Intercepted Phone Calls at the Russo-Ukrainian War: Cyberoperation or Propaganda Campaign?
Tikkanen, Raimo (2024)
Tikkanen, Raimo
2024
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Julkaisun pysyvä osoite on
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:amk-2024050810026
https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:amk-2024050810026
Tiivistelmä
Russo-Ukrainian war started in 2014 and escalated on 24.2.2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine. At the moment, the war is still ongoing. The war was fought on multiple fronts, information domain included. The Ukrainian military intelligence, GUR started to publish alleged intercepted cell phone calls between Russian personnel at 28.10.2022 and this activity did deviate greatly from normal publishing activity of official actor of such branch. From this viewpoint it was imperative to research this anomaly as a sample of information warfare conducted by other parties than Russia.
The anomaly was so interesting that it had to be researched from two different viewpoints, Cyber and information. Firstly, the content was allegedly obtained from intercepting and eavesdropping the mobile network communication. It was important to find out if this could have done technically and if Ukrainian national actor had been able to conduct such operation. Secondly, from the viewpoint of information, research was made to examine the content to find out if it was actually propaganda and what was the purpose of this alleged propaganda.
The study was implemented by using qualitative and quantitative methods, and by collecting a dataset of all published tweets between 28.10.2022-1.9.2023. The samples were quantified and analyzed using both statistical and qualitative methods.
It was found that the content was highly likely obtained with the means of cyber operation that was focused on eavesdropping and intercepting communication. The content itself was not found to be propaganda, but it was used as such. It was utilized in publishing operation that was highly organized. The operation itself was considered to support or to undermine both Russian and Ukrainian narrative from the viewpoint of strategic communication.
The anomaly was so interesting that it had to be researched from two different viewpoints, Cyber and information. Firstly, the content was allegedly obtained from intercepting and eavesdropping the mobile network communication. It was important to find out if this could have done technically and if Ukrainian national actor had been able to conduct such operation. Secondly, from the viewpoint of information, research was made to examine the content to find out if it was actually propaganda and what was the purpose of this alleged propaganda.
The study was implemented by using qualitative and quantitative methods, and by collecting a dataset of all published tweets between 28.10.2022-1.9.2023. The samples were quantified and analyzed using both statistical and qualitative methods.
It was found that the content was highly likely obtained with the means of cyber operation that was focused on eavesdropping and intercepting communication. The content itself was not found to be propaganda, but it was used as such. It was utilized in publishing operation that was highly organized. The operation itself was considered to support or to undermine both Russian and Ukrainian narrative from the viewpoint of strategic communication.