Hybrid Threats to Power Grid: A Case Study on Vulnerabilities in the Power Grid
Fagerlund, Konsta (2025)
2025
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Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:amk-2025121837945
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:amk-2025121837945
Tiivistelmä
The thesis was carried out as part of the Laurea R-GRID project, which aims to develop an artificial intelligence–based simulator for modelling hybrid and military attacks on energy networks. The purpose of the study was to identify the most significant vulnerabilities in the electricity grid from the perspective of hybrid influence and to examine how early warning signals of hybrid operations could be detected by power grid organizations.
The study adopted a qualitative case study design using three complementary methods, literature analysis, field observation at seven substations in Finland, and a semi-structured expert interview. Data triangulation was used to strengthen the validity and reliability of findings. The study was framed by the European hybrid threat framework and ISO 31000 risk management principles.
The results show that the most critical vulnerabilities exist in the intersection of physical, cyber and organizational domains. Key findings include inconsistent physical security controls, weak network segmentation between IT and OT systems and insufficient monitoring capabilities. Human factors and insider risks were identified as the main vulnerabilities. The study also confirmed that long replacement lead times for high-voltage transformers and other critical nodes extend recovery time after major incidents.
The conclusions highlight that hybrid threats exploit organizational and technological seams. Therefore, an integrated risk management, standardized physical protection, improved detection across domains and enhanced collaboration between operators and authorities are essential for resilience. The results can be directly utilized within the R-GRID project to refine simulator scenarios and to guide energy companies in prioritizing security measures and risk management.
The study adopted a qualitative case study design using three complementary methods, literature analysis, field observation at seven substations in Finland, and a semi-structured expert interview. Data triangulation was used to strengthen the validity and reliability of findings. The study was framed by the European hybrid threat framework and ISO 31000 risk management principles.
The results show that the most critical vulnerabilities exist in the intersection of physical, cyber and organizational domains. Key findings include inconsistent physical security controls, weak network segmentation between IT and OT systems and insufficient monitoring capabilities. Human factors and insider risks were identified as the main vulnerabilities. The study also confirmed that long replacement lead times for high-voltage transformers and other critical nodes extend recovery time after major incidents.
The conclusions highlight that hybrid threats exploit organizational and technological seams. Therefore, an integrated risk management, standardized physical protection, improved detection across domains and enhanced collaboration between operators and authorities are essential for resilience. The results can be directly utilized within the R-GRID project to refine simulator scenarios and to guide energy companies in prioritizing security measures and risk management.