents), the opinions and feelings of students with regard to violent radicalisation in HEIs and the role the law and teachers/lecturers can play in its prevention. However, the reliability of the survey cannot be assured due to the fact that respondents cannot be guaranteed to be genuine students albeit they were approached within the premises of a University of Applied Sciences.

Secondly, there is no guarantee that respondents expressed their true opinions on the questions, neither are there any assurance that they indeed understood the questions correctly. Thirdly, the opinions of 46 respondents who were mainly approached in a Finnish University of Applied sciences, cannot be said to be valid enough to make a definitive conclusion due to the questionnaire’s limited demographic reach.

These sentiments, as expressed by students is also of particular concern to the Finnish government. In recent time, the Finnish government has taken some measures aimed at combating radicalisation and violent extremism in Finland, particularly in Finnish schools as will be discussed below.
The Finnish Ministry of the Interior defines violent extremism as the encouragement, justification, threat or the use of violence based on either an individual’s way of viewing the world or on his/her ideological views. The Finnish government believes ‘specific measures’ must be taken and implemented in order for the programmes to prevent violent radicalisation to be successful (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 5).

Such measures, according to the Ministry of the Interior, involve proper coordination of prevention programmes, rightful dissemination of best practices standards, launching of RADINET - an exit programme for violent radicals, launching of helpline services for the relatives and friends of radicalised individuals, promotion of the works of organisations in the prevention of violent radicalisation, increasing competencies, awareness and skills in the prevention of violent radicalisation, detection and investigation of hate crimes and supporting the victims, prevention of violent radicalisation among asylum seekers, balancing communications for the prevention of violent radicalisation, training the youths to identify and disregard propaganda and violent-supporting messages, specifying police responsibilities and developing techniques for the prevention of all forms of violent radicalisation and extremism (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 19-28).

As a global phenomenon, the Finnish government recognises that the threat from terrorism is not limited to a particular country or region, it affects all countries around the world including Finland.

In 2014, Suojelupoliisi (Supo), the Finnish Security Intelligence Service claimed that Islamic extremists pose one of the most significant threats to Finland and that such threats mainly come from individuals who are sympathetic to Islamist organisations in Syria and Iraq. In the same year, it was reported that six Somali women travelled to Syria from Sweden, a neighbouring country, with the aim of joining the rebels in ousting the Syrian President (Helsinki Times 2014).

These revelations and events show that the threats from extremism within the Nordic region may largely be due to individuals who become violently radicalised as a result of travelling to countries where Islamists are waging war against the governments.

In recent history, there have been three public fatal attacks in Finland. In November 2007, an 18-year-old man, Pekka-Eric Auvinen shot and killed 8 persons at a school in Jokela before killing himself. Ten months after the incident, a 22-year-old Hospitality Management student of Seinajoki University of Applied Sciences, Matti Juhani Saari, shot dead 10 students before
shooting himself dead. In December of 2009, Ibrahim Shkupolli, shot dead five persons including his girlfriend before shooting himself dead (Gabbatt 2009; Murderpedia n.d.)

In another development, two individuals, a male and a female were in June 2014 jailed by the District Court of Helsinki for planning to commit mass killings at the University of Helsinki. Although the motive behind their plan was unknown, it was revealed that the culprits were inspired by the Boston Marathon bombings of 2013 (Salomaa & Teivainen 2014).

In spite of the fact that the reasons behind these shootings may not be fully understood, they cannot be categorically referred to as terrorist acts. They, however, raise concerns about public safety in Finland and in Finnish schools.

The Soufan Group (TSG) in 2015 (8) released a report which shows that 70 individuals have left Finland to join ISIS as at August 2015. Out of this figure, it was reported that more than 25 have returned to Finland.

Supo, Finland’s intelligence service also revealed that 20 people returned to Finland within the same period during the previous year. The agency added that half of those recruited in Finland by ISIS have lived in Finland all their lives while two third of these recruits possess Finnish citizenship (Yle 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official figures</th>
<th>Last updated</th>
<th>Unofficial estimate</th>
<th>TSG 2014 report</th>
<th>Returnees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td>70-100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: The Soufan Group (TSG) Foreign Fighters 2015 Report.

The effects of the Syrian conflict, fatal shooting incidents and the issue of foreign fighters returning to Finland, coupled with the influx of refugees into Europe (which may have helped extremists to travel undetected) may have contributed to the development of a National Action Plan to prevent violent extremism and its attendant consequences in Finland.

6.1 Legislations against Terror-Related Offences in Finland

The Criminal Code of Finland captures offences that are related to or regarded as terrorism offences. According to the Act, an individual is regarded as having a ‘terrorist intent’ if he/she has the intention of creating fear among the Finnish people by unlawfully forcing or destabilising any arm of the government, the constitution or finance institutions of Finland (Ministry of Justice, Finland n.d.).
Chapter 34(a), section 1-8 of the Code (17/2003) details offences and sentences specifically regarded as terrorist acts in the Act. Some of such offences include, recruiting for terrorist purposes, making unlawful threats, intentionally possessing explosives, aggravated assault, murder, mass killings, homicide, coordinating a terrorist group, financing or giving legal advice to a terrorist group, providing training to terrorists, being in possession of explosives and explosive materials, among other similar acts stated in the Act (Ministry of Justice, Finland n.d.).

Apart from the Criminal Code Act, the Police Act (872/2011) and the Coercive Measures Act (806/2011) also gives security agencies additional powers to effectively carry out their duties. The Police Act (872/2011), for example, in Chapter 2, Section 6, permits the police to access public and private properties. It also gives the police the power to search (section 12, 13 supports searching) people in critical situations. Chapter 5 of the Act gives the police the right to use clandestine means to gather information on serious offences including terrorism and related offences specified in Chapter 34A of the Criminal Code Act (Ministry of the Interior, Finland n.d.).

To aid security agencies work, Chapter 2 of the Coercive Measures Act (806/2011) gives the police the right to apprehend and remand terrorism suspects while Chapter 6 of the Act allows the police to ban terrorist suspects from travelling. Additionally, Chapter 6 of the Coercive Measures Act permits the police to seize materials or properties for security reasons including that of terrorism. Other powers (Chapter 9) include the right to use compelling means to retrieve information from suspects and covertly persuading suspects for reasons of special investigation purposes and terrorism-related offences to divulge needed information (Chapter 10) (Ministry of Justice, Finland n.d.).

6.2 The National Action Plan

The Finnish National Action Plan for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism was concluded in 2012 but updated and approved in April 2016. The plan was created to render assistance to the Ministry of the Interior of Finland in the coordination of the prevention programmes for radicalisation at the national level.

The objective of the Action Plan is to guarantee the existence of a permanent structure and capability for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation throughout Finland (Ministry of the Interior n.d.).
The Finnish government believes that the problems related to social issues, such as poor upbringing, lack of social well-being and cohesion, discrimination, integration issues, lack of education or poor education can all contribute to the development of extremism or violent radicalisation in Finland (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 13).

There are different actors that the Action Plan rely upon to achieve all of its objectives in the different sectors stated in the Plan. They are policy makers, social workers, the police, education stakeholders, healthcare practitioners, youth workers, social service workers, religious leaders, non-governmental organisations and the local communities (Ministry of the Interior n.d.).

The Action Plan emphasises the importance of the education sector in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The Plan recommends that teachers should monitor their student’s wellbeing and social participation at different levels of study in order to improve general security and safety around schools. As professionals in the education sector, teachers are expected to improve student’s skills and ability to process public information with open minds and also assist them on how to engage and participate in decision-making activities without the use of violence (Ministry of the Interior 2016, 17).

6.3 Training of Teachers

As pointed out in the National Action Plan, teachers are expected to always observe and correctly guide their students away from violent extremism. In achieving this, the Finnish government has concluded plans to use the police in the training of education sector professionals in order to assist them in identifying students that are vulnerable to radicalisation or those that show signs of violent radicalisation and extremism through proper observation (Yle 2016).

The training programme which is expected to be voluntary is scheduled to begin in 2017, however, a pilot project has already been conducted in some parts of Finland. It is expected that only senior school officials will be enrolled for the programme. These trained senior officials will later be tasked with the training of other members of their institutions (Yle 2016).

From the series of measures taken by the Finnish government, it is clear that the government has recognised the threats and problems posed by extremism and violent radicalisation in Europe and the Nordic region and has taken series of measures to prevent their spread within Finnish societies. It, however, remains to be seen how these measures will be perceived by
different groups, particular the minority groups, and how these measures impact in the fight against violent radicalisation.

7 Challenges

Radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation studies are an emerging field of study. They are broad, diverse and can have inconclusive and controversial research results. Also, there are limited scholarly books and articles that directly and comprehensively discuss counter-radicalisation. Many of the research works focus on case studies from countries that have initiated one form of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation programmes or another. This makes it difficult to get a general perspective on counter-radicalisation studies and policies from research scholars.

There are also challenges of getting the English versions of the Finnish Laws. Where available, the English translated copies of the laws are only admissible in the Finnish language. By implication, it means that the English translations of these documents that are referenced in this write-up may not necessarily provide the accurate translations to the quoted Acts.

Another challenge faced was getting approval for the survey questionnaire on time due to administrative and safety-related issues. The thesis report was delayed for some time while awaiting approval or the survey questions from the Research and Development Services office.

Also of a challenge is getting students to fill questionnaires particularly the online questionnaires. Some students procrastinate and end up not filling it at all. Hard copies of the questionnaires proved a better alternative in this regard due to the fact that they are easy to distribute and easier to retrieve after filling. However, analysing the results of the hardcopy questionnaires proved more challenging and time-consuming.
Conclusions

The definitions of violent radicalisation and extremism by different governments have noticeable keywords that may have largely been influenced by their way of life and/or local politics. For example, the UK government is of the opinion that radicalisation has to do with activities that are against British ‘fundamental values’ and regards extremism as ‘unacceptable behaviours’ while the Australian Government thinks ‘unconventional beliefs’ cannot be regarded as radicalisation as long as they do not promote violence. The former definition is equivocal while the latter is more explicit in terms of interpretation.

In addition, some country’s counter-radicalisation programmes focus attention on preventing violent radicalisation by profiling specific set of individuals or communities while many scholars and researchers focus on understanding the state of minds of radical individual’s and the impact their immediate environment plays in their radicalisation process. Scholars are more holistic in their approach to counter-radicalisation while it seems governments prefer shorter but ineffective routes to counter-radicalisation.

Also, from the research works analysed and from the different scholarly books and articles read, it is clear that there are no definitive paths that lead to violent radicalisation. Thus, it is hard to create specific profiles or counter-radicalisation programmes for violent radicals, extremists or terrorists. Even among scholars, there is no consensus on the process that leads to violent extremism. However, one thing that is clear and agreed upon by many of the scholars is that radicalisation, violent radicalisation or extremism is a ‘process’ that needs an ideology or a certain belief to thrive. It was understood that violent ideologies or beliefs are mostly fuelled by grievances of different nature and in order to counter these ideologies and beliefs, the process that leads to them must first be studied and understood.

Apart from grievances against the state, it was noted that thoughts of changing the governance system a country, perhaps as a result of perceived corruption or bad governance can also lead to violent radicalisation and terrorism.

Presently, the issue of violent radicals’ state of mind remains inconclusive. While some researchers believe depression and mental instability may contribute to violent extremism, others have argued that majority of extremists are rational. I believe that mental instability is one factor in the radicalisation process, however, it seems that this factor contributes insignificantly to many of the cases of violent extremists studied over the years by researchers.
Of importance is the fact that what some potential extremists perceive to be grievances against their community or country may be wished away by others, and what lead some individuals to violent radicalisation do not necessarily lead others to it. This, I consider an area of interest for future research.

The SCCP under the Prevent Strategy has made significant progress in the prevention of violent radicalisation in HEIs in the UK. This is in spite of its criticisms by concerned professionals in the education sector. These concerns should be looked into to further strengthen the effectiveness of the programme and restore confidence in its acceptability by all concerned stakeholders.

In Finland, the Finnish government appears to understand the threats posed by violent radicalisation in the society and has initiated a national programme to prevent the factors that lead to it in all aspects of its residents’ daily life, including the education sector. This is to be achieved through the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism in Finland.

Apart from the fact that the result of the student survey conducted shows that majority of the respondents (60.9%) support an enactment of a national law in Finland that is similar to that of the UK’s Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 that encompasses the Prevent Strategy which empowers HEI managers to prevent violent radicalisation in their institutions, a significant number of respondents (30.4%) are also of the opinion that the Finnish HEIs are not ‘attack-proof’ and can be targeted for attacks by violent radicals or extremists.

Interestingly, unlike in the UK where university professors, managers and student groups are against the Prevent Strategy programme in HEIs for fear of the programme’s subversion of the freedom of speech that students enjoy, teachers/lecturers in Finland have so far not objected to the training programme being organised by the government to train them. Perhaps, this is due to their different approaches.
General Observations and Recommendations

Firstly, government definitions that are related to violent radicalisation, extremism and/or terrorism should be defined objectively and unambiguously, and in a language that a layman can understand. Also, such definitions should be devoid of appeals to political interests or narratives. This is to allow for anti- and counter-radicalisation programmes to be carried out effectively without political, religious or cultural influences, and also to give credibility to such programmes.

From the different researches that were read and analysed, one point was clear, violent radicalisation or extremism is a process that differs from individual to individual. For this reason, any strategy, programme, plan or approach designed to prevent violent radicalisation should be tailored towards understanding the factors and root causes of violent radicalisation in individuals. For example, this can be achieved by interviewing de-radicalised individuals to get an insight into why they transformed from using non-violent approaches to using violence as a means of agitation.

From my understanding of the several research works on counter-radicalisation, introducing a general strategy to counter radicalisation may at best be controversial and ineffective, and at worst, counter-productive.

Training of the actors (those responsible for detecting and preventing violent radicalisation in students of HEIs) with the required skills and knowledge is also essential. This is because, to be successful with counter-radicalisation programmes, individuals tasked with preventing violent radicalisation must have the needed qualifications, experience, right attitude towards work, good motivation and commitment that can allow them to carry out their tasks as expected so that they can be able to instil confidence in their students and assure them that the true intentions (objectives) of the programme are not to spy or gather intelligence but to prevent violent radicalisation in HEI environments and to ensure that campuses are safe not just for the students, but also teaching and non-teaching staff, visitors and study purposes.

To ensure that professional training is constantly given to these actors, the government must address the issue of lack of funding for universities and colleges staff in order not to disrupt or discontinue training programmes that are meant to empower HEI authorities.

The Muslim communities in the UK should also through their various associations be assured by the government that the Prevent Strategy was not set-up to ‘snoop’ on their private life but to ensure the prevention of violent radicalisation in the whole of the UK without specifically targeting a particular group for intelligence gathering, persecution or unjust
prosecution. This initiative can be achieved by involving influential Islamic organisations like the neglected Islamic Society of Britain, Muslim Association of Britain and, the Muslim Council of Britain in the Prevention Strategy programme. Influential Muslim clerics and leaders should also be involved. These leaders can be encouraged to preach and propagate the benefits of the Prevent Strategy to their followers and also allay fears that the government is specifically targeting Muslim communities for spying purposes but that the programme’s aim is to prevent violent radicalisation in the whole of UK.

Such awareness programme can also be adopted in university campuses in the UK. Leaders of different organisations, particularly Muslim student’s organisations should be actively involved in the Prevent Strategy. This is to assure some of these organisations that the SCCP, an arm of the Prevent Strategy is not directed towards witch-hunting, intimidating or discriminating against Muslim students but to ensure university environments are safe for learning and devoid of recruitments by violent radicals.

In addition to these, good communications and interrelationships among different authorities tasked with various responsibilities under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act must be developed and encouraged in order to ensure that the Prevent Duties stipulated in the Act are effectively delivered. Furthermore, universities, colleges and local authorities like the police should be encouraged to work together to prevent violent radicalisation in universities, colleges and the general society.

It also appears that the UK government failed to carry HEI managers along before proposing the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to the parliament. This, perhaps, led over 500 professors from different UK universities to protest against the Act in The Guardian Newspaper. The government needs to create awareness programmes that can be used to educate HEI managers on the aims, objectives and benefits of the Prevent Strategy programme. The government should also state clearly the responsibilities of HEI managers in achieving the Prevent Strategy goals. This is in addition to guaranteeing that the Act was not formulated to water down the freedom of speech of students, the openness or the free-thinking nature HEIs enjoy. The government should also assure HEIs managers that the law does not discourage debates of controversial issues that are not regarded as demeaning or inciting violence towards minority groups as expressed in the Act.

Relatively, distinctions should be made between students’ freedom of speech and speeches that incite discrimination or violence.
The Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) Website

The structure of the SCCP website needs to be redesigned, reorganised and updated to make its navigation and use more effective and informative. There are excessive menu sections and subsections that can mislead and waste the time of the website visitors. Some of these sections and subsections can be merged to reduce surfing time and increase delivery and effectiveness of the SCCP website. For example, the Resources menu can contain all relevant and up-to-date materials about researches and findings associated with violent radicalisation and Safe Campus Communities Programme (SCCP) without repeating such in other menus.

Additionally, easily understood and straightforward names should also be given to the main menu lists. Also, the maximum number of menu sections on the SCCP website should not be allowed to exceed five to reduce the unnecessarily wasted time on the website.

Apart from this, the search link should be made to be robust enough to suggest similar topics that could not be found on the website. In addition, the loading speed of the SCCP should be increased on both desktop computers and mobile phones. Loading speed of 53/100 on desktop and 43/100 on mobile phones cannot be said to be impressive or satisfactory.

The Contact link on the SCCP should be updated to include contact details like the phone numbers, e-mails or contact addresses of the officials or managers of the programme that can be contacted for inquiries, complaints or feedbacks about the website or the SCCP.

Aside from the Contact link, the Resources section on the website also need to be updated to include valuable and relevant information for students and visitors about violent radicalisation, the factors that lead to it and the different ways to prevent it. Presently, most of the materials on the website focuses on information that largely serves as a guide to HEI managers.

Security of the SCCP website should be prioritised and improved. The ability of visitors to obtain passwords and log-in details despite warnings and supposed restrictions on the website is unbelievable and poses information exposure risks to the personal details of HEI managers in UK universities and colleges.

In general, the SCCP website should be periodically assessed to allow for its conformity to the deliverables it was created to serve, and updates should always be provided to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the website.
Improving the effectiveness of the counter-radicalisation programmes in Finnish HEIs.

Impressively, there have been series of measures that the Finnish government has taken in order to prevent violent radicalisation in Finnish societies, and in particular Finnish schools. However, in order not to encounter the pitfalls associated with the UK Counter-Terrorism Act of 2015 which encompasses the Prevent Strategy under which the SCCP falls, the Finnish government must, apart from making laws (Criminal Code, Police Act and Coercive Measures Act of Finland) to prevent and dissuade terrorism, should create awareness about the benefits of the National Action Plan on the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism to all Finnish residents irrespective of religion, race, culture or political affiliations.

Instilling confidence in the public about the apolitical, unbiased and indiscriminate nature of the programme will serve as a solid foundation for the success of the National Action Plan. In addition to the actors captured in the Plan, human rights organisations, HEI managers and student union leaders should also be actively involved in the Plan to make it acceptable and far reaching to different groups.

Although there have been no established concrete reasons why assailants have attacked HEIs in Finland in the past, there is the need for improved safety awareness programmes for students in HEIs in Finland. Orientations about general safety rules and actions that can be taken in case of emergencies should be given to new and old students at regular intervals so that students can develop proper natural responses to unfortunate and unforeseen situations. Furthermore, there should be information system mechanisms in place to monitor and deny students the access to online materials that teaches, promotes or propagates the incitement of violence or terrorism. HEI study rooms should also be allocated based on a booking process that identifies the booking student, duration of use and the purpose for booking.

Training of religious leaders and teachers at all levels of education should be regarded as the most important mandate of the National Action Plan. Teachers, aside from parents are the first contacts that children have, thus, there is the need to recruit qualified teachers and equip them with the relevant trainings and skills to be able to identify real signs of [violent] radicalisation in their pupils, be able to neutralise these ideologies and also be able to identify when such cases should be transferred to higher authorities, for example, the police if their interventions fail.

In the National Action Plan, the police are expected to train teachers. I will suggest experts in the field of counter-radicalisation from HEIs and reputable organisations should be tasked with such responsibilities to avoid speculations of intelligence gathering or spying on minority and certain religious groups. To add to this, counter-radicalisation training for specific HEI
managers and practitioners should be made to be mandatory and not voluntary as revealed in
the Plan. This is to inculcate the culture of awareness and prevention [of all forms of violent
radicalisation] into Finnish HEI managers and staff.

Finally, the aim of the National Action Plan is to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism
and not to allow individuals to cross the line of peace to violent agitation. In achieving this,
the social well-being of children should be given the required attention. Additionally,
discrimination, persecution and illiteracy should be discouraged, particularly among minority
groups.

10 Future Research

In the course of this research work, some certain questions come to mind and others were
raised by researchers in the field of counter-radicalisation. Some of these questions are:

1. Why do some radicalised individuals resort to violence while others do not?

2. Some of the factors that lead to violent radicalisation and terrorism in some
individuals also happen to a larger number of the population, why do few members
resort to terrorism?

3. Does racism or discrimination (of different sorts) lead or speed up the process that
leads to violent radicalisation?
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