The Role of Universities of Applied Sciences in Combating Online Radicalisation

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Radicalisation has gained worldwide attention in both academia and the political spectrum. With the advent of ICT, radicalisers have kept abreast with the trend and have resorted to propagating their messages virtually to reach even the remotest part of the world. Social media has now become a major dumping place for hate speeches and radical messages and most students are very active on social media in their quest to gain knowledge accessing their schools’ internet resources thus making them vulnerable. This study therefore seeks to establish what the Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland are doing to prevent the misuse of the IT infrastructure especially the internet provided to students for learning. The specific objectives are, to find out what kind of IT infrastructure UAS provide for their students, ascertain whether there are restrictions to what kind of contents are allowed for the students using the IT resources of the school, ascertain whether the school monitors the use of the IT infrastructure provided to students, to find out whether there have incidents of violations to those restrictions set by the schools with regards to the display of what content is permitted by the schools, to identify the limitations of the schools towards enforcing the restrictions of the display of contents forbidding by the schools and to find out whether the schools have ever punished any student for flouting those restrictions.

Questionnaires were mainly used to secure information from the student respondents. Forty questionnaires were administered to students of some Universities of Applied Sciences. The questionnaires were designed using both opened ended and closed ended questions and were randomly administered. The IT policies of 10 universities across the world were also examined in detail.

With the analysis done from the field work and information gathered from the review of literature indicate that, the conclusion of the study indicate that the internet plays a significant role in online radicalisation due to the use of the internet especially social media in propagating the messages of radical groups. The study also indicated that, students are exposed to radicalised materials due to the fact that, they make maximum use of the internet in their quest to seek knowledge.

It was recommended from the findings that, the Universities of Applied Sciences must collaborate with social media organisations to train staff of the IT departments to spot and remove all hate speeches and radicalised materials on their internet resources provided to students. Students must constantly be conscientise about the modus operandi of radical groups using the internet.

Keywords: radicalisation, online radicalisation, de-radicalisation, netizen, social media.
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1 Introduction

Finland is one of the well established democracies in the world. According to Willige (2017) of the Economic Forum, Finland placed 9th on the index of the world’s strongest democracies in 2016. People are encouraged to openly express their ideals and beliefs be it political, religious or ideological. The worrying part of this is when individuals begin to advocate or use violence to achieve their political and or religious objectives. However, only a minute fraction of the population of about 5.4 million may engage in violence to promote their cause. Indeed, those who may engage in violence might have gone through the process of radicalisation.

Finland has about twenty-six universities of Applied Sciences nation wide providing various educational disciplines. Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland provide their students with internet access to enhance their studies. As the internet is well known for its borderless nature, monitoring the use of the internet resources accessed by students by the universities may be practically challenging to achieve. Henceforth, students may be exposed to radical campaigns by radical organisations whose main tool for propagating their ideas is through the internet.

1.1 Background

Radicalisation has become a hot issue globally. The concept of radicalisation has evolved from offline to online radicalisation. Extremist groups now engage and recruit prospective members more on the internet than by physical contact. Recently, social media has become a very powerful tool in the recruitment drive. A click of a button of recruiters in Syria or Iraq can go as far as Alaska to influence most young people to buy into the ideology of that extremist group. Richard Barrett (2014) supports this point in a report published by the Soufan group and gave an account of a Dutch Jihadist, Yilmaz who is noted for posting updates about the life in Syria and also responds to questions from potential Jihadists on the social media Kik, Tumblr and ask.fm. Richard Barrett (2014, p17) asserted that, recruiters usually portray welcoming and reassuring images of their bases and address the fear of unfamiliar circumstances of life fighting in Syria. Below are some of the social media posts captured by the United Kingdom Home Office of radical groups

Facebook: “I might be only 18 but I know coming to Shaam (Syria) the best decision, staying in the UK completely diminishes your Islam”

Question on ask.fm: “Do you speak Arabic? If you don’t, how are you learning”?
Answer on ask.fm: “When I came, I only knew a few words but slowly you pick up the language. This isn’t a concern at all”.

Twitter: “Deactivating twitter for good. Sisters, if you need advice kik me. Don’t dm me. Females only. Kik me but be careful”.

Recent events have seen young people, including students being radicalised via social media and influencing them to make the journey to the bases of the radical groups. In 2014, Shannon Conley, a nineteen year old American was arrested at Denver International Airport as she was trying to make the journey to Syria. Conley told the FBI she had recently converted to Islam and become radicalised via social media that was where she met a purported Islamic State fighter and had agreed to marry and was trying to travel to meet with (Robert Siegel, NPR, 2014). Others even undertake the orders of extremist groups via the internet to engage in violent activities in their native countries. This trend has far reaching consequences since those new recruits may influence their colleagues or schoolmates in their respective countries towards being radicalised.

The Internet has largely been recognised as a major medium of information and a vehicle driving a collaborative interaction between individuals and their computerised devices without geographical limitations. According to www.internetlivestats.com, the world has a total of over 3.5 billion of Internet users representing about 46% of the entire population of the world. What this means is that, the number of Internet users have increased tremendously compared to the year 2000 which was 414,794,957 representing about 6.8% of the world’s population (www.internetlivestats.com). With regards to social media platforms, according to Daniel Sparks (2017) facebook with 1.9 billion users tops the 10 major social media networks in 2017. Whatsapp network followed with 1.2 billion, Facebook Messenger 1.2 billion, Wechat 87700, QQ 86900, Instagram 70000, Qzone, Twitter and Weiber have 63000, 32800 and 31300 users respectively. According to Dave Chaffey (2017) a research done by ComScore Media Metrix revealed that 90% of social media audiences fall within the age range of 18 to 34. What the above means is that, young people are increasingly becoming technologically literate thus are exposed to radical information. Henceforth, unscrupulous scouts of radical groups could lure vulnerable young people to become radicalised.

Nonetheless, the Internet has become part of our daily lives. It provides users with a wide array of opportunities that benefit them in their various endeavours. It is imperative to note that, in order to prepare students to achieve their goals of fitting well in life is the ability to search and evaluate pieces of information relevant to their studies. In the process of learning, the student learns the rudiments of email and the use of the various search engines to source for information. Students also use the Internet via school portals to interact with teachers and other students, access study materials and submit assignments. A current phenomenon

has been the introduction of online studies by higher learning institutions where tuition is provided online irrespective of the location of the student. All these have enhanced learning and equipped students with the necessary tools towards accessing information at their disposal.

1.2 Problem Statement
People do not engage in radicalisation without a motive behind their actions and information plays a vital role in shaping the beliefs and ideologies of people. The Internet is a key component of information dissemination. There are tonnes and tonnes of information on the Internet serving the needs of information seekers. And radicalisation can be facilitated through the internet to reach the prospective audiences. Students, on a daily basis make use of the Internet to aid their learning experience. The challenge here is how they use their schools’ IT infrastructure without disregarding certain protocols that could lead to being influenced by radical groups to become radicalised.

1.3 Research Questions
The research questions were derived from the research problem statement and are as follows:

1. Why are young people becoming radicalised online?
2. How are young people especially students radicalised online?
3. What are institutions such as governments, universities and media doing to combat online radicalisation?

The above questions will be answered by relying on the existing literature on online radicalisation and analysis from the information to be sought from Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland.

1.4 Objectives of the study
The general objective of the study is to gain knowledge into what the universities of Applied Sciences in Finland are doing to prevent the misuse of the IT infrastructure provided to students for learning so as to avoid being radicalised online. The Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland were chosen because, young persons who are active on the internet and are exposed to radical materials online are students in higher learning institutions such as the Universities of Applied Sciences. The specific objectives are to:

- Find out what kind of IT infrastructure Universities of Applied Sciences provide for students.
- Look into whether there are restrictions to what kind of contents are allowed for the students using the IT services of the school.
• Investigate whether the schools monitor the use of the IT infrastructure provided to students.
• To gain insight into whether there have been incidents of violations to those restrictions set by the schools with regards to the display of what contents are permitted.
• Identify the limitations of the schools towards enforcing the restrictions of the display of contents forbidding by the schools.
• Find out whether the schools have ever punished any student for flouting those restrictions.

1.5 Significance of the study
The study will help identify the various IT resources Universities of Applied Sciences provide for students. This will bring to bear information on the IT services the universities provide for students.

This work will identify the challenges that Universities of Applied Sciences face with regards to the implementation of the established IT policies to regulate the use of the internet resources of the schools.

Students knowledge of the IT guidelines of their universities will be brought to bear after the end of this work. This will enable the universities to know if students have knowledge and understand the IT guidelines or not.

Students’ perspective on the role of the internet in online radicalisation of the youth will be investigated. This work will also reveal whether students are exposed to radicalised materials online. This will enable to conscientise students how to identify and what to do when they are exposed to radicalised materials.

The study will also bring to light how governments and other organisations such as social media help to counter online radicalisation. Key examples of governmental efforts of other countries in tackling online radicalisation will be highlighted in this work. This will serve as a learning example to the Finnish government.

1.6 Organisation of the study
The study is made up of five chapters. Each chapter focuses on specific issues of concern. The first chapter deals with the introduction of the study, the statement of the problem, research questions, the objectives of the study, the significance of the study as well as the organisation of the study.
The second chapter reviewed the relevant literature in the field of the study. The sections under this chapter include: defining the terms: radicalisation and de-radicalisation, the essence of online radicalisation among the youth, how young people especially students become radicalised online, Countering online radicalisation by governments and social media organisations.

The third chapter explains the methods and procedures the researcher used to collect data for the study. The chapter involves, the sample size, sample techniques, instruments for data collection, field work, response rate as well as the limitations of the study.

The fourth chapter presents the analysis of the data collected. This is based on the fact that the soundness of the study is judged by the data on which it is based and the interpretation given. This chapter presents data in detail with simple statistical tools such as tables and percentages used in the analysis. The study gathered information from students and IT policies of universities across the world.

Chapter five deals with a discussion of the findings and connecting it to the research questions. The aim of the discussion phase was to ascertain whether the research questions have been answered per the findings.

The last chapter brings a closure to the study with conclusion remarks and provision of recommendations concerning the field of study.
2 Literature review

This section gives an account of the existing literature with regards to the role of the University of Applied Sciences in combating online radicalisation. The literature reviewed in this section are of relevance to the research topic being under study. Specific areas considered include: defining the terms radicalisation, online radicalisation, offline radicalisation and deradicalisation, the essence of online radicalisation among the youth, how young people especially students become radicalised online and countering online radicalisation by governments and social media organisations.

2.1 Defining the terms: radicalisation both online and offline radicalisation and de-radicalisation

In order to understand the concept of online radicalisation, it is important to define certain terms that are associated with it. The term radicalisation emerged into the academic discussions in Europe in the aftermath of the bombing in both Madrid (2004) and London (2005). Policymakers decided to coin the term radicalisation and since then, it has become a jargon used by both policymakers and academics. Aurun Kundnani (2009) agrees with this assertion and further stated that, since 2004, the term radicalisation has become central to terrorism studies and counter terrorism policymaking. However, defining the term radicalisation is a frustrating process and when even defined, lacks precision. To buttress the point made by Kundnani, Alex P. Schmid (2013) is of the view that, if the very concept of radicalisation itself is problematic, the same must by extension, also be true for de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation. This means that, the deferent opinions with regards to the definition and understanding of the term radicalisation may affect the de-radicalisation efforts of politicians and policymakers in arresting the issue of radicalisation. Below are some definitions of radicalisation as defined by some scholars and governments.

*According to the Australian government (), radicalisation happens when a person’s thinking and behaviour become significantly different from how most of the members of their soceity and community view social issues and participate politically.*

*The United Kingdom government also defines radicalisation as the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism (Prevent strategy, Home Office 2011).*

*According to schmid (2011:217), radicalisation studies the approach the field of extremism and terrorism by focusing on the processes through which individuals become socialised into engaging in political violence without moral restraints.*

*On the other hand Dela Porta and Lafree (2012) stated that, radicalisation may more...*
profitably be analysed as a process of interaction between violent groups and their environment, or an effect of interactions between mutually hostile actors.

For the purpose of this study, I shall rely on the definition given by Angus (2009). According to Angus (2009), the term radicalisation is the process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward extreme views. I relied on the definition given by Angus (2009) because the beliefs and ideologies as used in the definition may be political, religious or racial. For instance, the belief system of the Islamic state is religious, whereas the Ku Klux Klan have a racial ideology upon which they spread their message. Also, the ideological message as used in the definition could be introduced to the young people via the internet or offline.

It is instructive to note that, radicalisation may happen either offline or online. According to Omotoyinbo (2014), offline radicalisation is simply a radicalisation that does occur without the intervention of the internet, whiles online radicalisation is thus a radicalisation that happens through the internet: a peculiarly modern process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs so as to make them publicly available and emotively accessible to the populace through the processes of the internet. The reality is that, with the advent of the internet, radicalisation has now gone deep into every fabric of human life.

Two key words worth defining are the internet and online. According to Wikipedia (2017), the internet is the global system of interconnected computer networks that use the internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) to link devices worldwide.

However, online as defined by the Merriam Webster Dictionary (2017), is devices connected to, be served by, or available through a system and especially a computer or telecommunications system such as the internet. The above definitions suggest that computer devices play important role in making sure the internet works.

According to Della Porta and LaFree (2012) the term de-radicalisation can be understood to simply denote the reversal of radicalisation process. They noted that, even more than radicalisation, the concept of de-radicalisation suffers from lack of precision concerning the actual processes involved: often what is meant is the prevention and disruption of radicalisation rather than its reversal and often behavioral and cognitive elements are not clearly identified. The above assertion buttresses the argument made by Schmid (2013) that, if the very concept of radicalisation itself is problematic, the same must by extension, also be true for de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation. The researcher agrees with the above assertions made by the scholars and adds that, it is common knowledge that, when the
principal concept being radicalisation has so many flaws with regards to its definition and subsequent interpretation in practice, measures to counter it are most likely to suffer.

2.2 The essence of online radicalisation among the youth
In our neck of the woods, it is not uncommon to find a certain number of radicals. This however, does not mean all those who show violent tendencies engage in violence to promote their beliefs. There are those who will engage in acts of radicalisation to achieve a just goal which will benefit humanity in a positive way. Borum (2011), supports this point and stated that some people with radical and violent justifications—perhaps even most of them—do not engage in terrorism. Young people do not become radicals overnight. They go through a process that support their beliefs. Scholars, since the latter part of the 1960s have endeavour to attempt to find out the question that most people have in mind about why people come up with strange beliefs and behaviours which support their violent actions towards non-combatant civilians.

According to Borum (2011), early efforts tended predominantly to focus on the individual level, assuming that the aberrant behaviour so prominently associated with the dramatic consequences of terrorism must reflect mental or personality abnormality. Borum (2011) further stated that, this line of thinking prompted some clinical explanations for terrorism and a multitude of attempts to identify a unique terrorist profile. Bakker (2015) in support of the above statement, stated that “[...] moreover, in many the acts committed by terrorists evoke moral outrage. This moral outrage sometimes clouds our ability to form objective judgement of the rationale or mental state of terrorists. Additionally, because such acts are generally strongly condemned, there is a tendency to regard these persons as fundamentally different from the rest of society. Henceforth, most scholars view radicalisation leading to terrorism as dynamic process and have refuted the notion that, people thought to be crazy are engaged in terrorism and have moved past such narrative” (Bakker, 2015)

Several pathways account to the existence of radicalisation and each of the pathways are affected by certain factors. According to Borum (2011), within the developmental or pathway approach, radicalisation is viewed not as a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual towards a commitment to violence over time. In essence no single pathway is applied to every radicalised group. Various groups may have their pathways by which individuals belonging to a group use to become radicalised to engage in either violence or non-violent activity. The question that is central in all these discussions is: how do individuals arrive at adopting violent tendencies or ideologies and either translate them or not into violence. Roy Olivier (2007) in profiling young radicalised Muslims living in Europe, stated that, there is no clear-cut sociological profile of radicals or anything that could link them to a given socio-economic situation. He, further stated that, reasons that may push young people
towards violence are not specific enough but are shared by a larger population that deals with such a situation in a very different way. Henceforth, the assumptions that young people become radicalised simply because of poverty, exclusion, racism and acculturation largely are not enough to determine why people get attracted to violence. Studies have shown that, most of the radicalised groups are a movement with a common goal and one factor that makes young people join those movements is the single element of frustration. These frustrated mostly show their frustrations online because of the anonymous nature of the internet.

Yardi and Boyd (2010) made an interesting observation that, group polarization is a phenomenon both in real world and online contexts when group exposure to debate simply results in the reinforcing of current beliefs in addition to a shift towards a more extreme position. Yardi and Boyd (2010) asserted that, group polarization stems from homophile, where like-minded individuals seek each other out, resulting in a mutual reinforcement of beliefs and opinions. Khader et al (2016) also contend that marginalised and disaffected individuals join interest groups that allow terrorists to specifically target individuals in a manner similar to the way a marketing group would target consumers. From the foregoing, the researcher believes that, young people who may be going through identity crisis could avail themselves to be radicalised. The anonymity that the internet also provides, makes it easy for young people with identity crisis to become radicalised.

2.3 How young people especially students become radicalised online
The obstacles that exist in the physical world have been violated by the emergence of the internet for a certain group of people who engage in acts of radicalisation. The internet has created a situation where individuals can share instant radical messages without any physical touch. This is especially so with women who engage in Islamic Jihadism since it is not permissible for them to meet physically with men who are extremists. The internet therefore provides them with a meeting platform to meet and share radical ideas. Schmidle (2009), supports this assertion and contends that, however, the internet affords them greater anonymity. The anonymity that the internet provides has helped radical groups to send messages out there to the public. Fernandez (2015) contends that, the major elements of what would become the ISIS brand of propaganda, including a focus on Syria, high quality production values, an emphasis on social media networks and appeal to a wider, pan-Islamic and non-arabic speaking audience, all become salient. These high quality videos have gone a long way to persuade young men and women in the West to get involved in violence. In August of 2017, a radicalised Australian Islamic State fighter appeared in a vile new propaganda film encouraging Jihadists to use petrol, nail guns and tracks in the fight against the West (Sam Mcphee, Daily Mail UK, 2017).
Radical groups send appealing messages and the internet accelerates these messages in a bid to radicalise a broader range of young people. Stevens and Neumann (2009) point out that, the internet can be used by extremists to illustrate and reinforce ideological messages and or narratives: through the internet, potential recruits can gain access to visually powerful video and imagery which appear to substantiate the extremists’ political claims. Pantucci (2011) also stated that, the internet is clearly the running theme between most of the plots including in this dataset and it appears to be a very effective tool: it provides a locus in which they can obtain radicalising material. The radical materials available online is overwhelming and the number increases each day. Behr et al. (2013) of the RAND corporation did an illustration of today’s wide-spread availability of material pertinent to extremism and terrorism online and came up with the following results as illustrated below in table 1.

Table 1 Google search for examples of critical key words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Search Term</th>
<th>Number of Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“how to make a bomb”</td>
<td>13000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Salafi publications”</td>
<td>46,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Beheading video”</td>
<td>25700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Behr et al. 2013

The figures above clearly indicate that, the internet has become a useful component in the radicalisation process. It provides information that confirm the beliefs of young people. It also provides a broader platform without borders of likeminded young people who are seeking answers to confirm their beliefs. Similarly, as argued by Pantucci (2011), the prevalence of the internet and the easy availability of extremist materials online have fostered the growth of the autodidactic extremists. The autodidactic extremists are individuals who become radicalised and plan to engage in acts of violence but without any form of connection with radical or terrorist groups Pantucci (2011). The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (no date), tabulated the names of mostly young persons who are thought to have radicalised wholly or partly online and how they became radicalised.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Younis Tsouli</td>
<td>Tsouli joined a number of popular web forums in early 2004 and quickly emerged as the undisputed superstar of ‘jihadism online’. Tsouli and Ifran Rafa spent hundred of hours downloading videos, posting email messages, and chatting on web forums. As a result of these activities and without any prior involvement with extremist groups, both concluded they wanted to participate in a terror attack. They were joined by other online to create a virtual terrorist cell. Both men were arrested by the British authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamaad Munshi</td>
<td>Hamaad Munshi was a 16 years old when he was found guilty of possessing materials that were likely to be used in acts of terrorism in the UK. He collected instructions for making napalm, high explosives and suicide vests, and was a member of a British group of online jihadists who regularly shared extremist videos and spent hours discussing their plans to travel to Pakistan and die as ‘martyrs’. Much of his extremist activism took place online.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Basheer</td>
<td>Abdul Basheer, a Singaporean law graduate was arrested by Singapore’s internal Security Department in February 2007 for attempting to join the Taliban in Afghanistan. He had turned to the internet for answers to his questions on religious and chanced upon radical explanations that resonated with him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Benbrika</td>
<td>The Australian Benbrika group downloaded, collected and distributed extremist material, including videos of hostage beheadings and documents entitled The terrorist’s handbook and White resistance manual that contained recipes for the manufacture of explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human al-Balawi</td>
<td>Human al-Balawi, a Jordanian doctor, started out as an eager online ‘jihobbyist’ and later switched his keyboard for a suicide bomb belt at a CIA base in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arid U. also known as Abu Reyyan</td>
<td>Arid U. killed and attacked US servicemen at Frankfurt airport February 2011. He appears to have been radicalised online, telling police that the spark that led to his action was seeing a video online the night before the attack in which United States soldiers were apparently raping a Muslim girl. He also had a history of playing violent video games online. For weeks for the attack, he had developed a web of digital acquaintances in the Islamist community. Within this network, he wrote about Jihad and listened to lectures at Dawa FFM, a Facebook group he joined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hussein Osman, one of the London bombers, claimed to have been influenced by watching internet video footage of the Iraq conflict and reading about Jihad online.

Various
Preparators of the 2005 Khan AL-Khalili BOMBING IN cairo downloaded bomb-making instructions from a jihadist website.

Aabid Hussein Khan, a 22 year old British Muslim, founded a terrorist cell in the United Kingdom. From the age of 12, he had become an avid fan of anything he could find on the internet relating to jihad and the mujahideen. He discussed these issues in newsgroups and discussion forums. He created an online network of supporters in Europe, Canada, United States, who formed a tightly-knit circle. The cell was broken by British officials in June 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 Names of individuals and how they became radicalised online (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, no date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Preparators of the 2005 Khan AL-Khalili BOMBING IN cairo downloaded bomb-making instructions from a jihadist website.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the advent of social media, radical groups have devised strategies online to get the attention and recruit young people. These radical groups create pages on various social media platforms where they organise and promote themselves. Their membership keeps soaring because they have the ability to convince young people. According to Mughal Sajda (2016) far-right groups such as Pegida's Facebook page has more than 20000 likes whereas Britain First has a whopping two million likes more than the likes of the Facebook pages of the labour and Conservative parties combined.

2.4 Countering online radicalisation by governments and social media organisations

Radicalisation in its online form has infiltrated not only the western world, but the entire world (Thompson, 2011). This means radical materials could be sent to any part of the world with the help of the internet. With the emergence of terrorist groups such as the so-called Islamic State, many young men and women especially from the West have been radicalised via the internet. Some have even joined those terrorist organisations to engage in acts of violence. Others also take instructions from those extremist groups to engage in violence on home soil. According to the investigation done by the Soufan Group (2015), between 27000 and 31000 people have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and other violent extremist groups from at least 86 countries. Majority of the foreign fighters were from the Middle East and the Maghreb with a combined figure of 16240. The rest of the fighters were 5000 western Europeans, 4700 from former Soviet Union countries, 875 from the Balkans, 900 from Southeast Asia and 280 from North America. It is estimated that, most of the foreign fighters from the West to Syria and Iraq are in their youth. In light of this, some European governments in conjunction with some educational institutions as well as social media
organisations have developed strategies to combat radicalisation of the youth. Two of such anti radicalisation strategies are the Aarhus Model of Denmark and the Prevent Duty by the United Kingdom government.

2.5 Aarhus model of Denmark

Volunteers to Syria were returning in large numbers back to Denmark and other European countries and there was the feeling that most of them had been radicalised. This became a major source of worry to the governments in Europe. According to Julian Robinson (2016) of the daily Mail, in 2016, out of the 5000 foreign fighters from Europe who travelled to Syria and Iraq, up to 35% representing 1750 returned. Across Europe, most governments have been cracking down on these returnees which further compounded the issue of radicalisation. However, in the city of Aarhus in Denmark, the authorities are tackling the issue of radicalisation unconventionally. Instead of cracking down on returning Syria volunteers or radicalised young adults, Aarhus has implemented a successful dialogue based anti-radicalisation effort that attracts great attention and interest abroad (Aarhus Kommune, 2015). The efforts to prevent radicalisation have been running since 2007, preparations for dealing with events in Syria started in mid-2013 (Tim Mansel, BBC World Service 2015). According to Preben Bertelsen (2015) the Aarhus Model comprises programmes for both early prevention and exit processes. Preben Bertelsen (2015) further explained that, the prevention programme aims to prevent further violent radicalisation of youngsters who do not yet represent any danger or security risk but may become dangerous if their radicalisation process continue in a violent direction. The exit programme is directed at already radicalised people who have intentions and capabilities of committing politically and or religiously motivated violent crimes and terrorism. According to the Aarhus Kommune (2015), the strategy is to regard radicalisation in the same way as any other crime prevention work that requires general, group related and specific actions. The specialised work in Aarhus consists of the design and execution of coordinated prevention of radicalisation, guidance and counselling on radicalisation, covering the subject of radicalisation in groups or with individuals and handling of individual cases of radicalisation of young people at risk.

Like any other social programme, the Aarhus model is saddled with challenges. Most critics claim the Aarhus model has been a soft approach towards clamping down on radicalisation. In an interview with the mayor of Aarhus, Jacob Bundsgaard by the freedom from fear magazine, on the challenges of the Aarhus model, the mayor discredited that claim and stated that, the Aarhus model is based on two pillars: efforts based on social dialogue and efforts based on police involvement. He further stated that the model is not a get out of jail free card for people who have committed or who are committing crimes. However, Ann-Sophie (2015) stated that the approach has developed by trial and error in tandem with the entire new policy area being developed, practical experiences being made and knowledge
being produced. According to Ann-Sophie (2015), one of the major challenges is that, the Danish approach relies on cooperation and coordination between different sectors, authorities, institutions and individuals as such cooperation can be challenging, not least it is not entirely clear who has the final coordinating responsibility for example, in relation to transition from one system to another, such as prison to another. On the other hand, the researcher identified that not much is being done to tackle online radicalisation with regards to the Arhus model. The model has not stated clearly, measures to educate young people on how to identify radicalised information on the internet and how to handle those information.

2.6 Prevent duty of the United Kingdom

According to the UK Home Office (2011) more than 30% of people convicted for Al Qa’ida associated offences in the United Kingdom between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended university or higher education institution. Another 15% studied or achieved a vocational or further education qualities. About 10% of the sample were students at the time when they were charged or the incident for which they were convicted took place. These statistics roughly correspond to classified data about the educational background of those who have engaged recently in terrorist related activity in the United Kingdom: a significant proportion has attended further or higher education. (UK Home Office, 2011).

It is instructive to note that, following the failed Detroit bombing, Universities UK (UUK)- the main higher education sector umbrella body set up a working group to look at ways to prevent radicalisation on campuses while protecting freedom of speech. In its report published, UUK concluded that higher education sector does need to be vigilant and aware of the challenges posed by extremism. The report focused largely on universities’ legal responsibilities relating to freedom of speech and academic freedom. It made recommendations regarding universities work with charity and higher education regulators and student unions as part of future efforts to tackle extremism (UK Home Office, 2011).

In tackling online radicalisation, the UK government is dealing with the internet as a sector in its own right and the legal framework for doing so (Prevent Strategy, 2011). Henceforth, in 2006, the British government decided to launch a campaign to counter international terrorism dubbed CONTEST, as it has been identified that the internet is a domain where many types of radical views are strongly promoted (UK Home Office, 2006). The CONTEST programme was organised around four work streams: pursue, prevent, protect and prepare (UK Home Office, 2011). However, the document acknowledged that the internet presents significant challenges for CONTEST in general (UK Home Office, 2009), therefore, in March 2009, the document was revised. According to the UK Home Office (2009), the new approach places a premium on working with filtering companies, disrupting the use of the internet for extremist messaging and increasing the use of the internet to promote alternative views to the
radicalised messages that may otherwise be accessed. In 2011, however, the prevent strategy was introduced to replace the CONTEST. The revised strategy sought among others to; limit harmful content in specific sectors or premises (notably schools, public libraries and other public buildings and to ensure that action is taken to try to remove unlawful and harmful content from the internet (Prevent Strategy, UK Home Office, 2011).

The revised strategy also stated that more work was needed, including: the roll-out of filtering product across government departments, agencies and statutory organisations, determining the extent to which effective filtering is in places in schools and public libraries, directing further resources to a police agency, the CTIRU, to take down web sites which breach legal guidelines relating to extremist material inciting hatred or furthering radicalisation, Increasing the number of referrals to the CTIRU’s technical, investigative and international capabilities and Increasing the UK’s international work, both with the US, the EU and EU member states to explore self-regulatory measures to tackle terrorist use of the internet and seek to optimise existing projects and initiatives and prioritising projects to disrupt terrorist and radicalising material and radicalisers working in the United Kingdom. (UK Home Office, 2011).

The measures to counter radicalisation and terrorism on the internet is coordinated by OSCT. The OSCT has engaged with DfE, Regional Broadband Consortia and the filtering software industry to explore effective filtering options across the public space (for example, schools, libraries etc.). DfE and OSCT have also secured the inclusion of language that promotes terrorism and extremism in the filtering technology ‘kitemark’ and it covers commercial filtering software for sale to schools and families (The Prevent Strategy, 2011).

The Prevent strategy has also placed a duty on schools across the United Kingdom to be extra vigilant in identifying students who show signs of extremist tendencies. ...Schools and childcare providers should be aware of the increased risk of online radicalisation, as terrorist organisations such as Islamic State seek to radicalise young people through the use of social media and the internet (The Prevent Duty, 2015). In order to do this, Prevent has emphasised the need for local authority and local police to help provide contextual information to help schools and childcare providers understand the risks in their areas.

The prevent duty also has some challenges just like the Aarhus model. Some critics of Prevent claim the strategy may hinder free speech in schools. Kevin Courtney (2016), asserts to this claim and stated that a strategy to oppose and confront the radicalisation of young people who become prey to nefarious influences will fail to meet that aim if young people feel prevented from expressing views in class. Homa Khaleel (2015), a staff feature writer for the Guardian Newspaper, supports the above assertion and also stated that, in April of 2015, delegates at the National Union of Teachers’ conference of the United Kingdom complained they were being turned into frontline Stormtroopers, who listen, spy and notify the
authorities. Homa Khaleeli (2015) further stated that, in July 2015, 280 academics, lawyers and public figures signed a letter arguing that the new duty would divide communities, clamp down on legitimate dissent and have a chilling effect on freedom of speech. Other critics claim that, the Prevent is targeted at Muslims. Ian Cobain (2016) stated in the Guardian Newspaper that a new study by the Open Society Justice Initiative concluded that the British government’s key counter-radicalisation policy is badly flawed, potentially counterproductive and risks trampling on the basic rights of young Muslims.

2.7 Countering online radicalisation by social media organisations

It has been established that, social media has now become the channel where most radical groups propagate their message to unsuspecting netizens. Facebook, twitter, YouTube and the other social media platforms have been flooded with messages and audio visuals from radical groups to propagate their agenda. This trend has indeed caused a lot of fear and panic to netizens and governments have initiated steps to compel social media networks to be proactive in curbing the menace of terrorists using their networks for terrorists activities. In April 2017, Germany passed a bill to fine social networks up to 50 million Euros if they failed to give users option to report hate speech and fake news, or if they refused to remove illegal content flagged as either images or child sexual abuse or inciting terrorism (BBC News, 23 June 2017). Consequently, Facebook launched an initiative to counter hate speech and terrorism. The initiative include not allowing any organizations that are engaged in terrorist activity or organized criminal activity to have a presence on Facebook (Facebook, 2017).

Facebook also removes content that expresses support for the groups that are involved in the violent or criminal behavior and also supporting or praising leaders of those same organizations, or condoning their violent activities is not allowed on Facebook (Facebook,2017). Facebook is also introducing for the first time image matching. According to Gordon Corera (2017), image matching means that, if someone tries to upload a terrorist photo or video, the systems look to see if this matches previous known extremist content to stop it going up in the first place. This initiative by Facebook is laudable and will indeed go a long way to reduce the menace of radicalisation online. However, the goal is to eradicate the menace of online radicalisation and so the researcher believes that, nothing should be left to chance for the situation to continue to fester. Therefore, the image matching concept introduced by Facebook may be flawed since the system only recognizes the images of previous known terrorists or contents.

Google and YouTube have also introduced four new measures to tackle the spread of terrorist materials online saying it will take tougher stance on videos that contain inflammatory religious or supremacist content (Press Association, 2017). According to twitter (2016), since mid-2015, they have suspended over 12500 accounts for threatening or promoting terrorist acts. By February 2016, 23500 accounts for violating twitter policies related to promotion of
terrorism were all suspended.

A new phenomenon that social media organisations are increasingly exploring in conjunction with research institutions and NGOs in the field of counter radicalisation is counter narrative. To effectively do this, some former violent extremists have been engaged in those projects. One of such projects is the one managed by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in conjunction with jigsaw (formerly Google Ideas) and some former violent extremist and survivors of extremism. The objective of the project was to create, curate and bring light to the effectiveness of ‘online counter-narratives’ (Silvermann, 2017). According to Silverman et al., the findings from the project demonstrated that each social media platform provides different strength and weaknesses for disseminating advertised content to particular audiences across the radicalisation spectrum from downstream to upstream. They noted that, facebook produced the greatest reach, videos views and engagement for each campaign. Youtube provided the lowest cost-to-ratio and the highest rates of viewer retention. Twitter provided the second largest number of video views across platforms as well as the highest engagement-to-impressions ratio. Individuals such as Abdullah-X who was a former extremist and linked to jailed Islamic cleric Abu Hamza, has created counter narrative in the form of cartoons aimed at preventing young British muslims from joining jihadist groups abroad. According to Abdullah-X, he hoped the cartoons would dissuade young Muslims from getting involved in foreign jihads, as well as dispelling some of the ‘myths’ and ‘prejudices’ non-muslims may have about Islam (Simpson Jack, Independent Uk, 2014).

2.8 Future plans to counter radicalisation by social media organisations

Following complaints from users that facebook and other social media networks are not doing enough to counter online radicalisation, Facebook will in the future use artificial intelligence to remove inappropriate content (Frenkel Sheera, New York Times, 2017). One of the first applications for the technology is identifying content that clearly violates Facebook’s terms of use, such as photos and videos of beheadings or other gruesome images, and stopping users from uploading them to the site. The artificial intelligence system according to Facebook would, over time, teach itself to identify key phrases that were previously flagged for being used to bolster a known terrorist group (Frenkel Sheera, New York Times, 2017).
3 Research methodology
This section gives an account of the methods used to collect data about the research in order to obtain answers to the study. The topics concern include: sources of data, sample size, sampling techniques, research instruments, field work, response rates and limitations of the study.

3.1 Sources of data
The sources of data were primary and secondary sources. The primary data sources were collected from the student respondents and IT policies of ten universities across the world whilst the secondary sources were collected from related publications such as journals, newsletters, published works as well as the internet.

3.2 Sample size
I targeted ten universities across the world and analysed their IT policies.

Table 3 Breakdown of the ten universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of University</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above mentioned higher educational institutions were chosen due to the fact that information needed to be analysed were readily available on the websites of those schools. It could be observed from the table that, schools located in the regions of Africa, Asia and Australia were not captured in this research. This is because information needed by the researcher could not be found on their websites to be analysed. It could be observed from table 3 above that only two universities from Finland were chosen. This is because of factors such as time constraints, proximity to the two universities was close and limited financial resources. Also, the higher educational institutions including the Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland, provide the internet infrastructure to students to help them with their studies. I also included students of the various Universities of Applied Sciences with the view that, they are the users of the IT infrastructure and persons exposed to online radicalisation.

3.3 Sampling techniques
I visited the premises of some selected Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland to get the information needed for the research work from the students. I randomly selected students from the schools I visited. I presented students with choices of filling or rejecting the questionnaires presented to them. Henceforth, no student was coerced to fill the
questionnaires. On the otherhand, the ten universities were carefully selected using google search engine. The following key words were used: IT policies of American universities, IT policies of universities in the United Kingdom, IT policies of universities in the Netherlands and IT policies of universities in Sweden and Finland.

3.4 Research instrument
Based on the purpose of this study, the tools of data collection I employed was mainly questionnaires. The questionnaires were designed using both opened and closed ended questions. Only one set of questionnaires was designed, that is for the student respondents. The questionnaires for the students sought to obtain data on the demographic characteristics of the students. The other parts of the questionnaire sought data from students on their familiarity with the IT guidelines of the schools, internet accessibility, their exposure to radical materials, the role of the internet in radicalising the youth online, whether they have come into contact with radicalised contents online and whether the government should empower the Universities of Applied Sciences to monitor their activities when using their schools’ internet resources. I also undertook observations of students accessing the internet in the IT laboratory of the schools contacted.

However, I studied and analysed the IT policies of various universities across the world. The study of the IT policies of the universities covered; provision and use of the internet resources of the schools, privacy to the use of the internet resources, monitoring of the authorized users’ activities, misuse of internet resources and investigations and sanctions to the misuse of the internet resources. The research objectives guided the choice of the topics for the analysis.

3.5 Field work
The fieldwork was done from April to May, 2017. The administration of the questionnaire, studying and analysing the IT policies of the universities and the processing of observation were undertaken by the researcher in a well-coordinated manner. This was done to ensure that, the right respondents were contacted. The personal contact with the respondents helped them to accurately answer all questions, especially on the questionnaires. This was because, the researcher gave explanations to the various aspects of the questionnaire that otherwise would have been misinterpreted and wrongly answered by the respondents.

In addition, the field work techniques used by the researcher, to a large extent, facilitated the timely return of the administered questionnaires for processing. Admittedly, the student respondents were free and eager to provide information.
3.6 Rate of response
The researcher achieved a hundred (100%) percent rate for the student respondents surveyed as a result of the fact that all the students surveyed provided the researcher with the relevant data needed for the study. Out of the 40 questionnaires administered to the students, all were returned promptly.

3.7 Limitations of the study
Much as I sought to achieve the highest score in obtaining, analysing and presenting an accurate work, various factors served as challenges to the research. However, the I took steps to counter these challenges. Some of the challenges are as follows:

Time constraints in administering the questionnaires was a challenge. The students could be available to respond to the questionnaires only when the schools were in session. This challenge delayed the completion of this work.

Restrictions regarding responses from the IT departments of the various Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland. The IT departments of the Universities of Applied Sciences, I contacted refused to grant me audience to be interviewed. They refused claiming, the information needed from them for the research goes against their privacy policies. They believed that the information needed would have security implications for the institutions. Upon recommendation by my supervisor, I had to resort to studying and analyzing the IT policies of ten universities across the world which included two Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland.
4 Presentation and analysis of data

This section presents the analysis and discussion of the views of students and the IT policies of some Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland and the rest of the universities across the world contacted on the role of the Universities if Applied Sciences in combating radicalisation. Basically, the technique adopted for this presentation is descriptive in which some of the analysis are presented in either tabular form with absolute figures and relative percentages or pie charts, histogram and bar charts. Data collected from student respondents were analysed and presented first, followed by data analysed from the information provided about the IT policies of some universities across the world.

4.1 Data collected and analysed from student respondents

The questions asked student respondents bothered on socio-demographic variables of students. Some of the demographic variables were introduced to elicit the background of the students. Others had a bearing on the study thus to agree with what some scholars are saying about young people and online radicalisation. Other questions asked students bothered on students’ knowledge of the IT guidelines of their schools, online radicalisation and their notion of the role of the internet in online radicalisation of students. Below are the details of the analysis of data collected and analysed from student respondents.

**Gender of students**

The information below in figure 1 serves as a background information to the study. However, it will help to analyse in detail subsequent data acquired. As presented in figure 1, 75% of the respondents were female whereas 25% of the respondents were male. These figures clearly show that females dominate the males as confirmed by the population of female against the population of men in the various Universities of Applied Sciences surveyed.

![Figure 1: Gender of students](image-url)
**Age of students**

In table 4 below, 75% of the respondents were below the age of 25, whiles 25% of the respondents were in the bracket of 25-34. This clearly indicate that, most of the students in the various Universities of Applied Sciences are in their youth. Indeed, this age bracket of below 25 and 25-34 could be susceptible to online radicalisation. They could be susceptible to online radicalisation because they are active on the internet. As suggested by Jacob Poushter (2017) of the Pew Research Center that figures obtained from the survey from 14 countries across the world indicate that an average of 87% of age demography of people using social media are between the ages of 18 and 34. Due to students’ activeness on the internet, radical groups take advantage of that to post and send radical messages online. The latter information is aligned with the assertion by Mughal Sajda (2016) that far right extremist groups are using the internet to recruit younger generation of members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Age of student respondents

**Nationality of students**

The data below in table 5 collected sought to gain insight into the background of the student respondents to appreciate the cultural diversity of students attending the various Universities of Applied Sciences. Therefore it has no direct bearing on the research topic being studied. Table 5 shows that, Finnish students dominated the various Universities of Applied Sciences contacted with 70%. Other nationalities represented 30% of the student respondents which included Vietnamese, Russians, Belgians, British, Israeli, Fillipinos and French students. These figures above imply that Finnish students form majority in the various Universities of Applied Sciences contacted. Another implication is that, even though majority of the students were Finns, there is diversity as regards the nationality of students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Nationality of student respondents
Accessibility of school’s internet resources

Figure 2 depicts the question asked about whether students of Universities of Applied Sciences access their school’s internet for studies and a whopping 100% of the student respondents stated that they use their school’s internet for studies. This figure clearly confirms my observation of always filled capacity of students in the IT laboratory of the various Universities of Applied Sciences contacted. My observation of students using the internet resources also revealed that, most of the students were on social media platforms. It goes to say that students are making use of the internet in the various Universities of Applied Sciences which aligns with the earlier statement made by some scholars that students in the age bracket of below 25 to 34 years are active on the internet. It also means that students are most likely to come into contact with radical materials since radical groups use the internet as a bait to radicalise and recruit young people.

![Accessibility of school’s internet resources](image)

Figure 2: Accessibility of school’s internet resources

Familiarity with schools’ IT guidelines

Regarding whether students were familiar with their schools’ IT guidelines, 22.5% said yes whereas 72.5% said no and then 5% said they were not sure. This clearly indicates that majority of the students were not familiar with the IT guidelines of their schools. This is indicative of the fact that, the IT guidelines of the various Universities of Applied Sciences contacted have not been duly explained to students. It is instructive to note that, the IT guidelines of the schools may contain instructions as to the rights and responsibilities of students when accessing the internet resources of the schools. This instructions may include what to do when students come across radicalised materials or information that may be deemed offensive. Henceforth, the figures above raises serious questions about the role of those in charge to ensure that students get acquainted with the IT guidelines of their schools.
Students’ exposure to radicalised materials online.

As depicted in table 6 below, respondents were asked whether they think students are exposed to radicalised materials on the internet, 67.5% responded that indeed students are exposed whereas 32.5% said no. The figures above agree with the assertion made by Stevens and Neumann (2009) that “[...] through the internet, potential recruits can gain access to visually powerful video and imagery which appear to substantiate the extremists’ political claims”. Radical groups use social media which has a large following of young people including students to send messages in order to radicalise and recruit them. These messages are well crafted and published on the social media pages of those radical groups and shared by anyone who believes in their ideology. In fact the British House of Commons Defense Committee (2015) stated in their report that, the Islamic State have proved themselves adept in the use of social media, sending 9000 messages a day. This figure is huge and has the propensity of reaching students who are constantly on the internet and social media platforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Students’ exposure to radicalised materials online

Students’ reasons why the youth become radicalised

Respondents gave varied responses when they were asked why they think the youth become radicalised online. It is instructive to note that students are not experts on radicalisation hence their views do not represent the views of experts on radicalisation. Below are some of the reasons given:

Young minds are more prone to radicalised information online. This is true due to the lack of direction by some of the youth from society. When they lack direction in the society, they resort to the internet for guidance and when they come into contact with radical materials, they believe in them and gradually become radicalised. The above reason is also in close
connection with the reason given by another student respondent that, because some of the youth have no proper upbringing and are in search of identity.

Some of the students pointed out that it is very easy to access radicalised information online. This reason aligns with the report given by the British House of Commons Defense Committee that 9000 messages are posted on social media each day by the so-called Islamic State. This makes it easy for students to gain access to radicalised materials online.

Other students claimed it is easier to say and do things when one is behind a screen and no one sees what they are doing. The above point buttress another reason given by a student respondent that, radicalised people can gather on the internet because they can discuss their views without the fear of obstruction and arrest. The anonymity that the internet provides makes it easy for young people to become radicalised online. Mostly, radical individuals use fake names to engage unsuspecting young people on the internet ostensibly to radicalise and recruit them. They send friend requests using fake names and sometimes hack into the accounts of young people to send radical messages to users’ peers. Belinda Grant of the Daily Mail Australia reported in 2015 that a mother has claimed her 13-year-old was targeted by the Islamic State recruiters online. The mother claimed her son had received messages from the radical group and thus she forwarded the message to the Australian police.

One reason raised by one of the student respondents indicate that the youth are more active on the internet. Various research have proved that, the youth are more active on the internet. To buttress this point, Baroness Shields was quoted in the report by the British House of Commons (2016) that, the younger generation are more technologically literate than their parents and teachers. The British Minister of Internet Safety and Security further noted that, the younger generation are susceptible to online influences because they are almost constantly connected to the digital world. What this means is that, due to the constant presence of the youth online, they can be radicalised online easily.

One of the students raised an interesting point that a lot of those information online are geared towards brainwashing the youth. This is true because, the aim of a any radical or extremist group is to brainwash, radicalise and eventually recruit new members especially young people. Thus the internet facilitates the spread of those radical information towards brainwashing young people.

**Facilitation of the internet in online radicalisation**

As depicted in figure 4 below, 85% indicated that, the internet plays a significant role in facilitating the radicalisation of young people whiles 15% said the internet has no place in
radicalising the youth. These are the views of students and do not represent the views of experts on radicalisation. The figures above clearly aligns with the assertion made by Stevens and Neumann (2009) that, the internet can be used by extremists to illustrate and reinforce ideological messages and or narratives: through the internet, potential recruits can gain access to visually powerful video and imagery which appear to substantiate the extremists’ political claims. The figures above confirm the response given by 67.5 respondents that students are exposed to radical materials online eventhough the margin of 85% of respondents who think the internet facilitates online radicalisation is quite significant. One would have thought that the figures for the responses of the facilitation of the internet in radicalisation would be be at par with that of students exposure to radical maerials online. Nevertheless, both figures point to the fact that, the internet has a place in the radicalisation process.

![Figure 4: Facilitation of the internet in online radication](image)

**Respondents contact with radicalised materials online**

Respondents were asked if they have ever come into contact with radicalised materials from any radical groups, 25% said yes whiles 75% said no. This is shown in table 7 below. Analysing the above figures further, I sought to find out about the gender of those who said they have come into contact with radical materials online. It came to light that,seven out of the ten respondents representing 70% were male and three representing 30% were female. What this means is that, more young men are targeted to be radicalised online than young women. Indeed the RAN Corporation (2015) estimated that out of the 5000 young people who travelled to Syria and Iraq from the European Union, 4,450 were young men. Eventhough a minority of the respondents said they have come into contact with radical materials online I believe the figure is quite huge. This is because, respondents coming into contact with radical messages may be subjective. The messages may not be direct to the respondents but may be radical information and videos shared by individuals on social media and in the process respondents may have come into contact with those images. However, one could also argue that, the messages may have been sent to the respondents directly confirming the estimation
given by the British House of Commons that 9000 radical messages are posted on social media everyday.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Respondents contact with radicalised materials

When those respondents who said they had come across radicalised materials online were asked what action they took after being contacted, below are some of the responses they gave.

Some of the students indicated that they ignored the message. Ignoring the message is the easiest one could do. However, the message if sent as a private mail will stay there for a long time without any effective action taken by the appropriate authorities.

Others reported the video to Facebook. This is an effective measure taken by the respondent. This is because, Facebook and other social media platforms have policies against extremism narratives that seek to encourage violence thus encourage users to report such information for action to be taken. The social media organisations continue to explore the possibilities of making their platforms safe for users.

A number of them said they deleted the video from their inbox. On the individual level, this action may be effective. However, there is the likelihood that the same message was sent to a large number of young people. Henceforth, the appropriate action should have been reporting to the social media organisation to take action.

One of the respondents said she replied to the email with a warning to report to the police. This is not an effective action taken by the respondent. Replying to the email with a warning to report to the police is not enough to counter online radicalisation. The respondent should have reported to the police directly for action to be taken. Having done that, the action to be taken by the police would not be effective if they do not collaborate with the social media organisation in question.

Empowerment of UAS by government

From all indications as demonstrated in figure 5, a whopping 88% of the respondents do not want the government to pass a law to empower the Universities of Applied Sciences to monitor their activities whiles a paltry 12% said yes. The figures above clearly mean that
majority of the students cherish their privacy and would feel uneasy being monitored when using their schools’ internet.

Figure 5: Empowerment of UAS by government

4.2 Data collected and analysed from universities

Ten universities were selected across the world and their IT policies were analysed. The analysis of the IT policies of these universities bothered on the provision and use of internet infrastructure for students by the universities, privacy to the use of internet infrastructure of the universities, monitoring of the authorized users’ activities, misuse of internet resources by students and investigations and sanctions. As explained in the methodology, the universities were randomly chosen using google search engine. The universities that have the relevant information regarding the IT policies were chosen. The objectives of the study served as a guide in formulating the topics for analysis. For instance the topic of monitoring of authorised users’ activities was formulated from the objective of investigating whether Universities of Applied Sciences monitor the use of IT infrastructure provided to students. It is instructive to note that, the purpose of the universities’ IT policies are not necessarily to counter radicalisation. One point that runs through the purpose of establishing IT policies by the universities is to protect the electronic devices and information from unauthorised users. Some of the universities also stated that, the aim of establishing IT policies is to avoid cyber crime thereby making the cyber environment of their universities safe.

Provision and use of internet infrastructure for students

I found out from the IT policies of the universities regarding the provision and the use of internet that, all the universities provide internet connectivity to the students and staff. The
internet resources of the various universities are shared and available to all students, faculty and staff purposely for educational, research and other academic and administrative activities. The above information aligns with the assertion made by Bhatti (2013) that, the internet has played a significant role to spread education and updating information. A university in the United Kingdom stated that, they provide computing facilities in the university to enhance the teaching, learning and research activities of the university.

The information I gathered also revealed that, the universities have varying categorisation of authorised users. Students and staff of the universities per the contract of employment and contract of the right to study have exclusive access to the IT facilities of the universities. Persons who are not students or staff do not have access to use of the IT facilities of the universities. They can only access the IT facilities especially the desktop computers, by securing a permission from the IT manager. However, all the universities have wifi internet access for guests. It was also established from the information gathered that, the universities have the user guidelines detailing the rules and regulations governing the use of computer systems which includes the internet. The universities assign user accounts to students and faculty members to enable them have access to the IT infrastructure of the schools. Per the information gathered, the student body, faculty members and staff of the universities are solely responsible for protecting their user account. And the universities require that, personal devices of students, faculty and staff must conform to the individual university’s IT policies regarding data accessibility, storage and transfer.

Monitoring of the authorized users’ activities

Monitoring means, gaining access at all times to what authorized users are doing when accessing the universities’ IT facilities. Monitoring could be done by the use of Closed Circuit Television to scan the environment to monitor the activities of users of the IT facilities. It could also be done by gaining access into the accounts of users. Information regarding the monitoring of activities of students revealed that, the universities do not monitor the authorized users of the schools’ IT infrastructure. This is because the universities respect the privacy of users. This is in alignment with the response given by majority of the students of the Universities of Applied Sciences that, they do not want to be monitored by their universities when using the IT facilities. However, the universities have systems that back up data for purposes of troubleshooting of personal accounts of the authorized users. Specifically universities in the Americas and the United Kingdom stated that, they have systems where information is recorded in logs. The saved information can be read or copied due to the exclusive right the universities have to examine files that may be considered harmful to other users and the computer devices of the universities. Analyzing this in detail, the I am of the view that, it is a step in the right direction for the universities not to monitor the activities of
students and staff. This is because it may create some uneasiness for them and may not create the enabling cyber environment to use the IT resources of the schools fully if monitored.

**Misuse of internet facilities**

I found out from the IT policies of the universities regarding the misuse of internet resources of the schools that, the universities grant authorized users privileges and responsibilities regarding their user accounts. In universities in North America, these privileges and responsibilities are not to be used to violate any university policy or city, state or federal laws or regulations. Misuse of internet resources intended to cause harm or perform illegal activities to the schools’ systems are strictly prohibited. Illegal cyber activities as captured in the information from the universities in Northern America include the email spam, sending inciting messages to other students, disabling of systems and programmes, causing harm to data of others and the university and watching or posting pornographic materials. From the above, one could conclude that, the IT policies of the universities are not directly geared towards tackling online radicalisation.

**Sanctions for the misuse of the IT facilities**

With regards to sanctions for the misuse of the IT facilities, the universities strictly sanction those found violating the IT policies of the schools. When issues of violations are reported or noticed, the universities launch investigations into those purported violations to establish the facts and appropriate disciplinary actions handed to the culprits. However, information on the type of sanctions meted out to violaters was not available on the websites of the universities.
Discussions

The internet has become an indispensable element in the delivery of knowledge to students. Students in universities depend mostly on the internet to enhance their learning experience. For that reason, the universities provide students with unlimited access for academic purposes. Other studies have emphasized the importance of the internet to the lives of students in higher institutions. A study by Bhatti (2013) concluded that, internet has radical impact on the changing higher education institution. The impact, as stated by Bhatti, could be positive if students explore the internet according to the school’s IT guidelines and use it effectively to gain success. On the other hand, the impact could be negative, if students explore the internet in an undesirable manner leading to the student being radicalised online. Because students make use of the internet daily and radical groups also send messages online daily targeting young people especially students, it was pivotal to gain knowledge on what the universities were doing to counter online radicalisation.

From the survey, I found out that, most of the students were between the ages of below 18 and 34 years. This age group according to some studies are active on the internet which invariably make them vulnerable to radical messages. Young people especially students become susceptible to radical materials because the internet facilitates the spread of those messages. Precht (2008) gave an account of a study of 242 European jihadists from 2001-2006, on the effects of the internet on radicalisation, found that there is a correlation between websites and propaganda on the internet and rapid radicalisation. This information agrees with the survey I conducted that 85% of the students believe that the internet plays a significant role in facilitating the radicalisation of young people. In addition, the survey pointed that, 67.5% of the respondents believe students are exposed to radical materials online. There are varying reasons why young people become radicalised online. The reasons why young people become radicalised online may be similar to being radicalised offline. This assertion is buttressed by Yardi and Boyd (2010) who stated that group polarization is a phenomenon both in real world and online contexts. Studies have not pointed a specific pathway that lead to young people being radicalised online. According to the survey I conducted, student respondents gave varying reasons why young people would become radicalised. Some believe that, young people can gather on the internet because they can discuss their views without the fear of obstruction and arrest. Others believe that, young minds are prone to radicalised information online buttressing the earlier point made that students are susceptible to online radicalisation. As a result, it is easy to access radicalised materials online.

It has come to light that, young people especially students, are exposed to radicalised materials online. This is because of their huge presence online for various reasons including academic and social purposes. How young people become radicalised online was the next
question that this study sought to answer. From the information I received from student respondents, a key element that demonstrates how young people become radicalised online is the anonymity of the internet. This information aligns with the assertion made by Schmidle (2009), that the internet affords people greater anonymity. This means that young people can access anonymous information without being noticed. This is so especially in the so called Islamic Jihadism, where women are not allowed to mix with men. Henceforth, the internet affords them the opportunity to meet with radical groups usually men to express their radical views. Radical groups have taken advantage of the anonymity of the internet to craft appealing propaganda messages, both audio and audiovisuals to attract young people. A study by Fernandez (2015) suggested that, the major elements of what would become the Islamic State brand propaganda, including a focus on Syria high quality production values, an emphasis on social media networks and an appeal to a wider, pan-Islamic and non Arabic speaking audience, all become salient. Through those messages and videos, they project a very good image of their course to young people with the aid of the internet. This messages and videos go a long way to radicalise young people.

The next question that the study sought to answer was what governments, universities and social media organisations are doing to combat online radicalisation. From the study, I discovered that, 88% of student respondents did not want the government to empower universities to monitor their activities when using the internet resources of the schools. The IT policies of the universities point to the fact that they do not monitor the activities of their students using the internet resources. However, the universities have put in place mechanisms to back up data for purposes of troubleshooting of personal accounts of authorized users. In my opinion, this invariably could be one way to get ample evidence if needed for investigation into online radicalisation of students. I identified two anti radicalisation strategies by the governments of Denmark and United Kingdom dubbed the Aarhus model and Prevent strategy respectively. The Arhus model focuses on early prevention and exit processes. The challenge with the Aarhus model are the lack of focus on online radicalisation. There is no information regarding how the Aarhus model is tackling online radicalisation. The Prevent strategy however places a duty on schools in the United Kingdom to be extra vigilant in identifying students who show signs of extremist tendencies (The Prevent Duty, 2015). The prevent strategy creates an atmosphere of collaboration between schools, local authorities and local police. This could be interpreted as schools making sure the anti radicalisation laws of the state or the country are strictly adhered to by students when using the internet resources. This assertion confirms my analysis of the IT policies of some universities in North America that, the responsibilities of students in using the internet resources are not to be used to violate state or federal laws.
My analysis of the IT policies of the universities revealed that, the policies were not designed to tackle online radicalisation. This revelation may in part agree with the conclusion by the Universities United Kingdom that higher education sector in the United Kingdom does not need to be vigilant and aware of the challenges posed by extremism. The UUK argued that it will be a challenge to manage controversial speakers who spread hate speeches on campus. However, the conclusion of the Universities UK does not mean universities in the UK are not doing anything to tackle the issue of radicalisation. Individual universities in the UK are tackling the issue of radicalisation differently according to their individual policies.
6 Conclusions and recommendations

The internet accelerates the process of radicalisation due to its wide coverage. Therefore, if young people do not get access to the internet, it would be impossible to radicalise them online.

As stated earlier, extremist groups are facilitating radicalisation by sending numerous radical messages online targeting young people including students. This development has become a source of worry to some governments across the world, and they have put adequate strategies to counter online radicalisation. The study gave a vivid account of governmental efforts of some countries towards countering online radicalisation- the Aarhus model and the Prevent duty. Further, since social media platforms are mostly used as channels of communication by radical groups, various social media organisations have devised strategies to counter online radicalisation. Among those strategies is counter narrative which is a collaboration between former extremists and social media organisations to provide counter narratives in an effort to dissuade young people from becoming radicalised.

It came to light that, some of the universities do not have direct strategies to counter online radicalisation. Some of the universities depend on counter online radicalisation strategies of the countries to guide them in fighting the menace per the IT policies analysed. Other universities especially in the United Kingdom believe that higher education institutions do not have to be vigilant about the threat posed by extremists thus the government is solely responsible for combating the menace.

It is obvious that, there is no single pathway regarding why young people become radicalised online or offline. However, a key element mentioned by student respondents was the anonymity of the internet. This means that, young people could engage in acts of radicalisation without being noticed by the authorities.

Future studies

In the course of undertaking this work, some pertinent issues came up for future studies.
1. Why are some radical people not engaging in violence? In the course of this study I found out that there were radical individuals who never resorted violence to push forward their agenda. However, why they do not engage in violence to remains a dilemma worth studying.
2. Further studies into the reasons why people become radicalised online? Most scholars have attributed why people become radicalised online to offline factors. Offline factors may hold true for online factors. However, further investigations into why
people become radicalised online would be in the right direction to countering online radicalisation.

In view of the analysis and discussions of this study, the following recommendations were made.

Majority of the students were not aware of the IT guidelines of their various schools. Thus I recommend that the Universities of Applied Sciences must endeavor to increase the awareness of their IT guidelines. They should make it readily available during orientation of fresh students and also create a pop up information on the log-in screens of all the computers in the schools to serve as a reminder to students.

Students must be sensitized about the huge amount of radicalised materials online. Universities of Applied Sciences must hold frequent symposiums with experts on radicalisation invited to give talks to students on online radicalisation. This would create awareness of the dangers of the exposure of radicalised materials online to students.

It was realized from the study that, the universities do not have a clear cut policy to counter the menace of online radicalisation. It is incumbent however, that the Universities of Applied Sciences in Finland must draw up a clear strategy to tackle the problem of online radicalisation.

The Universities of Applied Sciences must also collaborate with social media organizations to train staff of the IT departments to spot and respond to hate speeches in their bid to combat online radicalisation on campus.

Students must also be taught how to deal with radicalised materials anytime they pop up on their screens when accessing the internet.
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Appendix : Questionnaire

The Role of University of Applied Sciences in Combating Online Radicalisation.
This survey is to collect information on the above mentioned topic. I humbly request your assistance to complete this questionnaire. The information to be collected is strictly for academic and research purposes only. Hence, all information gathered by this survey will be kept confidentially.

Your participation in this survey is of paramount importance in countering online radicalisation leading to violent extremism in schools.

Questionnaire for students

What is your gender?
O Male
O Female

Your age range?
O Below 25
O 25-34
O 35-44
O 45-54

What is your nationality?
.................................................................

Which stage are you with regards to your studies?
O 1st year
O 2nd year
O 3rd year
O 4th year

Do you access your school’s internet for your studies?
O Yes
O No
If No, state your reasons?............................................................

Are you familiar with your school’s IT guidelines?
O Yes
Do you think students are exposed to radicalised materials on the internet?
O Yes
O No

In your view why do you think the youth become radicalised online?


Do you think the internet place a significant role in online radicalisation of the youth?
O Yes
O No

Have you or any of your colleagues ever come in contact with radicalised materials from any radicalised groups when using your school’s internet facility?
O Yes
O No
If Yes, what action did you take?


Should the government pass a law to empower University of Applied Sciences to monitor the activities of students using the school’s IT infrastructure?
O Yes
O No